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Abstract
Since the 1960s democratic member based organizations (DMOs) have formed 
the back bone of the Norwegian environmental movement (NEM). A series of 
recent developments, however, have challenged both their dominant position and 
their need for popular support, prompting an investigation into the relation 
between the NEM DMOs and ‘the people’. 
This thesis approaches the problematic by investigating how the relation between 
the DMOs and ‘the people’ is understood from the perspective of informants 
working within three NEM DMOs: Norges naturvernforbund, Fremtiden i våre 
hender, and Folkeaksjonen for et oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja. Through 
an analysis of semi-structured interviews from 12 informants I will examine 
three aspects of this relation, the DMOs’ movement connections, their collective 
identity and the impact negative public stereotypes have on their operation. 
Based on these analyses I will argue that the Norwegian DMOs are inclusive 
organizations with a low level of collective identity, who are afraid of alienating 
the public by appearing too radical. Despite having relatively few supporters, the 
DMOs draw on the culturally specific image of folkebevegelse (popular 
movement) when presenting their organizations. The DMOs focus on low-level 
and short-term activism, lest a more intensive approach will alienate people, who 
are viewed as busy, but well-willing. They actively take measures to combat 
common stereotypes associated with their organizations. Sometimes this  takes 
the form of policy changes, other times it is to hide their more radical positions 
by presenting their own identity and their message as  moderate. As  such the 
DMOs are engaging in a process of frame negotiation where they adjust their 
identity and their agenda to fit a more moderate image.
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Chapter 1: The People and the Environment
1.1 Cause for an Investigation
Norwegian environmentalism as an organized effort can be traced back to 1914 
and the founding of Landsforeningen for Naturfredning i Norge, the precursor of 
Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV). Long an elitist phenomenon, with few 
members  and low social stratification, it championed a narrow field of issues 
centered on conservation efforts and outdoor recreation. During the 1960s this 
began to change. Internal democratic structures were developed, membership 
numbers rose, and mobilization efforts grew in importance (Bortne et al. 2002: 
15). Environmentalism started to get more politicized and populist in orientation, 
and new organizations such as Natur og Ungdom (NU), NNV’s independent 
youth division, and Samarbeidsgruppe for natur- og miljøvern (snm) were 
formed.1 By 1970, and Mardøla-aksjonen, one could talk about a breakthrough 
for a proper Norwegian environmental movement (NEM). This organized 
protest, utilizing civil disobedience in an attempt to stop the damming of two 
waterfalls, marked the first alliance between local people and organized 
environmentalists (Gundersen 1996: 55). The ensuing golden age of Norwegian 
environmentalism (1970-75) saw a continued growth in public interest, as well as 
the foundation of alternative organizations like Framtiden i våre hender (FIVH) 
in 1973, who sought to mobilize the masses through the creation of a new 
lifestyle centered on solidarity and low consumption. The period as a whole was 
characterized by rising membership, increasing internal democratization and a 
continued interest in popular engagement and mobilization (Bortne et al. 2002: 
16). 
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1 Though unusual ‘(snm)’ is the normal abbreviated form.
Since the 1970s democratic member-based organizations (DMOs), like NNV, NU 
and later also FIVH,2 have continued to play an important role in the Norwegian 
environmental movement. Several developments since the golden age, however, 
can be seen to have challenged their dominant position and complicated the 
relation, which will be the thematic focus  of this  thesis, between these 
organizations and what we broadly might refer to as ‘the people’.
First, starting in the 1980s, a general trend within Scandinavian civil society has 
seen it become more professionalized and less member-based (Wijkström and 
Zimmer 2011: 17). Within NEM this can be seen, on the one hand, in the rise of 
new types of organizations without a member-based democracy (Østerud et al. 
2003: 147). These include non-democratic NGOs, like Bellona and Greenpeace; 
research centers, such as Cicero, Zero, and SUM; as  well as umbrella 
organizations, like Broen til Framtiden, Klimaalliansen and Forum for Utvikling 
og Miljø. The trend can also be seen within DMOs, where active members  play a 
smaller part in favor of the rise of professional staff and secretariat (Gundersen 
1996: 77). The result is what Bortne et al. calls: “An environmental field that to 
an increasing degree is  project run [prosjektstyrt], research based and more elitist 
in character […]” (Bortne et al. 2002: 157). 
Second, membership levels  among Norwegian environmental DMOs have had 
several spikes and falls  since the 1970s, but have remained well below the level 
of the same sector in neighboring Sweden and Denmark. After reaching a nadir 
of 17.500 members at the turn of the millennium, NNV’s current membership 
stands at 21.212 (NNV 2015b), about half of what it was  at its peak around 1990 
(Bortne et al. 2002: 126-7). NNV has only recently been surpassed by FIVH, 
who in terms of members is Norway’s largest environmental DMO with 24.884 
members. In comparison, the Swedish Naturskyddsföreningen (2015), according 
4
2 For FIVH’s development from movement to organization see chapters 4.2 and 5.2.
to their own numbers, counts 221.000 members, while the Danish 
Naturfredningsforening (2015) has 125.000.
Third, the forms of engagement and the roles of activists have changed. In the 
digital age social movements  have access to a new set of tools such as  e-mail, 
message boards, online petitions and social media, for recruitment, 
communication and activism (Pickerill 2001). Internationally, new actors like 
avaaz.org and 350.org have gathered millions in support of their environmental 
and climate campaigns organized online. In Norway FIVH (2013) has been 
prominent in online organizing, through campaigns such as ‘Evert the clothing 
companies’ (Vreng kleskjedene) where they ask for signatures and encourage 
people to confront companies  on social media. Not only do these new tools 
change the role of active participants in these organizations, they also blur the 
line between active and passive supporters, because these campaigns “[…] create 
the impression of widespread social concern and thus  of a large social movement 
even while ordinary supporters  of the proposed change have to do remarkably 
little.” (Yearley 2005: 12).
Fourth, through its activity NEM has succeeded in institutionalizing several of its 
policies through both laws and institutions, and its  rhetoric has been adopted 
across the political spectrum (Jørgensen 1997: 75). However, their increased 
prominence and influence has, according to Bortne et al. (2002), led to NEM 
being trapped by its own success. When environmentalism has  become an 
integrated political area, taken care of by the state, the need for public 
engagement has faded (Bortne et al. 2002: 152). 
Fifth, trust in both NEM and the environmental organizations has been high and 
rising. In 1995, 59,1% of a representative selection of the Norwegian public had 
‘very great’ or ‘great’ trust (tillit) in the environmental organizations (Strømsnes 
2001: 489). According to the World Values  Survey, trust (tiltro) in NEM among 
the Norwegian public has increased from 63% in 1996 to 72% in 2007 (Listhaug 
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2008). This stands  in contrast to how environmentalists  are perceived elsewhere. 
Not only are trust levels considerably lower in other OECD countries  such as the 
US, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands (World Values Survey 2015), but 
research on stereotypes conducted with Canadian and US participants has shown 
that environmentalist are perceived as eccentric and militant (Bashir et al. 2013). 
In contrast, Norwegian environmentalists have been shown to harbor similar 
values as the majority of the population (Grendstad et al. 2006: 83). 
Finally, a continuing rise in consumption levels challenges the view that people 
are willing or able to adhere to the goals  of the movement. According to the most 
recent numbers from Statistics  Norway, waste levels are now at a record level 
(Skjerpen and Vinju 2015). In addition, since 1958 Norwegian consumption 
levels, measured by household expenditures adjusted for inflation, have more 
than tripled (Strand and Thorsen 2013). Both trends can be seen as signs of a 
public disengaged from central aims of the movement. 
Taken together these developments  warrant an investigation into the present 
relationship between the environmental DMOs and ‘the people’. What 
importance does public support and member participation have for the 
democratic member-based organizations in NEM today? What roles do they see 
themselves as occupying in relation to ‘the people’? In a time where the rise of 
non-democratic foundations  means  it is no longer obvious that a large member 
base necessarily translates  into political influence (Østerud et al. 2003: 146), how 
do the DMOs understand their relation to ‘the people’? 
These questions grow in importance if we consider both the pressing concern of 
the issues the movement claims humanity is  faced with, and the need, in 
democratic societies, for public support to solve them. The Norwegian 
environmental movement has  championed a whole range of causes  spanning 
from deep-ecological ideas about positive human–environment relations to 
critiques of issues such as resource depletion, species eradication, ecosystem and 
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landscape destruction, excessive consumption, and global warming. These causes 
haven’t merely been vacuous intellectual pursuits. They have been accompanied 
by a clear rhetoric, often emphasizing calls  for dramatic societal and individual 
changes, and paired with an insistence on ‘the need to act now!’. Ultimately, the 
movement relies on public support through activism, mobilization and protests in 
order to effectuate these changes (Rootes 2003: 2). A perennial difficulty appears 
at this  juncture because in order to achieve their goals, then, the environmental 
movement must in many cases balance their critique of ‘the people’ with their 
need for support from the same ‘people’. Adding to the problem is that such a 
critique, while alienating some, might be essential in order to mobilize core 
activists  (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102-3). In her study of FIVH, Hansen 
(2007: 71) describes a similar tension between the need for a shared core of 
stringent beliefs and practices which gathers the participants around a cause, and 
the openness required to gather as many supporters  as possible. This is a question 
of identity as much as  it is about strategy. Do the Norwegian environmental 
DMOs handle this tension by adopting an inclusive identity to gain popular 
support, an exclusionary identity prioritizing core activists, or do they attempt to 
appeal to both? 
1.2 Research Question
So far I have established the relation between the environmental DMOs and ‘the 
people’ as a problem field. As such it can be approached and studied in a wide 
variety of manners. What I want to focus on is how this  relation is understood 
from the perspective of informants working within these DMOs. Opting for this 
approach is done, first, because grasping how the informants understand and 
make meaning out of their context is interesting in itself. More importantly, 
however, is  that such an approach could yield ‘expert knowledge’ from those 
who through their daily work have the most intimate knowledge of the problem 
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field. In addition, the way this relation is understood within the organizations 
contributes to the interpretative processes that shapes the organizations’ strategy. 
Focusing on the DMOs understanding, then, can reveal the interplay between 
understanding and choice of strategy. Further, by following this path I will be 
moving into an area that has been given comparatively little attention within they 
study of NEM.3
My main research question is  formulated as follows: How do the Norwegian 
environmental DMOs understand the relation between their own organization 
and ‘the people’? Before I describe how the question will be answered I will 
clarify what I mean by each of the three central terms  here employed: 
‘environmental DMOs’, ‘understanding’, and ‘the people’. 
Environmental DMOs
Extrapolating on Spear’s  definition of DMOs as organizations that “[…] serve a 
membership and give that membership democratic rights  of governance 
[…]” (2004: 33), an environmental DMO’s  singular additional feature is  that it 
operates within the environmental sector. These organizations distinguish 
themselves from umbrella organizations by having people (and not other 
organizations) as members; and from non-democratic member-based 
organization by giving their members the right to have an influence in the 
governing of the organization through participation and voting rights. Their 
democratic features thus pertain to their internal democracy. 
The complicated part of this definition, concerns the meaning of ‘environmental’ 
in the special case of Norwegian environmentalism. Even though modern 
environmentalism is  an international phenomenon, Grendstad et al. has  argued 
that the Norwegian variant is a unique case defined by two anomalies, which, put 
together, separate it from the rest. The anomaly relevant for our present purpose 
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3 See chapter 2.
pertains to the political system where adversarial actors are included and 
welcomed by the state in what is referred to as a state-friendly society (2006: 
2-3).4 The state’s inclusive role also gives it a key position in determining who is 
included in and excluded from ‘the Norwegian environmental 
field’ (miljøvernfeltet) (Bortne et al. 2002: 80). The Ministry of Climate and 
Environment,5  who through its selective funding practice is a central arbiter of 
both status and legitimacy, divides this field into four categories  (see Table 1): 
environmental organizations, umbrella organizations, children and youth 
organizations, and environmental foundations (Klima- og Miljødepartementet 
2014).
Environmental 
organizations (DMOs)
Umbrella 
organizations
Children and 
youth orgs.
Foundations
Environ-
mental 
movement
- Framtiden i våre hender
- Norges miljøvernforbund
- Norges naturvernforbund
- Folkeaksjonen oljefritt 
Lofoten, Vesterålen og 
Senja
- Sabima
- Grønn Hverdag 
(now defunct)
- Regnskogs-
fondet
- Natur og 
Ungdom
- Miljøagentene
- Idébanken
- Miljøstiftelsen 
Bellona
- WWF Norge
- Zero
Cultural 
conservation
- Forbundet Kysten
- Fortidsminneforeningen 
- Kulturvern-
forbundet
- Norsk 
Kulturarv
Outdoor 
recreation
- Den Norske 
Turistforening
- Norges Jeger- og 
Fiskerforbund
Notable omissions from this list of funding recipients are organizations who 
work within the fields of animal protection (dyrevern), such as NOAH and 
Table 1 shows the Ministry of Climate and Environment’s list of funding recipients 
which categorizes the environmental organizations into four categories. The distinction 
between environmental, cultural and recreational organizations in this list is my own. 
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4  The second anomaly is ideological, referred to as the local community  perspective, 
and centers the focus of Norwegian environmental to the protection of man in nature. 
Both will be given further treatment in chapter 2. 
5 Up until 2014 The Ministry of Climate and Environment was known as The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (Miljøverndepartementet).
Greenpeace, and organic food production, such as Oikos. The exclusion of these 
fields from environmentalism is not particular to the Ministry. Whereas  organic 
food production is  seen as part of the agricultural sector, the opinion that animal 
protection is not environmentalism is shared by the ‘proper’ environmental 
organizations (Bortne et al. 2002: 89). Another peculiarity of the Ministry list is 
the inclusion of several cultural conservation and outdoor recreation 
organizations whose operation is only tangentially related to environmentalism 
proper. In their classification, Grendstad et al. excludes the most prominent of 
these organizations, Den Norske Turistforening, from the group of core 
environmental organizations.6  Their reasoning, partially based on input from 
environmental organization leaders, was that this organization did not have 
environmentalism as its prime task (Grendstad et al. 2006: 49). If we, by the 
same token, remove the other culture and outdoors organizations from the 
Ministry list, what we are left with is  an outline of the organizations  usually 
associated with ‘the Norwegian environmental movement’ (miljøbevegelsen); 
organizations whose prime concern is the environment.7
Save for the exception of Natur og Ungdom, the environmental DMOs are all 
located within the Ministry’s  environmental organization category. In this way 
the environmental DMOs are not identical to, but form a central part of both ‘the 
Norwegian environmental field’ (miljøvernfeltet) as well as  the narrower 
‘Norwegian environmental movement’ (miljøbevegelsen). They are Framtiden i 
våre hender (FIVH), Natur og Ungdom (NU), Norges miljøvernforbund (NMV), 
Norges naturvernforbund (NNV), and Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen 
og Senja (FOLVS).
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6 Since the list provided by Grendstad et al. of the core organization within Norwegian 
environmentalism is not recent (and thus both lacks recent additions, and includes 
organizations now defunct) I have not taken that list as a starting point.
7  Missing is only Greenpeace (which in addition to its animal protection activity 
commonly is included as a part of the environmental movement on the count of its other 
environmental activity), and several umbrella organizations, such as Broen til 
Framtiden, and Klimaalliansen.
Understanding
The main interest of this thesis is the way environmental DMOs understand the 
people. Since organizations  aren't subjects capable of understanding in the 
conventional sense, a specification of what is meant by ‘understanding’ is 
needed. In this  thesis I will use the term ‘understanding’ as  a broad cover term 
for a series of related cognitive phenomena. By way of illustration, working 
within environmental organizations are staff, activists, organizational leaders and 
elected board members. Through cooperating, in a shared environment, and 
working for the same goals  they develop certain shared assumptions, beliefs, 
knowledge, frames, in short, a shared understanding of their own organization, 
their work and their context. As Dahlberg et al. says: “Only through interaction 
with others is meaning established for objects […]” (2008: 149). My interest is in 
these shared understandings inherent in the organizations. Described as such the 
term shows similarities to several other concepts used to describe shared 
cognitive phenomena within social movement studies, namely frames, discourse, 
cognitive praxis, and ideology. These terms are notoriously fickle and subject to 
differing interpretations  (Polletta and Ho 2006: 3), but they all refer to different 
aspects of the broad phenomenon of understanding. Whereas ideology and 
discourse are concepts that refer to overarching systems of beliefs tacitly present 
or passively encroaching on groups or individuals, the terms  frame and cognitive 
praxis  rely more on agency and denote how organizations actively and explicitly 
shape how states or events are understood (Yearley 2005: 14-5, Polletta and Ho 
2006: 3-4). What they all have in common is that they describe cognitive 
elements that are shared within groups, and that both constrain and enable the 
interpretation of the world (Dryzek 2005: 9). Instead of limiting the investigation 
to a specific aspect of the understanding I will approach the topic in a heuristic 
manner. I will not commit to a theoretical language, beyond the broad cover term 
understanding.
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It is important to distinguish, however, between three different ways these 
understandings manifest themselves, each representing a source for empirical 
data. The first way is  through normal quotidian praxis, the manifest 
understanding is here implicitly present in the behavior and actions of groups or 
individuals  as they engage with their tasks. Second, understandings can also be 
manifest through what I term non-official presentation. This  refers to how those 
working within an organization present who they are and how they work, in a 
relatively spontaneous fashion. The last way an organization’s understanding 
manifests itself is through the act of official presentation. The understanding is in 
this  case presented in a deliberative manner through the organizations’ official 
documents, speeches, and statements. Whereas an ethnographic study aiming for 
a thick description primarily would focus on the first two, a discourse study 
would normally limit itself to the level of official presentation (Dryzek 2005: 
75-6). These levels of manifestation should have overarching similarities, but 
they could also be very distinct, e.g., there might be discrepancies between how 
an organization claims to be working and how their actual praxis unfolds. What 
they have in common is that all have the potential of revealing different aspects 
of how environmental DMOs understand their relation to ‘the people’, and a 
complete study of this topic would have to include all three levels. This thesis, 
however, will mainly be based on non-official presentations, and will only to a 
limited extent make use of official documents, and then in a supplementary 
capacity. 
My focus will be on how central staff and leadership talk about the situation of 
their own organization. This does not mean I am interested in these informants’ 
private experiences. I am interested in their views in so far as  they are 
knowledgeable operatives that play an important part in shaping the workings of 
their organization. As Tarrow notes: “[…] movement leadership has  a creative 
function in selecting forms of collective action that people will respond to. 
Leaders invent, adapt, and combine various forms of contention to gain support 
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from people who might otherwise stay at home.” (2011: 29). Through this work 
the chosen informants have an intimate understanding of the problematic of this 
thesis: the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’. Furthermore, through 
working in the same environment with the same challenges, their understanding 
is  in many cases  shared. Through analyzing both the implicit and explicit levels 
of the understanding manifest in the informants’ interview statements I will try to 
reveal how certain phenomena are understood within their organizations. This 
approach enables us to illuminate issues which the official documents do not 
touch upon, and it could also open up in-depth discussions  which perhaps show 
less degree of coherence and polish.
The people
Whereas the extension of ‘environmental DMOs’ has been properly defined 
above, I want to hold ‘the people’ as a term, open for a broad area of 
interpretation. The aim of the investigation is to try to capture how the relation 
between the DMOs and ‘the people’ is understood. Since this  also includes 
capturing how the informants understand ‘the people’, as such, it makes  little 
sense to limit the application of the term at the outset of the investigation. 
Dahlberg et al. claim that: “Openness in lifeworld research means  entering the 
world of a person and leaving behind any structures  that would shape one’s 
expectation for what will be found.” (2008: 112). This  is  correct up to a point, but 
any investigation has to be led by some kind of pre-understanding of what one is 
looking for, in this case ‘the people’. As Heidegger says: “Every investigation is 
guided beforehand by what is  sought.” (2006: 5). In this  way positive terms like 
‘the public’, ‘supporters’, ‘volunteers’, ‘active members’ and ‘passive members’, 
are all included in our pre-understanding of ‘the people’ just as  much as more 
negatively charged notions like ‘suspicious skeptics’, ‘lazy apathetics’, and 
‘disengaged clicktivists’. The only group excluded from ‘the people’ is the 
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informants themselves, who all, save two highly involved volunteers, belong to 
the central level of their organizations. 
An important caveat at this junction: The aim of this thesis is not to provide a full 
categorical schemata of the various ways the DMOs designate the people. It will 
not be limited to how ‘the people’ is understood as something else, say a member 
or supporter. First, because, as Offe notes, within movements and grassroots 
organizations these designations are often fuzzy and in dispute: 
[…] the concept of the ‘base’ or the ‘people’ remains operationally fuzzy and 
the constant object of disputes, which is exactly what happens when quasi-
empirical collectivities such as ‘all those affected’, all mankind, all members of 
specific ethnic, racial, age, or gender category are used as referents in the 
names of which political action is staged. (Offe 1990: 237)
Second, the aim of the thesis  is  to look at the relation between the DMOs and the 
people. Thus, of far more important is  the description of how these terms are 
contextualized by the informants. 
1.3 Methodological Considerations
When the meaning of the question now has become clearer I will briefly give a 
methodological characterization of the thesis. First of all, the thesis is 
exploratory, in the sense described by Stebbins (2008: 325). As such it will be 
based on the collection of open-ended data from semi-structured interviews of 
informants working within the DMOs. The analysis will also be based on the 
concepts and topics emerging from the interview material. The thesis sets out to 
explore the informants’ understanding, not to confirm previous  theories on the 
subject. Second, the investigation is interpretive. It seeks to interpret the 
informants’ understanding with a focus on the way they give meaning to the 
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activities and operation of the organizations they work in. Third, the thesis  is 
descriptive. It will be limited to describing how the relation between the DMOs 
and the people is  understood; it will not attempt to construct a theory explaining 
why the relation is understood in a certain way. 
Fourth, the thesis could also be called comparative, but in a weak sense. The 
comparative nature of the study does not mean that a systematic point-by-point 
comparative analysis  is the aim. I am interested both in the sector as a whole and 
in the understanding involved in the individual organizations. Of the five 
organizations that fall under the above sketched category of environmental 
DMOs in Norway I have chosen to focus on the following three: Norges 
Naturvernforbund, Framtiden i våre hender, and Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, 
Vesterålen og Senja. This enables  me both to cover the Norwegian environmental 
DMOs as a whole while at the same time giving enough room to analyze each 
organization more thoroughly. By focusing on three DMOs I will use comparison 
as an instrument to bring out interesting aspects  concerning the sector as a whole. 
By ‘pooling’ the participants in one general notion of NEM, however, I could 
risk losing valuable differences distinguishing the DMOs. Separating the DMOs 
in the analyses  would instead allow me to draw comparisons when this  serves to 
add nuances to the interpretations. The selection of these three organizations, and 
the exclusion of the last two, NU and NMV, were done on the basis of the 
following considerations. NNV and FIVH were selected due to their size and 
prominence within the field, being the two largest environmental DMOs. As for 
the third organization, the choice of FOLVS was done first because it provides 
several contrast points. Whereas the concerns of NU and NMV show great 
similarity in scope with NNV in particular, FOLVS focus on one single issue sets 
it apart from both NNV and FIVH. Selecting FOLVS also meant that the three 
different organizations all stem from a separate era. Second, I already had 
contacts  within the organization, which would greatly facilitate the interview 
process. Third, and most importantly, FOLVS fashion themselves  as a 
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folkeaksjon (people’s action), a somewhat anachronistic move that harkens back 
to the popular mobilizations of the 1970s. That the organization in its very name 
thematized the relation between them and the people made it especially relevant 
for this thesis. In addition to having something in common, all three being 
environmental DMOs with a presence across the country, the organizations are 
sufficiently different in both their history and their operation to provide the 
opportunity both for comparing the differences between them as well as looking 
at their overarching similarities. 
1.4 Outline of Structure
The relation between the Norwegian environmental DMOs and ‘the people’ is 
not a new topic of study. In chapter 2 I will look at two main attempts at 
describing this relation. A study by Dryzek et al. (2003) has evaluated NEM after 
the ‘social movement theory’ (SMT) definition of a ‘social movement’. A group 
of researchers (which I refer to as the Bergen Group8) have through a series of 
books and articles also evaluated NEM based on the Norwegian term 
folkebevegelse (popular movement) (Bortne et al. 2002, Grendstad et al. 2006). I 
will argue that since neither of these definitions were found to fit the case of 
NEM, it is an open question as to how the DMOs’ relation to the people should 
be described. In this  chapter I will also look at how the theoretical concepts of 
collective identity and framing can shed light on the relation in question. I will 
claim that the literature on the Norwegian case has  omitted focusing on the role 
identity plays within single organizations, how organizational identities  relates to 
its context, and how identities are employed strategically. In chapter 3, I will 
describe the choice of method and situate the investigation within a qualitative 
methodology. This  will involve describing the selection of informants, the 
interview sessions, the considerations of the analysis process, and the credibility 
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8 See chapter 2.2.
of the analysis. Chapter 4 will provide an introduction to the three organizations, 
focused mainly on their history and development as well as their organizational 
structure. This introduction will serve as  an initial contextualization for the 
following three analysis chapters.
In chapter 5, I will pose the question of how the DMO-informants understand 
participation in their own organizations. This will involve looking at local group 
influence and popular mobilization in NNV; democracy, networks and identity in 
FIVH; and local adherence and popular support in FOLVS. I will argue that the 
informants not only draw on the image of folkebevegelse when they describe 
their own organizations, they emphasize the importance of grassroots 
involvement, and describe an aspiration for becoming folkebevegelser. In chapter 
6 I will ask what role the informants see their own organizations as playing in 
relation to the people. I will look at the voice-provider role of NNV, the educator-
mobilizer role of FIVH, and the facilitator role of FOLVS. I will argue that all 
these roles share the similarity of assisting activism. As such they also indicate 
the inclusive identity of the DMOs. In chapter 7 I will look at the stereotypes the 
informants perceive the public to have of their organizations. I will describe the 
stereotypes of negativism in the case of NNV, moralism in the case of FIVH, and 
elitism in the case of FOLVS. I will argue that the way the DMOs distance 
themselves from these stereotypes while at the same time attempting to hold on 
to a more radical agenda, is indicative of a process of frame negotiation, where 
the DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda to fit a more moderate image.
Through the analysis  of these three topics  we will arrive at a fairly 
comprehensive view of how the informants  understand their organization’s 
relation to ‘the people’. This will be summarized in chapter 8, where I attempt to 
connect the findings of the analysis with the questions posed in the literary 
review. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The Norwegian environmental DMOs form part of two distinct, but related, 
political phenomena. On the one hand they are described, and often self-identify, 
as belonging to the environmental movement. As such the DMOs fall under the 
domain of ‘social movement theory’ (SMT), a diverse theoretical body that aims 
to give a full account of the broad social movement phenomena. With a few 
exceptions, such as Løken (1999), this perspective has largely been lacking in the 
study of Norwegian environmentalism, and in the study of Norwegian civil 
society in general (Seippel 2003: 181, Andreassen 2006: 147). Especially 
apposite to my purposes are the two central SMT concepts of ‘framing’ and 
‘collective identity’, which both will be detailed below. On the other hand the 
DMOs can also be seen as a part of regular institutionalized interest politics. 
Operating within Norwegian corporatist society these organizations have been 
drawn into a close relationship with the state. In this  regard the DMOs have been 
extensively studied by Norwegian political scientists  as  an interest group or as a 
folkebevegelse (people’s  movement). The foremost example of this tradition is 
the considerable empirical work done by the Rokkan Center in Bergen 
(henceforth the Bergen Group), which I will draw on extensively. The 
overarching task of this literary review, however, is not to provide a systematic 
survey of these two fields, but to focus on a subset of issues related to our 
problematic, employing perspectives from both traditions. In chapter 2.1 I will 
describe and lay out the differences between the SMT tradition’s concept of 
‘social movement’ and the Norwegian term ‘folkebevegelse’, which both can be 
seen as describing the relation between the DMOs and the people. Building on 
this  differentiation, in chapter 2.2, I will examine two studies of Norwegian 
environmentalism. Both conclude that it falls  short of being a movement, 
prompting the question of how environmental DMOs should be assessed. In 
chapter 2.3 I will look at collective identity theories and how they describe the 
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relation between organizations  and individuals. I will put emphasis on the 
difference between inclusive and exclusive identities; the way institutionalization 
affects movement identity; and how a dearth of focus on the way identity plays 
within the DMOs paves the way for asking how identities are employed 
strategically within NEM. In chapter 2.4 I will look at framing theory. It offers a 
coherent terminology for describing a central sense-making aspect of social 
movement praxis, specifically on how collective identities are shaped. Then, in 
chapter 2.5 I will summarize the state of research on the relation between the 
NEM DMOs and ‘the people’.
2.1 Social Movement or Folkebevegelse?
Social movement theory is a broad field encompassing several different 
theoretical approaches  (e.g. resource mobilization theory, political process/
opportunity theory, framing theory, new social movement theory, collective 
identity theory), while spanning disciplines (e.g. sociology, political science, 
social psychology, organizational theory), objects of study (e.g. environmental 
movement, environmentalism, environmental organizations), and methodologies 
(e.g. constructivism, objectivism) (Hjelmar 1996, Tarrow 2011). In the 1980s a 
distinction was commonly made between the Anglo-American resource 
mobilization (RM) paradigm and the predominantly European focus on new 
social movements (NSM) (Hannigan 1985, Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 23). The 
former, emphasizing the role of social movement organizations (SMOs), 
attempted to provide a broad theoretical framework for the understanding of all 
social movements (McCarthy and Zald 2009). Whereas earlier collective 
behavior theories had viewed movements as spontaneous, often irrational, 
reactions to structural problems, within RM theory movements were studied as a 
rational and organized phenomenon (Hannigan 1985: 436, Eyerman and Jamison 
1991: 11). Their aim was to understand how rational actors employ resources 
(such as funding, contacts, or popular support) to obtain their political goals 
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(Seippel 2003: 187). The RM approach has primarily been criticized on two 
counts by NSM theories. First, constructivist perspectives (such as  framing 
theory and collective identity theory, the latter associated with NSM) criticized 
the RM assumption that the grievances causing movement action were a stable 
feature of society. Instead these theories proposed that both interests and 
grievances  have to be interpreted as  such in order to motivate collective action, 
and that these interpretations are actively created and shaped by the movements 
themselves (Snow et al. 1986: 465, Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283-4).9  Second, 
NSM theories sought to describe the contextual and historical nature of 
movements, both aspects which RM theory had neglected. According to NSM 
theories, the rise of new social formations, variously dubbed ‘post-industrial’, 
‘network’ or ‘information’ society, after WWII also saw a withering away of 
structural and cultural restraints. The new movements that started to arise in the 
1960s (the environmental, civil rights, feminist, LGBT, and peace movements) 
took advantage of this  void to fashion new collective identities and new political 
goals (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 23, Polletta and Jasper 2001: 286, Seippel 
2003: 188). In contradistinction to the old labor movements, the new movements 
were not based on class conflict. Support came primarily from the educated 
middle classes, and participation was based on altruistic values, a focus on 
collective goods and the good life, and often centered on identity issues  (Brulle 
2000: 94). The NSM perspectives have also received criticism, mainly for being 
ill-defined, for exaggerating the difference between new and old movements, and 
for lacking an empirical base for their theoretical claims (Dalton 1994: 9, Brulle 
2000: 94-5). 
Since the 1990s, several attempts have been made, by e.g. Dalton (1994: 10), 
Della Porta and Diani (2006), and Tarrow (2011: 29-30), to fuse elements from 
both traditions, and the field is now characterized by a general trend towards 
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9  Collective identity and framing theory  will be further examined in sub-chapters 2.3 
and 2.4 respectively. 
synthesis  (Seippel 2003: 189, Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 30). Even though 
SMT is a broad field, Diani’s definition of a social movement forms  an apt 
starting point as  it lays out three features central to how the SMT literature 
understands social movements. For Diani, social movements  “[…] are involved 
in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense 
informal networks; share a distinct identity.” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20).10 
By fighting against perceived unjust conditions or structures, social movements 
enter into both cultural and political conflicts with established elites. They arise 
outside the confines of the state and institutionalized power structures, with 
which they have a conflictual relationship (Andreassen 2006: 148).11  Though 
movement organizations have a central role to play in movements, “[n]o single 
organized actor, no matter how powerful, can claim to represent a movement as  a 
whole.” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 21). A movement is instead conceived of as 
a wider phenomenon, a network of informal bonds between both individuals and 
organizations. Such networks can be built on preexisting linkages and 
connections between people, or they could be created by the movements 
themselves (Tarrow 2011: 132). What holds these bonds together is the 
movement’s collective identity. This identity goes beyond single events and 
pertains to groups and individuals  who regard themselves as part of a larger 
collective. It involves a common purpose and a shared understanding of the 
struggle of the movement, as well as a demarcation of who is a part of the 
movement and who is opposed to it (Melucci 1996: 75, Della Porta and Diani 
2006: 94). 
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10  These three components are echoed in Tarrow’s definition of social movements as 
“[…] sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on 
resonant collective action frames, and the capacity  to maintain sustained challenges 
against powerful opponents.” (Tarrow 2011: 7).
11 One exception is McCarthy and Zald (2009), the founders of RM theory, who define 
social movements as “[…] a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents 
preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward 
distribution of a society [...]” (McCarthy and Zald 2009: 196). This definition is neutral 
as to the level of conflict. 
Folkebevegelse
As stated above, in the literature on the Norwegian environmental movement, 
SMT perspectives have been lacking. Instead movements have been approached 
through the term folkebevegelse (people’s  movement), which has similar, but 
somewhat different connotations. It is a broad term, alluding to Norwegian 
history while emphasizing a broad popular appeal spanning different interest and 
social strata. The term is most commonly associated with the peasant, labor, 
sobriety, layman, sport and nynorsk movements that started to gain political clout 
in the 19th century (Østerud et al. 2003: 143). It can be both political and non-
political in application. The Norwegian Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) was often 
referred to as a folkebevegelse, especially in its early history (Keul and 
Kjeldstadli 1973), and the term is also applied to ‘organized sports’ (idrett) 
(Kulturdepartementet 1992). A central account and definition of the term is to be 
found in Makt- og demokratiutredningen (Power and Democracy Governmental 
Report), by Østerud et al. (2003). For them there is an added conflict dimension, 
defining folkebevegelser as “[…] organizations that want to greatly change 
society instead of just serving the interests of its own members, and which often 
represents  an ideology that creates conflict.” (Ibid.: 141). According to 
Andreassen (2006), the report puts special emphasis  on two features. 
Organizationally, a folkebevegelse is a broad member organization with a 
hierarchically structured local and central level. In terms of orientation, it works 
towards aims benefitting the society as a whole, not only its members 
(Andreassen 2006: 158-60). Østerud et al. (2003) contrasts folkebevegelser with 
‘here and now’ (‘her og nå’) organizations. The latter represent a newer 
organizational type which relies on the persuasive power of lobby and media 
savvy individuals, rather than popular support, to obtain political goals. These 
organizations have the swift satisfaction of their members’ needs as their 
rationale, and they are described as having weak or no ideological anchorage 
(Østerud et al. 2003: 142-6). 
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Andreassen describes  four major differences between the SMT and the 
Norwegian conception of movements (2006: 160-7): First, whereas for Østerud 
et al. folkebevegelser are associated with organizations, the SMT tradition 
focuses on networks  of individuals and organizations. Second, while the term 
folkebevegelse emphasizes both broad and large popular support, SMT theory, on 
the other hand, requires neither in order to qualify as a movement (Ibid.: 160-4). 
Small and non-democratic organizations, such as Bellona, could easily fit within 
a social movement by the SMT definition, while they, on the count of their 
organizational structure and size, would not be considered a folkebevegelse. 
Third, Andreassen points out, instead of distinguishing between organizations 
that are directed either toward serving member interests or society, SMT stresses 
the connection between participation and identity (Ibid.: 160-1). To this point it 
should be added that within SMT the process of collective identity formation is 
seen as one where individual interests are identified with collective interests 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102). But, given that SMT doesn’t require a 
movement to be broad, the collective interests of a social movement are not 
necessarily the same as  the societal interest of a broad and large folkebevegelse. 
This means that within SMT the collective identity of movements is often, 
though not always, portrayed as radical or in opposition to large swathes of the 
population as well as the dominant power structures  (Tarrow 2011: 6). This  leads 
us  to the fourth difference: Whereas both traditions stress the conflict aspect of 
movements, they do so in different ways (Andreassen 2006: 165). Even though 
Østerud et al. highlight the conflict dimension, they describe folkebevegelser as 
having established a very close working relation with the state (Østerud et al. 
2003: 144). The SMT tradition, on the other hand, connects the process of 
increased interaction with the state with a loss of movement characteristics  and 
identity (Andreassen 2006: 165). 
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2.2 Norwegian Environmentalism and the State
Turning the focus  to Norwegian environmentalism, I will in the following focus 
on two approaches, one by Dryzek et al. (2003) and another by the Bergen Group 
detailed in Bortne et al. (2002), and Grendstad et al. (2006). Whereas the former 
employs a definition of movements closer to the SMT tradition, the Bergen 
Group (whose work also appears in Makt- og demokratiutredningen) draws on 
the notion of folkebevegelser. Both, however, seek to understand Norwegian 
environmentalism as a special case because of its close relation to the state. 
The Dryzek study
The Dryzek study sorts  the modern states  after two formal criteria yielding four 
different ideal state variants. First, they distinguish between inclusive and 
exclusive states, where the latter type restricts representation or denies access  to 
certain political actors. The inclusive state is more open to a broad set of interests 
and movements. It is also characterized by corporatism, a tripartite arrangement 
where policy is decided through agreements between labor unions, business 
federations and the executive branch of government. The second distinction is 
between active and passive states. While the former actively intervenes to control 
and affect both the content and the power of interest groups  or movements, the 
latter does little or nothing to heighten or lower the standing of specific groups. 
Norway, with the sole exception of Mexico, is grouped alone in the actively 
inclusive state category (Dryzek et al. 2003: 6-8). For Dryzek et al. Norway is 
unusual because its  corporatist inclusive structure also extends to groups outside 
of business and labor. In this  assessment they follow Rokkan, whose dictum, 
‘votes count, resources  decide’, refers to how groups  with low parliamentary 
support (votes) can achieve influence through corporatist channels (resources) 
(Asdal 2011: 29). But they also add that through the increased power of the 
Norwegian parliament (Stortinget) since the 1990s, environmental DMOs have 
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also been provided a greater opportunity for lobbying directly (Dryzek et al. 
2003: 26-7).
This intimate state context has several consequences for Norwegian 
environmentalism, according to the Dryzek study. First, it means that it is 
difficult to start a social movement because the state gets  there first by funding 
and supporting, thus institutionalizing, activists (Ibid.: 8). Second, when 
environmental DMOs receive government funding, and committee participation 
and lobbying form the basis of their operation, it enables these groups to neglect 
their membership (Ibid.: 100). Third, the closed door committee negotiations 
leave ordinary members  with little influence, and mobilization efforts also suffer 
from a public perception that sees  no need for action due to Norway's perceived 
status  as an environmental pioneer (Ibid.: 24). With these factors in mind the 
Dryzek study concludes that: “Nowhere in this sweep of Norwegian history can 
we find much that looks like a new social movement, the anti-dam protests 
notwithstanding.” (Ibid.: 27). According to Dryzek et al. a social movement is 
“[…] an association or set of associations  organized around a common interest 
that seeks  to influence collective outcomes without obtaining authoritative 
offices of government.” (Ibid.: 2). Key in this definition is  that social movements 
are understood in direct opposition to the state. By this criterion, Dryzek et al. 
exclude the Norwegian DMOs from the social movement phenomena and instead 
place them as  “[…] arms of the state […]” (Ibid.: 3). In a later assessment of the 
Norwegian case Dryzek concludes: “One hazard accompanying the inclusion of 
greens and environmentalists in corporatist government is  [the] depletion of the 
public sphere, as former activists  are attracted into government, and accept 
moderation […] as the price to be paid.” (Dryzek 2005: 236). According to 
Dryzek, then, in the Norwegian case, there never was an environmental 
movement at all, instead environmentalism has been coopted and fully 
institutionalized, to the detriment of the public sphere. 
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The Bergen Group
The most extensive study of the Norwegian environmental field has  been done 
through a series of books and articles  by a group of researchers (Øystein Bortne, 
Gunnar Grendstad, Per Selle and Kristin Strømsnes) connected to the Rokkan 
Center (previously the LOS center) at the University of Bergen (see especially: 
Bortne et al. 2002, Grendstad et al. 2006). They agree with the Dryzek study, 
both on the assertion that country specific structural factors are central when 
charting the development of environmentalism, and in the study's  description of 
the Norwegian case as unique based on the state's  inclusion of adversarial actors 
and interests (Grendstad et al. 2006: 27). That notwithstanding, the Bergen Group 
finds the Dryzek study significantly wanting. They claim it misunderstands the 
relation between the state and civil society in Norway. The state, according to the 
Bergen Group, is  neither as  dominant nor as suffocating as Dryzek et al. hold 
(Ibid.: 12-3). Relying on the concept of folkebevegelse, they point out that the 
Norwegian state has been structured by the struggle of mass  movements and 
voluntary organizations for representation and power, giving people's movements 
a prominent, mythical place in Norwegian consciousness (Bortne et al. 2002: 20). 
This translates both into an intimate set of formal and informal links between 
movements and the state, but also, on the count of these links, a high degree of 
trust in the state. For movements and other civil society actors, then, state 
cooperation yields not only influence and funding, but also public legitimacy 
(Ibid.: 56). The state is  seen as the solution, not the problem. The intimate 
relation between the state and the environmental organizations, however, does 
have a price tag, namely in the form of “[…] responsibility, some loss of 
autonomy, less ideological purity, and that the organizations also have to take 
into account the demands of the state […]” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 18). 
According to the Bergen Group, this intimate relation does not inhibit the 
organizations’ ability to criticize the state, on the contrary. Norwegian 
democracy, they claim, is  especially open to input from DMOs with extensive 
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local networks (Ibid.: 19). Since the 1960s the environmental DMOs have had a 
tight connection between their central and local levels, thus giving the grassroots 
access and influence over the organizations. This  is a structure the state has 
actively encouraged through funding (Bortne et al. 2002: 58). By avoiding the 
common development of a split or dual-organizational society, with little 
grassroots  influence at the central level, Norwegian civil society is  characterized 
as among the most vibrant in the world (Grendstad et al. 2006: 14). Nor is the 
close connection seen as  resulting in a loss of organizational autonomy. The 
Bergen Group instead points out that state interference in organizational matters 
is  virtually non-existent, and that because of their close relationship, the state is 
also to a high degree influenced by the organizations (Ibid.: 21). 
The close relationship between the environmental DMOs and the state does, 
however, pose several challenges to the relation between the organizations and 
the people. First, as environmentalism to a certain extent has  succeeded in 
becoming an integrated policy area taken care of by the state, the need for 
volunteers to fight for the cause is diminished (Bortne et al. 2002: 152). Second, 
the state’s preference for an increased use of umbrella organizations – to 
facilitate interaction with the environmental sector – moves the location of 
decision making away from the realm of member meetings and popular 
engagement (Ibid.: 149). Third, in order to develop an expertise that satisfies the 
state’s requirements for cooperation, the environmental sector has  begun to favor 
professional administrators and experts. This to the detriment of volunteer 
workers and resulting in the “[…] possible exclusion of ordinary people 
[…]”(Ibid.: 149-50). Given these trends, the Bergen Group therefore speculates 
that Norwegian environmentalism could be on its  way toward the scenario 
described by Dryzek above (Grendstad et al. 2006: 156), which the Bergen 
Group characterizes as a dual-organizational society, i.e., a fully state-oriented 
environmental sector “[…] without the backing of a real movement […]” (Bortne 
et al. 2002: 148). Such an outcome had not yet arrived, at the time of the Bergen 
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Group’s study, but they nevertheless claim that: “[…] the Norwegian 
environmental organizations by themselves do not have the strength to form a 
folkebevegelse, neither together or individually.” (Ibid.: 156). This assessment is 
in line with the bemoaning of the current “[…] total lack of successful 
folkebevegelser […]” from Østerud et al. (2003: 141), and is mainly based on an 
evaluation of the organizations’ membership size. Bellona, MVF, and NU are all 
too small individually and too different when considered together to qualify as a 
folkebevegelse. NNV, on the other hand, is disqualified on the count of their too 
close governmental cooperation (Bortne et al. 2002: 156). 
Overall the consensus seems to be that the Norwegian environmental DMOs do 
not belong to the movement phenomenon, neither in the sense of a social 
movement (on the count of the intimate state relation), nor in the sense of a 
folkebevegelse (because of the limited size of the organizations). This, however, 
poses the problem of how the DMOs should be assessed. The Dryzek study 
refers  to the DMOs as ‘voluntary groups’ and, as  earlier noted, as  ‘arms of the 
state’ (Dryzek et al. 2003: 107). These descriptions, nevertheless, seem to gloss 
over both the focus on mass mobilization and democracy which characterize the 
history and identity of these organizations, especially in the 1960s and 70s, and 
the fact that it is common among the DMOs to identify themselves  as part of 
miljøbevegelsen (the environmental movement), see for example Lem (1996: 
167) and Sørensen (1996: 139). As  we have seen, the Bergen Group describes 
several trends signaling the rise of a dual-organizational society. From their 
writing it is unclear how far the DMOs had progressed in this  direction. They do 
not treat the DMO as professional ‘here and now’ organizations, even though 
they note that the DMOs have undergone significant professionalization. That 
their work was mainly done based on data collected between 1995 and 2000, also 
poses the question of how far this  transition has progressed since then. Rejecting 
the term folkebevegelse, the Bergen Group accepts the description of the DMOs 
as part of miljøbevegelsen (Bortne et al. 2002: 38). They do not, however, specify 
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what role this movement identity has  within the organizations. What kind of 
movement is this, if it is  not a folkebevegelse? The relation between the people 
and the DMOs is in this regard left unclear. These questions bring us  into the 
next topic of movement identity. 
2.3 Identity and Participation
Collective identity is not only, as we saw in chapter 2.1, an important facet of 
SMT, but it is  also a concept which, at least to an extent, attempts  to encapsulate 
the relation between movement organizations and the people. Della Porta and 
Diani (2006) describe collective identity as “[…] the process by which social 
actors recognize themselves – and are recognized by other actors – as part of 
broader groupings, and develop emotional attachment to them.” (Della Porta and 
Diani 2006: 91). Collective identity is that which draws organizations and 
individuals  together to fight a common cause. In this capacity it is used within 
SMT to answer Olson’s free rider problem and explain why people participate in 
movements in a way that is  rational (Ibid.: 102). Olson (1965), an economist, 
claims that for an individually rational actor, it would not be rational to 
participate in a large lobby organization despite having shared interests. By 
participating the actor would be assuming the cost (time, effort, risk) herself, 
whereas  the reward would befall her even without her participation (Olson 1965: 
11). On this short term, utility maximizing model, shared interest is not enough to 
motivate participation (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 289, Della Porta and Diani 
2006: 102). Instead, participation also requires either coercion or the distribution 
of selective incentives that give greater benefits to those who participate (Olson 
1965: 51). Mass movement participation, where shared interests are present, but 
extra incentives are lacking, is by Olson dismissed as a form of ‘nonrational or 
irrational behavior’ in the form of a ‘psychological disturbance’ induced by an 
alienation from society (Ibid.: 161-2). 
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Not wanting to reject movement mobilization as  an irrational phenomenon, 
collective identity theorists  have sought to describe movement participation in a 
more positive light. Polletta and Jasper (2001) suggests that collective identity 
“[…] seemed to capture better the pleasures and obligations that actually 
persuade people to mobilize […]” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284). By sharing a 
collective identity, people also share a set of prior norms and obligations, the 
observance of which motivates  participation (Ibid.: 290). In a similar vein, 
Melucci (1996), following Pizzorno, proposes  that collective identity is a 
condition for engaging in a cost/benefit analysis in the first place. It is  only 
through a prior collective identity specifying ideals and norms that a calculation 
of harmful and beneficial actions becomes meaningful (Melucci 1996: 63). It is, 
however, unclear how this collective identity could be a description of a 
movement or a group identity if it already was present in an individual when the 
calculation of whether or not to participate in the movement was done. Saunders 
(2008) has similarly noticed that both for Melucci and the collective identity 
literature it is unclear whether the term applies to groups or movements as a 
whole. As a remedy, she proposes that one only refers to groups as  having a 
collective identity, opening the possibility for describing several collective 
identities, possibly hostile towards each other, within one movement (Saunders 
2008: 232). 
As for a full definition of the term, there has  yet to be reached a consensus  (Snow 
and McAdam 2000: 42). There is agreement, however, that collective identity 
involves both a shared understanding of who ‘we’ are, and a conception of a 
common opponent (Melucci 1996: 73, Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94, Saunders 
2008: 232). Della Porta and Diani (2006) distinguishes between two types of 
‘we’ identification. First, there is the inclusive and flexible ‘we’ characterized by 
a lack of association with a specific social group, ideology or lifestyle. Groups 
adopting this  identity will facilitate their external communication and make it 
easier for ordinary people to get involved (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102). As 
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for the efficacy of such an identity Della Porta and Diani notes  that: “Forms of 
allegiance which are not particularly intense or exclusive can, in certain contexts 
guarantee continuity of collective action.” (Ibid.: 98). Saunders, in her study of 
British environmentalism, on the other hand, found that such a non-
comprehensive identity resulted in weak solidarity between members (2008: 
237). The other ‘we’ identification is exclusive, which means that it harbors a 
narrow definition of who can and who can’t be a part of the group or movement. 
Such an approach will gather fewer, but could provide stronger incentives for 
participant actions (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 101-2). The need to strike a 
balance between these two identity concerns, between gathering the masses and 
motivating the core is  a problem for several movements, including FIVH 
(Hansen 2007: 71). 
In addition to a shared conception of a ‘we’, a social movement’s collective 
identity also harbors a shared understanding of who the opponents are. Saunders 
ties a weak ‘we’ identity to a lack of opponents with whom to form an effective 
contrast (2008: 237). According to Della Porta and Diani (2006) this  is what 
differentiates a social movement from a consensus movement. Even though the 
latter has a shared understanding of the world, it has no conflictual element 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006: 22-3). They also note that lacking clearly defined 
opponents is a problem for the environmental movement in general (Ibid.: 102). 
Social movement development
The question of movement identity is also tied to a movement’s life cycle. A 
common account of social movement development charts a pattern from protest, 
to formal organization to institutionalization (Snow and McAdam 2000: 56-7, 
Dryzek et al. 2003: 3). Offe (1990), in his tentative account of ‘the logic of 
institutional politics’, describes  three stages of a social movement's  life cycle 
(Offe 1990: 246). The first, take-off, phase is characterized by radical demands 
and protest sentiment; a lack of distinctions between leadership and the rank-and-
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file members; as well as an unclear picture of who ‘the base’ or ‘the people’ the 
movement represents really are. The subsequent stagnation phase sees the 
adoption of features of formal organization to prevent the movement from 
withering away. Funding and legal expertise is gathered, membership roles are 
formalized, and internal communication routinized. In the third 
institutionalization phase, increased resources and influence lure the movement 
toward closer government cooperation or integration (Ibid.: 236-45). Through 
this  process, the movement identity, tied to its oppositional features, withers on 
the count of professionalization and bureaucratization (Offe 1990: 244, Burstein 
et al. 1995: 277, Andreassen 2006: 165). Several authors (Hjelmar 1996: 1-2, 
Dryzek et al. 2003: 3) have criticized this  and similar stage theories. Hjelmar 
(1996) claims that such models  make it difficult to explain the subsequent growth 
and effect of environmental organizations. Instead he proposes that 
environmental organizations embody two forms of political identity. The 
movement identity is  guided by a practice of problematization, where the 
questioning of conventional politics  and the redefinition of legitimate political 
causes are supplanted by bottom-up activities. Making social issues a part of the 
discussion is the goal of such a practice. The pressure group identity on the other 
hand is governed by a practice of effectiveness. Here the goal is  influence and it 
is  sought through a pragmatic modus operandi that adjusts  after the existing 
power structures. These two identities are not exclusive, they can co-exist, and 
the dominant form may vary after historical period (Hjelmar 1996: 2-3). 
Movement identity in Norway
In the Norwegian context the study of collective identity has been given 
comparatively little attention, a fate shared with most constructivist approaches 
(Bratland 2008). But this does not mean that identity as  a topic has been omitted 
as a whole. When the Dryzek study refused to characterize Norwegian 
environmentalism as a social movement it worked from the assumption that all 
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environmental movements are radical. Based on an extensive survey of 
environmentalists and the general population, the Bergen Group instead argues 
that the core of Norwegian environmentalism from the start has  been moderate 
(Grendstad et al. 2006: 85). Based on attitudes towards a range of issues 
environmentalists are a bit more left-leaning, ecological, post-material, and 
egalitarian, but on the whole “[…] fail to be distinguished from the general 
population in any profound way.” (Ibid.: 83). Moderation is not seen as  an effect 
of institutionalization, but instead as rooted in two anomalies of Norwegian 
society which together make Norwegian environmentalism unique (Ibid.: 85). 
That is  to say, both the environmentalists  and the general population had attitudes 
in tune with both the first anomaly, called the state-friendly society, and the 
second, the local community perspective. The first anomaly fosters  political 
moderation because the state is seen as  an ally, not as an opponent. The second 
anomaly stems from the Norwegian experience of a self-reliant rural co-
habitation with wild natural forces. It centers the environmental focus on “[…] 
the protection of man in nature […]” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 2-3). Nature is not 
portrayed as a romantic ideal in isolation from man. Following Witoszek, the 
Norwegian view of human-nature interaction is  instead described as pragmatic, 
where nature is both to be utilized and heeded, not isolated from human 
interference (Ibid.: 107). The local community perspective thus leads  to 
ideological moderation. 
Even if these anomalies characterize the environmental sector, the Bergen Group 
claimed it was “[…] barely possible to identify a common identity within the 
movement.” (Bortne et al. 2002: 44). For that, the environmental field is too 
broad. With regard to the identity of the individual organizations they note that 
the traditional DMOs used to “[…] put weight on affecting and ‘controlling’ that 
the members had ‘the right faith’. Now, attitudes, to a larger degree are 
developed other places – before people approach the organizations.” (Strømsnes 
and Selle 1996a: 29). In addition the Bergen Group notes the relatively weak ties 
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found between members and the organizations: “Often, most of the members are 
completely passive, and barely connected to the decision-making structures  of 
the organizations.” (Strømsnes and Selle 1996b: 283). Other than these and 
similar remarks, the Bergen Group does not attempt to describe identities specific 
to the different organizations. Their foremost concern is the environmental field 
as a whole, alternatively its sub-sectors, not single organizations. Identity is  here 
assessed primarily from an aggregate of survey responses of attitudes, not from 
the perspective of individual understanding. This has yielded firm insights into 
the character of Norwegian environmentalism, but it omits the role identity can 
have within the operation of individual organizations. 
One study that explicitly touches upon this question is Kapstad’s (2009) 
investigation of NU, NNV’s youth division. She characterizes  Norwegian 
environmentalism as an important arena for identity construction (Kapstad 2000: 
79). Given their occasional utilization of civil disobedience, NU, along with 
Bellona, is regarded as  the most radical of the Norwegian environmental 
organizations (Bortne et al. 2002: 24). Kapstad describes how the question of 
identity has become problematic for NU activists: “In NU we see how today’s 
identity construction is based on a choice of who one does not want to 
be.” (Kapstad 2000: 95). In her account there seems to be an identity 
ambivalence at work within the youth organization. The NU activists do not want 
to be associated with the stereotypical NU ‘uniform’ consisting of “[…] Icelandic 
sweaters, army boots, and Palestinian shawls […]” (Ibid.: 92). Through their 
protest actions this image of NU activists has been spread across the country by 
the media. The activists are not afraid to wear the uniform, however, only afraid 
that others might mistake their outfit for an authentic expression when they in 
fact wear it ironically. Thus, they are wearing clothes signifying a specific 
identity, while they at the same time express a wish for not being pigeonholed as 
‘one of those’. Kapstad claims that:
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“[…] the stereotyping and the creation of an image of a typical NU member is 
not done from outside but on the basis of internal conditions, for despite the 
desire of the members to liberate themselves from a style […] we nevertheless 
witness how NU and the local group still recruit  members on the basis of the 
image from which they wish to distance themselves.” (Ibid.: 92)
In this way, the image they want to get away from is not the result of negative 
external campaigns, it is an image the organization itself has created, and still 
uses. Interestingly, Kapstad does  not tie this act of identity distancing to anything 
specifically pertaining to the NU identity, such as a perceived toxicity of the 
organization’s radicalness. Nor does she try to interpret the situation within the 
specific Norwegian context, as described by the Bergen Group. Instead, Kapstad 
ties the phenomenon to a general problem individuals have within postmodern 
society, where the ideal is not to keep one’s identity stable, but instead to keep 
one’s options open by avoiding to fixate on one identity (Ibid.: 94). Thus it is the 
discomfort of feeling ‘typical’ that explains the activists  need to distance 
themselves. The notion of ‘typical’ is here used in the sense of typical for a small 
sub-group. Distancing themselves from a typical sub-group identity does not 
mean returning to a neutral identity, it means rather to keep the NU identity while 
holding it at a distance. In this way Kapstad makes identity an individual 
question, not something collective. Thus  she fails  to investigate how an identity 
distancing could be connected to the collective NU identity itself, or to the 
Norwegian public’s  reaction to such an alternative identity. A further omission is 
the lack of discussion of identity framing, and how identities  are employed 
strategically. The former issue will be treated in the following sub-chapter. 
2.4 Frame Theory
Frame theory is a theoretical approach that arose in the 1980s, and is now a 
central part of SMT. First seen as  a constructivist alternative to explaining 
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collective action in terms of rationalist models, it is now often merged with the 
RM or political process paradigms (Polletta and Ho 2006: 3). Frame theory 
disputes  the notion, common in earlier theories that grievances are given or pre-
existing (Tarrow 2011: 26). It seeks to describe how social movements, through 
frames, actively interpret their contexts, aims and interests, in order to motivate 
collective action. As such frame theory attempts to provide a terminology to 
describe not only a central aspect of how the DMOs understand their relation to 
the people, but also how frames are used to shape movement identity. According 
to Snow and Benford, collective action frames  are defined as “[…] emergent 
action-oriented sets of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social 
movement activities and campaigns.” (Benford 1997: 416). These sets of beliefs 
are composed of three core framing tasks: An articulation of a problem 
(diagnostic frame), a proposed solution (prognostic frame), and an 
encouragement to participate (motivational frame) (Snow and Benford 2000: 
615-18). Effective frames are those that integrate all these three elements 
(Polletta and Ho 2006: 3). In contrast to similar terms, such as ‘ideology’ and 
‘discourse’, frames are agentive, i.e., they are actively shaped by movement 
participants. This can happen either through a discursive process; as  a result of 
strategic deliberation; or as a product of conflict (Snow and Benford 2000: 
623-7). In order for a social movement to grow, spread its message, and increase 
in power, it is not enough to have a frame. Movements also need to convince 
people to join. This process  is  by Snow et al. (1986) described as frame 
alignment, and it can occur in four different ways. Frame bridging refers to how 
two or more ideologically similar movement actors (e.g. two DMOs), previously 
unconnected start to cooperate. While frame amplification describes the process 
where support is gathered through the clarification or reinvigoration of a frame, 
frame extension refers to how movement actors enlarge their concern to include 
interests not directly related to the main goal of the movement. The last frame 
alignment process is called frame transformation. It is a reaction to a situation 
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where old values “[…] may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear 
antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals  […] (Snow et al. 1986: 473). 
Thus the movement’s frames must be transformed by planting new values, while 
jettisoning old meanings (Ibid.: 467-75). In this way we can see that: “[…] 
identity constructions are an inherent feature of the framing process.” (Snow and 
Benford 2000: 631-2). Through framing, identities can be created or modified, 
aspects hidden or amplified. Tarrow (2011) notes that the best known identity 
framing was done in the civil rights struggles in the 1960s. Martin Luther King, 
jr. and the SCLC were “[…] working to create more generally a new collective 
identity among Southern blacks  […]” in order to combat the negative stereotypes 
then associated with African-Americans (Tarrow 2011: 151). Similar to the 
process of frame alignment Snow and McAdam (2000) have described how 
personal and collective identities are aligned. Their examples  revolve around 
how the identity of individuals are either amplified, consolidated, extended or 
transformed to fit the collective identity of the movement (Snow and McAdam 
2000: 49-53). Interestingly, they are only concerned with how individual 
identities  adapt to collective identities. There doesn't seem to be any systematic 
treatment in the literature on frames of how movements strategically transform 
their own identities to try to shift or broaden their appeal. This despite the fact 
that such a process is deemed of high importance. Della Porta and Diani (2006), 
for example, notes that the story of movements  is “[…] the story of their 
members’ ability to impose certain images of themselves, and to counter attempts 
by dominant groups to denigrate their aspirations to be recognized as 
different.” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 106). The lacking systematic treatment 
notwithstanding, a couple of observations is worth highlighting. For Della Porta 
and Diani an important part of identity work involves challenging negative 
stereotypes (2006: 107). Taylor and Whittier claims that for sub-ordinate groups, 
like the lesbian-feminist movement, giving a devaluated identity a new positive 
value, requires the withdrawal from the values of mainstream society (1992: 
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111). The environmental movement, however, hardly fits the description of a 
sub-ordinate group. Polletta and Jaspers, on the other hand, point out that 
organizations often build their movement identity on a previously extant 
collective identity, independent of the movement (2001: 291). Instead of creating 
news values, on this view, frames can also be adopted after the political and 
cultural landscape (Polletta and Ho 2006: 5).
2.5 New Questions
This review has  shown that the literature on the relation between the Norwegian 
environmental DMOs and ‘the people’ has  mainly been focused on assessing 
whether NEM conforms to the definition of a social movement or a 
folkebevegelse. The fact that neither definition is found to be a fitting description 
poses several questions: How should the relation between ‘the people’ and the 
Norwegian environmental DMOs be assessed? How far has Norwegian 
environmentalism progressed into a dual-organizational society? What kind of 
movement is  the environmental movement if it is not a folkebevegelse? The 
identity dimension of the relation between the DMOs and the people has been 
given less attention. The Bergen Group does characterize the sector as moderate, 
both politically and ideologically, but they focus on the environmental field as a 
whole, thus omitting the role identity can play within single organizations. 
Kapstad partly remedies this lack by describing how NU activists distance 
themselves from stereotypes of the organization. Nevertheless, she ties this 
identity distancing to a general problem individuals have in post-modern society, 
instead of connecting it to anything specific about the identity of the organization 
itself or the specific context it operates in. In the case of frame theory we 
described a terminology for frame alignment processes and identity construction 
processes. The focus, however, is  more on how individuals adapt to collective 
identities, than on how collective identities are strategically shaped. 
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Chapter 3: Method
In the introduction I described this thesis as an explorative, interpretive and 
descriptive study of the understanding of three Norwegian environmental DMOs. 
In chapter 3.1 I will argue that a qualitative approach is  best suited for such a 
study as  it is  specifically designed for capturing how people give meaning to and 
understand the world around them. I will also claim that a semi-structured 
interview form enables both directing the interviews toward specific topics  as 
well as  allowing the capturing of in-depth answers. Moving on to chapter 3.2 I 
will focus on the three main facets  of the interview process: I will describe the 
reasoning behind using purposive and snowball sampling for the selection of 
informants, the preparation of the interview guide, and the unfolding of the 
interview sessions. In chapter 3.3 I will explain how the statements from the 
informants were transcribed, analyzed, and presented. I will put emphasis  on my 
attempt to describe a shared narrative within each organization. In chapter 3.4 I 
will address the issue of the analysis’ credibility by describing how this thesis 
relates to three common criteria of credibility for qualitative research: 
transparency, coherence, and communicability. 
3.1 Qualitative Method
As stated in the introduction, in this thesis I aim to provide an interpretation of 
the organizations’ understanding of their relation to ‘the people’, from the 
perspective of informants within the organizations. For this purpose it is 
appropriate to adopt a qualitative approach. The quantitative alternative of survey 
questionnaires offers a convenient way to access people’s beliefs  and opinions, 
and the rigid and predetermined questions make it possible to quantify and 
compare answers. Because of these qualities, however, surveys are ill-equipped 
to capture the broader context of and meanings relevant to the interview subject 
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(Flick 2015: 10-2). Since surveys  rely on standardized questions  there is  little 
room to introduce new topics of discussion. To ensure standardization, surveys 
often clarify the meaning of the questions (Singleton Jr. and Straits  2012: 87), 
whereas  the aim in qualitative research is to provide the interview subject with 
the freedom to emphasize what is relevant for her (Flick 2015: 12). Neither do 
surveys provide sufficient opportunity for the interaction between interviewer 
and interviewee, specifically in the form of asking situation-dependent follow-up 
questions. These features  are necessary to capture the context and the broader 
processes of reasoning involved in the phenomenon of understanding. Surveys, 
then, form an insufficient basis for an open, explorative approach of the 
informants’ understanding, but would be a valuable asset for verifying the 
findings of such an approach.
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is  specifically designed to examine how 
individuals  see and experience the world. The approach is “[…] used to explore 
new phenomena and to capture individuals’ thoughts, feelings, or interpretations 
of meaning and process.” (Given 2008: xxix). It stresses the intimate relationship 
between the researcher and what is studied, and how the context shapes and 
constrains  research. Qualitative approaches seek to answer questions that 
underline how social experience is  created and given meaning (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2011: 8). The notion of ‘understanding’ is a central concept of 
interpretive research within the qualitative field (Bhattacharya 2008: 464). The 
phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition stresses the social and situational 
aspect of understanding. Merleau-Ponty highlights how the body is a vital site of 
understanding (1962: 144). More pertinent for our purposes is the notion stressed 
by Heidegger and Gadamer that understanding is a social phenomenon involving 
shared norms, rules  and practices as well as a shared understanding of the world 
(Heidegger 2006: 126-30). It is primarily through our family, society and 
situation our understanding of the world is shaped (Gadamer 2004: 278). 
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The interview form is an apt choice when the goal is  study people’ understanding 
of specific phenomena (Widerberg 2001: 17). Capturing the informants’ 
understanding, however, makes certain requirements  of the interview method. It 
has to be open enough to allow for long reflective in-depth answers that could 
provide descriptions, explanations, contextualizations, and reasons that could 
form the basis for a contextual interpretation. It also has to be directed enough to 
address the topic of interest. The semi-structured interview method provides for 
both these concerns. According to Flick (2015) a semi-structured interview relies 
on an interview guide with a number of questions covering a broad range of 
issues. The interviewer can deviate from the sequence of questions, and also 
change the formulation if required. The questions should initiate a dialogue 
between interviewer and informant, and the informants are expected to reply 
freely and extensively (Flick 2015: 140). Since the DMO-informants have a close 
relationship with the subject matter, the interviews could also be referred to as a 
kind of expert interviews (see, e.g., Flick Ibid.: 141). 
3.2 Interviews
Because the concern of this thesis  is  how the DMO-informants understand their 
relation to ‘the people’, the main source of information relied upon is interviews 
of informants  from the three selected organizations. To supplement these 
interviews I have also, to a limited extent, relied on official documents  and key 
texts which are available through the respective organizations’ webpages. These 
supplementary texts have not been systematically analyzed, but have assisted in 
and provided context for the interpretation of the informants’ understanding. 
Selection of interview subjects
The selection of interview subjects  can be characterized as a mixture of 
purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling means seeking 
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out interview subjects that can illustrate the features  and aspects we are interested 
in (Silverman 2005: 129). Central for the selection process was the desire to 
interpret how the DMOs operate now, not how they operated 5 or 50 years ago. I 
therefore only attempted to contact staff or organizational personnel working 
within the organizations at the time of the interviews. It was also important that 
the interview subjects had some familiarity with the problematic of the thesis, 
preferably having worked on strategy, member support, public outreach etc. 
within their organization. Summarized, I had three requirements of the 
informants: They had to be presently active; knowledgeable about the subject 
matter; and willing to participate. To find people who fit this description I used 
snowball sampling, which relies on using primary contacts as steppingstones to 
find new potential informants (Atkinson and Flint 2004: 1044-5). Before starting 
the first interview I already had one contact in both NNV and FOLVS; in the case 
of FIVH I had to start with a ‘cold call’. After making contact with the first 
informant in each organization and interviewing them, I was referred to one or 
several potential informants  who could fit my criteria. The new informants, in 
turn, referred me to other potential contacts. This snowballing method proved 
efficient, as it provided the advantage of introducing me to informants  who were 
highly familiar with the topic and who were willing to talk about it at length. A 
more stringent interview selection processes was not needed because the aim of 
the thesis is to explore and describe the understanding of the relation between 
DMOs and the people, not to portray a representative picture of that 
understanding. Using the snowballing method, however, could limit the views to 
one wing or sector of the organization, one example of what e.g. Atkinson & 
Flint refer to as  the gatekeeper problem (Ibid.: 1045). In my case, this was not an 
issue, however, as I was referred to contacts from different sectors  of the 
organizations, who offered a broad variety of opinions. 
Except for the three first contacts  in each organization, the potential informants 
were approached in a similar way by short, to the point e-mails. In these e-mails I 
42
first briefly presented myself, my institute and my project, before stating that I 
had been referred to speak to them by other members of their organization. I 
stated that I wanted to interview them in connection to this thesis about their 
perspective on their organization’s politics, strategy, and relation to the public. 
In total 16 persons were contacted, 12 of whom responded, five from NNV, four 
from FIVH and three from FOLVS; all of the respondents were interviewed. 
From NNV and FIVH all the informants worked at their respective main offices. 
With regard to FOLVS the informants either worked for the organization, or had 
a high function in their organizations voluntary sector. Within qualitative 
research the question of how many informants to interview is  difficult to answer 
(Becker 2012: 15, Flick and Salomon 2012: 27). Flick & Salomon (2012) state 
that the answer depends  on several issues and the researcher must balance 
between inside and outside determinants. From the inside of the study, the 
number of informants  should be determined by the dimensions that are the basis 
of intended comparisons. They suggest including at least two cases for each 
dimension (Flick & Salomon 2012: 27). I will argue that 12 informants spread 
out over three organizations are sufficient for my purposes, as a minimum of 
three informants from each organization yielded a sufficient amount of variety. 
As for the outside determinants, Flick & Salomon list both time constraints and 
resources as important (Ibid.). In this project, the time limit in particular set a 
restriction on how many informants I could include in the study. Further, given 
the small size of the organizations, the number of informants who fit the three 
criteria was limited, making it difficult to include more participants. 
Interview guide
In preparation for the interviews I wrote an interview guide with six main 
questions and 31 optional follow-up questions.12 The main topics were developed 
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12 See Appendix p. 141. 
with the main problematic of the thesis  in mind and concerned the organizations’ 
strategy, information work, and overall relation to members and the public. The 
guide formed a loose backbone for the interview sessions; a fixed point to draw 
the informants back to if their answers became too meandering. During the run of 
interviews some of the questions were slightly sharpened, but on the whole the 
interview guide remained roughly the same throughout. The questions in 
themselves provided the broad outline of how I wanted the conversations  to 
proceed. They were organized thematically and were formulated with the hope of 
provoking substantial answers as well as avoiding quick replies. They were not 
theoretical questions, but were designed with the aim of making the informant 
reflect on their organization’s activities, strategies and priorities. It is  important to 
stress that I did not want them to focus on their own participation in the same 
activities. Instead I wanted for them to make the organization the focal center, not 
themselves. The aim was to make them reflect, not theorize. Firstly, because 
theorizing is more abstract it is more difficult to do on the spot, but more 
importantly because what is under investigating are not theoretical positions, but 
operative understandings of their relation to the people. 
Interview sessions
The interviews were conducted between February 2014 and March 2015. Such a 
long time span was neither optimal nor by design, but occurred due to a 
prolonged illness. The relatively stable operating circumstances of the 
organizations mean it should not have any great effect on the results of the thesis. 
All the interviews, except for one, were held face-to-face. Six interviews were 
held at the offices of the informants’ organizations; five were held at quiet 
locales, cafes, study halls  or the informants’ home, at the request of the 
informants; and one informant was interviewed per telephone. 
Before the interviews the informants were asked if they consented to the 
interview sessions being taped, something all agreed to. They were told that they 
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could speak freely as they would be anonymized, and that their answers could 
end up in the thesis. The informants were not asked to represent their 
organizations, but to provide their own views on topics  concerning it. This was 
also made clear to them through the first question, which did not ask them for 
their personal motivation in joining the organization, but instead asked them to 
tell about their role in the organization. With that as a starting point, I directed the 
interview in a specific direction, and I stood free to draw on their first answer for 
elaborations or to go back to interview guide. Adhering to an open ended line of 
questioning, the interview guide was not followed slavishly, but I tried to get the 
informants to cover the main topics  of the guide. Save for one exception, the 
sessions  lasted between 45 and 120 minutes, the majority of which lasted about 
an hour. The exception was a telephone interview that was cut short after 25 
minutes. A lack of face-to-face interaction and distracting background elements 
cut the informant’s answers to a shorter length than desirable. The face-to-face 
interviews on the other hand allowed for a closer rapport between interviewer 
and informant, which facilitated longer responses from the informants, and better 
follow-up questions from me based on the long responses. All the interviews 
were held in Norwegian. I did not collect additional material from the 
informants, apart from the recording of the interviews. No sensitive or private 
information was collected, and the participants  have been anonymized. In the 
analysis they are referred to as Informants 1-12. 
3.3 Analysis and Presentation
After transcribing the interviews I read through them and got an overview of the 
material for each organization. Since the interviews were semi-structured 
different themes were present at different parts of the interview transcripts, which 
also meant that some re-organization of the themes was needed. For this purpose 
one separate analysis spread sheet for each organization was used. The analysis 
entailed breaking the transcribed interviews into bits and reassembling them in a 
thematically coherent way. What I looked for was recurring themes, as well as 
statements which through emphasis indicated importance. This was  done 
organically from the material itself without imposing the framework of the 
interview guide or other categorical schemata. This produced two effects. First, 
the thematic categories of the spread sheets  turned out differently than those of 
the interview guide, even if there were some overlap. Second, the spread sheets 
for the different organizations did not have the same categories, though you 
could also find an overlap here. Thus assembled the spread sheets formed the 
starting point for the presentation. 
One alternative for presenting the themes is the polyphonic method of 
representation, which stresses the differences between individuals. Bate (1997) 
claims that a polyphonic approach is ideally suited in the case of organizations 
because they “[…] are by their very nature pluralistic and multifocal, and made 
up of a rich diversity of intersecting dialects, idioms and professional 
jargons.” (Bate 1997: 1167). This is undoubtedly true, within organizations 
differing opinions do abound. More interesting for the purpose of this thesis, 
however, is the understanding shared among the informants. My assumption is 
that organizations as specialized as the Norwegian environmental DMOs not 
only employ a fairly homogenous group of workers, these workers are also 
exposed to the same tasks, challenges, and rewards, in short, the same reality in 
the same organization. Because of this  the experiences of the informants should 
show strong similarities. Through focusing on the shared understanding 
embedded in the recurring issues, examples, terms and phrases from the 
interviews of the informants it is possible to construct what Carr calls a shared 
communal narrative structure for each organization (1991: 150). Carr claims that 
a story about the ‘we’ of a social group can be told by an individual on behalf of 
t h e g r o u p . S u c h a s t o r y , h o w e v e r , “ [ … ] m u s t b e 
shared if it is to be constitutive of a group’s existence and activity.” (Ibid.: 156). 
46
By piecing together the informants’ statements it is  possible to present a narrative 
for each organization. Through the extensive use of direct quotes I could not only 
describe the topics of interest, but also illustrate the coherence between the 
informants’ statements as they discuss the same phenomenon. This narrative does 
not have to be monolithic or show no sign of contradiction, there is room for 
divergence where it is central, but the focus is on commonalities. In this process I 
went back and forth between single statements  and the whole of the narrative, 
letting the whole and the part refine and illuminate the meaning of each other, a 
process that took shape of what Gadamer refers  to as the hermeneutic circle 
(2004: 268-72). This did not lead to removing statements that went counter to the 
main point, rather it facilitated pointing out discrepancies between the 
informants. This process also involved both describing the explicit level of the 
informants’ understanding, as well as  making inferences based on their 
statements to their implicit understanding. Where I found it informative I have 
also added quotes from other sources external to the interviews. 
In a first draft I attempted to present the analysis in three chapters one for each 
organization. After discovering that the analysis of all three organizations 
coalesced around three main topics  (participation, role and stereotype) I chose to 
re-organize the analysis  chapters after each of these topics in order to better 
illustrate the similarities and differences between each organization. An integral 
part of the presentation was the translation of the informants’ statements from 
Norwegian to English. In the translations I tried to keep as close to the original 
meaning and structure of the sentences without sacrificing readability. 
 
3.4 The Credibility of the Analysis
Rubin and Rubin (1995) state that the standards of validity employed in 
quantitative studies are not directly transferable to qualitative studies. Instead, the 
credibility of qualitative research is judged by three factors, its communicability, 
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consistency-coherence, and transparency (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 85). By 
communicability, Rubin and Rubin mean that the analysis should be recognizable 
to the informants and to the readers: “The richness of detail, abundance of 
evidence, and vividness  of the text help convince those who have never been in 
the field that this material is real.” (Ibid.: 91). I will not claim any literary merit, 
but through the extensive use of quotes, and through keeping close to the source 
material, the criterion of richness of details and abundance of evidence should be 
satisfied. 
Regarding the second criterion, checking the consistency both between 
informants and between the statements of one single informant is important in 
order to assure the reliability of the informants’ claims (Ibid.: 87). As my interest 
primarily is  the informants’ own understanding, it would make little sense to 
question the validity of one informant’s statement because it differs from that of 
another. When that is said, as  I already have described in the outline above, 
describing coherence between the informants is an important aspect of the 
analysis. 
The third criterion, transparency, means that the process of data collection and 
analysis is clear to the reader, with possible biases addressed by the researcher 
(Ibid.: 85). The sampling method has already been discussed in chapters 3.2 with 
regard to bias. Also important is the question of my own role as a researcher and 
the interaction with the informants  in the interview session. Seidman (2006) 
states that the interaction between the data gatherer and the participants is 
inherent in the nature of interviewing. No matter how much effort is put into 
minimizing the effect of the interviewer, the interviewer still forms a part of the 
interviewing picture. (Seidman 2006: 22). According to Lincoln & Guba (1985), 
however, the in-depth interview, as opposed to quantitative approaches, is 
characterized by the recognition and affirmation of the instrument, the human 
interviewer. Instead of decrying the fact that the instrument used to gather data 
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affects this process, the human interviewer has the potential of being a smart, 
adaptable, and flexible instrument who can respond to situations with skill and 
understanding (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 107, here in Seidman 2006: 23). The 
interviewer must recognize that the meaning is, to some degree, a function of the 
interaction between participant and interviewer (Ibid.). During the interview 
sessions  I was conscious of my own role in the meaning creating process that an 
interview represents. Though sympathetic to the aim of the environmental 
movement I was careful not to express  any personal opinions on the matters 
under discussion. Instead I adopted the role of attentive listener. I tried to let the 
informants speak at length without interruption to let them develop their 
arguments and descriptions. 
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Chapter 4: The Organizations
The history of Norwegian environmentalism is commonly divided into several 
developmental stages (Gundersen 1996, Grendstad et al. 2006, Berntsen 2011). 
The three organizations under study, NNV, FIVH, and FOLVS, each arose during 
a different stage. NNV was established in 1914 during the period referred to as 
classical environmentalism, characterized by a scientific outlook and a focus  on 
conservation issues. FIVH was founded in 1973 during the heyday of Norwegian 
environmentalism, which saw an orientation towards grassroots organizing, 
populism, and politics. In the 1980s and 1990s  environmentalism saw first a 
decline in participation; upon its resurgence it had become more 
professionalized, and its  attention had shifted to local and single issues. When 
FOLVS was founded in 2009 its focus on one local issue conformed to the latter 
part, but in terms of organizational structure it takes a more grassroots approach.
In this chapter I will primarily provide an overview of the three organizations’ 
development and organizational structure. In chapter 4.1 I will describe NNV’s 
transformation from an elitist institution to a grassroots organization. In the case 
of FIVH, my focus will primarily be on their early years of operation where the 
issues of education, lifestyle changes and moralism were central. FOLVS, in 
comparison to the other two DMOs is smaller both in size and scope. Its singular 
focus is  to keep the LVS-area free from oil. Chapter 4.3 will therefore revolve 
around the battle of Lofoten which FOLVS is enmeshed in, in addition to 
describing the short history of the organization itself. 
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4.1 Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV)
Norges Naturvernforbund (The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature) is the oldest and second largest environmental organization in Norway. 
According to their statutes  they work for “[…] a society where the people live in 
harmony with nature. A society where the foundation and manifold of life is 
secured for future generations, and where nature’s intrinsic value form the basis 
for increasing people’s  respect for and love of life and landscape.” (NNV 2013). 
Originally concerned with classical environmentalism in the form of nature 
conservation (naturvern), NNV’s work now covers  a broad spectrum of issues 
with a focus on conservation, climate change, energy and transportation. The 
following account will chart the main outline of NNV’s historical development, 
drawing attention to its  popular engagements and organizational structure. It will 
mainly draw upon two secondary sources, Berntsen (2011) and Gundersen 
(1996). 
History
Recently celebrating its centenary, NNV traces its lineage back to 1914 when the 
first statutes of Landsforening for Naturfredning i Norge were adopted, and the 
first local group, Østlandske kretsforening, was founded. It wasn’t properly 
constituted until 1916, however, after having met their own requirement of 
organizing at least three local groups. Motivated by historical, scientific and 
esthetic ends NNV’s work during the first years was on conservation issues, 
especially on waterfall protection and the establishment of national parks. The 
latter aim proved problematic due to the organization’s  low popular appeal in a 
time when conservation efforts in general were perceived to be a scientific elite 
phenomenon. Membership levels before WWII didn’t reach a thousand people, 
and the member base, dominated by scientists, army officials and officers, 
showed low social stratification (Berntsen 2011: 109). 
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The groundwork for a broader appeal was laid in 1936 when the idea of 
conservation was extended to also include social ends. Conservation efforts 
should from then on also seek to preserve areas  for common people. Because of a 
near total breakdown of the organization during the war, however, the change had 
little impact until the post-war period, when NNV started to gain influence in 
corporative circles. Its  contributions were considerable in the work that led up to 
the 1954 law on environmental protection, which opened up for national parks, 
and to a lesser extent the 1957 law on outdoor recreation (friluftsliv), which 
guaranteed allemannsretten, the right of free passage and use of the wilderness 
(Berntsen 2011). 
After several name changes13 NNV got its current name in 1962, the same year 
as an extensive democratic reshuffling process was initiated (Sørensen 1996: 
138-9). The organization was still more of a top-down initiative, and bore little 
resemblance to other established grassroots organizations in the Norwegian labor, 
health and temperance movements. But, whereas the organization previously had 
functioned more as an information channel for experts, NNV was now at least 
recalibrated for the purpose of mobilizing the masses (Gundersen 1996: 43). 
Throughout the 1960s and the early 70s  the organization would continue to grow 
and be more politicized. In 1968 their youth division Natur og Ungdom (Nature 
and Youth) was founded, and through the European Nature Conservation year in 
1970 NNV saw a boost in members and funding as well as  a strengthening of the 
secretariat (Ibid.: 54). 
1970 was also the year of Mardøla-aksjonen, which Gundersen calls  the 
breakthrough of the Norwegian environmental movement (Ibid.: 55). It marked 
the first time both for the use of civil disobedience in the context of 
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13  NNV has been known as Landsforening for Naturfredning i Norge (1914-1936); 
Landsforbundet for Naturfredning i Norge (1936-1951); Landsforbundet for Naturvern i 
Norge (1951-1962); and Norges Naturvernforbund (1962-). It is also commonly referred 
to as Naturvernforbundet. 
environmental protest in Norway, as well as the first alliance between locals and 
organized environmentalists led by the now defunct (snm). NNV, who long had 
worked for the preservation of waterfalls, supported the viewpoints of the 
protesters who wanted to stop the construction of the dam, but did not support 
their means of civil disobedience (Berntsen 2011: 165-7). A similar pattern was 
to be seen a decade later in Alta-aksjonene in 1979 and 1981 against the 
damming of the Alta waterfalls. An independent people’s  action was formed,14 
civil disobedience was used, and NNV chose not to be directly involved with the 
protest, this time preferring to pursue the case through the judicial system (Ibid.: 
250-1). 
NNV’s already long held close ties  to the state was  also apparent through its 
active role in the establishment of Miljøverndepartementet (The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection)15  in 1972 (Bortne et al. 2002: 48-9). Even though 
NNV already the next year dissociated itself from the Ministry, and criticized it 
for being beholden to a growth and preservation (vekst og vern) ideology, the 
bonds between the two have continued to be close. The transition of personnel 
from NNV to new positions in the expanding environmental administration 
meant that strong personal connections tied the two together and shaped the 
development of both (Gundersen 1996: 59). NNV’s close ties to the corporative 
sector through their frequent participation in public councils and committees, and 
in departmental hearings is still a central feature of the organization (Bortne et al. 
2002: 50). 
After both Alta-aksjonen and an attempt at stopping oil exploration north of the 
62 parallel ended in defeat, NNV, along with the rest of the environmental 
movement, experienced a downturn in the late 70s and early 80s (Berntsen 2011: 
285). This  was  soon changed, however, when new issues  connected with climate 
change, the ozone layer, nuclear proliferation and acid rain raised the awareness 
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14 Folkeaksjon mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeinovassdraget.
15 Since 2013 it has been known as Klima- og Miljødepartementet.
of environmental problems on a global level, and contributed to a new rise in 
popularity for NNV. At their top in 1991 the organization had 40.000 members 
(Sørensen 1996: 139). 
Today NNV’s  work is characterized by a close cooperation with the public sector 
on both local and national conservation issues, often utilizing laws they 
themselves have put into place. Their focus has  also incorporated climate change, 
especially visible through the fight against gas plants  in the 1990s and the 
attempts to shield the LVS area from oil exploration beginning in the 2000s. In 
the latter case, NNV’s participation took on a familiar pattern. NNV did not take 
part in the, this time, limited civil disobedience, but in addition to supporting the 
issue at a national level, it was instrumental in the formation of FOLVS – a local 
based people’s action (folkeaksjon) against oil exploration in LVS.16 FOLVS is an 
independent organization, as Trædal (2013) notes, in his study of NNV, but he 
nonetheless  includes it as  “[…] an important source of climate-related activism 
within NNV.” (Trædal 2013: 53). According to Trædal, NNV is  closely involved 
in the operation of FOLVS to the point that they are obscuring their own 
involvement lest it hinders them in engaging people through proper NNV 
activity. In other words this is yet another example of NNV channeling popular 
mobilization efforts into separate actions. By his informants this was seen to 
increase mobilization potential by lowering the barriers  to entry into activism, 
preventing NNV’s other, more contentious policies to deter activism (Ibid.: 54). 
In recent years NNV has been affected by falling membership numbers and poor 
economic management. In 1998 the organization was rescued from bankruptcy 
by the ministry (Bortne et al. 2002: 51). And in 2007 the organization was again 
in financial troubles which hampered the organizations activity (Trædal 2013: 
36). Their current financial status is said to be sound; their funding mainly 
stemming from the Ministry and from membership dues.
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16 See chapter 4.3 for more information on FOLVS.
Organization
Even though their membership level has seen a continuous small rise the last 
decade, to 21.212 in 2014, it is  still only half the size it was in 1991. Recently 
surpassed by FIVH in terms of members, NNV still has the most extensive local 
network, by far. It has 17 regional groups (fylkeslag) and 84 active local groups 
(lokallag) at the municipal level, many of whom are characterized by high 
activity. Their secretariat, with its main office in Oslo, with offices in Bergen, 
Kragerø, Trondheim, and Vesterålen, employs 43 people, working 35 person-
years. As mentioned NNV started its transition towards  being democratically 
organized in 1963 when all members were given voting rights  in the 
organization. Their current structure of the National Convention (Landsmøtet), 
the National Board (Landsstyret) and the Central Board (Sentralstyret) was not 
incorporated until 1991, however (Sørensen 1996: 139). NNV’s highest 
governing body is the National Convention, which meets  on a bi-annual basis. It 
is  in charge of handling their governing documents as well as electing the 
National Board and the Central Board. At the National Convention local groups 
have one representative each, whereas the regional groups, Natur og Ungdom 
(NU, NNV’s youth division), and Miljøagentene (NNV’s children’s club), all are 
represented according to their member count. Between their sessions the 
organization is  led by the National Board, which meets four times a year and 
handles  budgetary issues  and matters of principal importance. It is  led by the 
Central Board with its  seven members, whereas the staff, NU, Miljøagentene, 
Regnskogsfondet and each of the regional groups have one member each. In 
addition to leading the National Board, the Central Board is in charge of daily 
operations as well as the direct supervision of the secretariat (NNV 2015a). 
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4.2 Framtiden i Våre Hender (FIVH)
Framtiden i våre hender (Future in our Hands) is a central actor within the 
Norwegian environmental sector. With 24.884 members it has recently surpassed 
NNV and is now Norway’s largest environmental DMO. According to its statutes 
FIVH’s overarching goals  are “[…] global justice, ecological balance and a 
solution to world poverty, that makes it possible for every person on earth to live 
a dignified life.” (FIVH 2014). Concretely this manifests  itself through a wide 
focus area ranging from personal consumption, via corporate responsibility to a 
fair global economy. Regarding the environment specifically it eschews 
engagement with the topic of conservation in Norway, instead prioritizing 
climate change related issues. 
In the following account I will mostly focus  on FIVH’s early years, for two 
reasons. First, because the early years  was when the central tenets of the 
organization were debated and started to congeal. Second, because this is  a 
period the informants frequently use as a contrast point for their present 
understanding of FIVH. Of most interest to us is  the conception of FIVH as a 
movement, its  focus on education and having a broad popular appeal as well as 
critiques directed against FIVH for being moralistic. This period has been studied 
by Hansen (2007), whose work will be the most central source I draw upon in the 
following. 
History
The organization takes its name from a 1972 book by the advertising executive 
Erik Dammann: Fremtiden i våre hender.17  An improbable hit it decried the 
injustice inherent in a world system where resources  abounded for the rich while 
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17  An attentive reader might have detected a slight difference in spelling in the two 
names. The slight modernizing change from ‘Fremtiden’ to ‘Framtiden’ was done in 
1977 when FIVH also went from calling itself a ‘people’s action’ to a 
‘movement’ (Hansen 2007: 16).
50 million people died of hunger and malnutrition each year. The book instead 
advocated a new lifestyle centered on a drastic reduction in consumption, and a 
more equitable sharing of resources (Dammann 1972: 17, 115). Two years later, 
at a legendary inaugural meeting in Nadderudhallen attended by 3.000 
participants, a people’s action (folkeaksjon) was formed based on the ideas  in the 
book. The action went under the full name of Fremtiden i våre hender, en 
folkeaksjon for en ny livsstil og fordeling av verdens ressurser (Future in our 
hands, a people’s action for a new lifestyle and sharing of the world’s resources). 
In its  initial phase FIVH differed from the traditional environmental 
organizations, notably NNV, in both form and content. In form it was conceived 
of as a movement of participants (deltagere) and not as a traditional organization 
with members. When it comes to content FIVH’s focus during the early years 
was broader than that of the traditional environmental organizations. FIVH’s 
overall concern, the equitable sharing of resources, was an issue that connected 
over-consumption at home with poverty reduction abroad. But even though a 
concern for resource use and consumption were more than just tangentially 
related to environmental problems, FIVH distanced itself from the traditional 
environmental movement. They were not active in the energy/resource debate at 
home, central to the environmental movement at the time (Hansen 2007: 103).18 
Instead Dammann (1972) criticized the growing interest in environmentalism 
“[…] if it is based on narrow self-interest, instead of on an interest for the 
individual humans all over the world. The problem of environmental protection/
aid is not an either/or, but a both/and.” (Dammann 1972: 114-5). Opinions differ 
on whether FIVH in its  formative years could be called an environmental 
organization at all. Whereas Berntsen places the early activity of FIVH in the 
category of environmentalism (2011: 219), Steinar Lem (1996), a former 
spokesperson for FIVH, claims that it was founded as a reaction to abundance 
and materialism and that, initially, it was not an environmental movement (Lem 
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18 See chapter 4.1 on NNV.
1996: 163). Indeed, Hansen (2007) claims that in the first ten years of FIVH’s 
existence the crossover points with the environmental movement where few and 
far between. She claims it was not until the 1980s that the goals of solidarity and 
environmentalism were drawn together generally and for FIVH in particular 
(Hansen 2007: 102). Since then FIVH has increased its environmental portfolio 
considerably, and the social and environmental goals are now put on equal 
standing (Løken 1999: 75). 
Already from its inception FIVH saw education and information dissemination as 
vital tools  to wake the populace from its  materialist slumber. The establishment 
of their headquarter as  informasjonssenteret (the info-center) showcased their 
intent. According to Hansen it was “[…] the most vital component of the whole 
movement.” (2007: 27). It was not only where FIVH was  run it was also the 
place where their information and attitude campaigns were shaped, and where 
their magazine and newsletters were edited. 
As a self-identified movement with far-reaching aims FIVH sought to appeal to 
the broadest public possible. In the words of Erik Dammann: “A consequence of 
us  aiming for a movement that in the end will encompass a majority of the 
people, is  that the movement has to be as open as possible. A member 
organization can never count on reaching such a scope.” (Cited in Hansen 2007: 
33). Important in this regard was the attempt to appear popular (folkelig). Not 
only did derivatives of the word ‘popular’ show up in their initial name 
(folkeaksjon); a newsletter (Folkeaksjonisten); and a magazine (Folkevett), FIVH 
also actively attempted to proselytize through popular channels such as 
housewives  magazines (Ibid.: 94). The aim was to recruit the economically 
average population of Norway as participants of the movement, not as members 
of an organization. The important thing wasn't a formal connection or paying 
membership fees, but that they followed the core values (verdigrunnlaget) of the 
organization. 
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As long as they adhered to these values  the participants were free to express 
themselves as they wished (Løken 1999: 76). And at their height in 1982 they 
counted 26.500 participants as well as claiming to have the support of 10% of the 
Norwegian people, at that time 280.000 people (Hansen 2007: 30). But, even if 
they intended to address the majority of the people, the economic middle, in 
reality their supporters had higher income and education levels than the average 
population. Hansen claims therefore that there was a wedge between the popular 
ideal and the actual social foundation of FIVH (Ibid.: 94).
FIVH’s focus on the individual, its concern with consumption and attitude 
change, as well as  its attempt at the creation of a new lifestyle were not 
uncontroversial. Their strategy was from an early stage “[…] accused of being 
unpolitical, naïve and moralistic.” (Ibid.: 53). The initial paucity of attention on 
the structural or political level was motivated by a belief that the politicians 
wouldn’t act until they saw a substantial change in the people first. But, already 
in 1976, after having been confronted with the charge of lacking an analysis  of 
the economic and political system of power, FIVH veered in a more political 
direction. From then on FIVH to a larger degree attempted to concretize its aims 
into political goals (Ibid.: 45). 
Moralism, however, wasn’t only a source of criticism, but also played a positive 
role in the internal cohesion of FIVH. The high ethical demands put on the 
movement’s participants to reduce their consumption did alienate even active 
participants  along with outsiders  (Ibid.: 83). But moralism also functioned as a 
glue that held the organization together. By uniting the participants around a 
shared ethical stance, moralism became a way of contrasting outsiders from 
insiders, of providing a bigger sense of belonging and of fostering a stronger 
identity among the participants. As  such, Hansen claims, “[…] moralism 
functioned as  an organizational resource in the movement. Each one was  asked to 
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take responsibility for the world’s problems and the participants were urged to 
live more correct and ‘real’.” (Ibid.: 74).
In its initial years  FIVH had an idiosyncratic, at least in a Norwegian context, 
conception of both its own role and that of the people. Seeing itself as a 
participant-based movement, it rejected both the traditional organizational form 
and the traditional role played by members. Instead they fostered an identity 
centered around participants and the creation of a new moral lifestyle through a 
focus on education with moralistic elements.
Organizational form
Unlike its contemporaries within Norwegian environmentalism, FIVH rejected 
constituting itself as an organization, its founders  thinking that was too 
bureaucratic an organizational form. Instead they initially saw themselves as a 
folkeaksjon (people’s  action), where the ‘action’ signified the people’s swift 
gathering around its central ideas. In practice this  meant that FIVH took on the 
appearance of a foundation. Its highest organ was the council who met twice a 
year. The board, following the framework put forth by the council was  in charge 
of overseeing the info-center, where the day-to-day operation was  run by the 
secretariat. This, however, was only the skeleton, the movement FIVH aspired to 
be was composed of a network of up to a hundred loosely connected local groups 
as well as  a rapidly increasing number of what FIVH referred to as participants 
(deltagere) (Ibid.: 22-35). 
After a few years, a dispute arose between those who wanted to keep FIVH as a 
movement, and those who wished to introduce a traditional bureaucratic 
organizational form. The latter criticized FIVH’s organizational structure for 
lacking democratic merit. Neither participants nor group representatives  had a 
say in the composition of the council, or any direct influence on the actions  of the 
board or the info-center. The critics’ attempt to lead FIVH onto a path of more 
traditional organizations did succeed in obtaining representation for the 
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participants  both on the council and the board. Nevertheless, more wide reaching 
reforms were longer in waiting. When FIVH changed its name in 1977 to 
Framtiden i våre hender, it also removed the reference to being a ‘people’s 
action’ preferring instead the label ‘movement’. This move, however, was not an 
expression of organizational change. Instead, along with the new statues of 1978, 
it represented a continuation of the movement form and as such a vindication of 
the founders’ ideas of FIVH (Ibid.: 32). It wasn't until 1992 that FIVH, on the 
initiative from local groups, were led into organizing as a DMO (Løken 1999: 
76).19  Today FIVH has 20 local chapters spread across Norway and employ 35 
people working 25 person-years in their headquarter in Oslo. The organization 
has diversified its  tactics, orienting itself more toward politics and the private 
sector, not only individuals. 
4.3 Folkeaksjonen Oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og 
Senja (FOLVS)
Folkeaksjonen Oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja (The Peoples  movement for 
an oil free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja) is a Norwegian environmental 
organization founded in 2009 for the single purpose of “[…] keeping the near-
coastal maritime areas around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (LVS) from being 
opened up for oil or gas exploration.” (Folkeaksjonen 2009). Because FOLVS is 
a single issue organization with a short history it is  natural to start out by giving 
an overview of the case which it is concerned, the battle of the Lofoten oil, 
before I move on to describe the organization itself. 
Oil expansion and political deferrals 
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19 For more information about FIVH’s current structure see chapter 5.2
Since the start of the North Sea oil boom off the coast of Stavanger in the late 
1960s, the area of oil extraction in Norway has expanded northwards at an 
intermittent pace. This expansion, driven by the oil industry and regulated 
through government concessions rounds (konsesjonsrunder), has to a little extent 
included local institutions or actors  (Kristoffersen 2014: 60). It has  not been 
without opposition, rather it has “[…] contributed to the most polarized conflict 
line in Norwegian oil politics.” (Ryggvik 2014). After the Norwegian Parliament 
(Stortinget) in 1979 permitted oil exploration north of the 62nd parallel the fault 
lines have been between those wanting to open the Lofoten archipelago for oil 
exploration and drilling, and those, like FOLVS, who want to preserve the area 
due to its  biodiversity, natural beauty, and food resources, especially the Lofoten 
cod (Ibid.).
Figure 1 shows the rough location of the oil sectors Nordland VI, Nordland VII and 
Troms II in relation to Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (LVS). The black areas PL 219 
and PL 220 show where exploration permits where given to Statoil and Hydro in 1996. 
A more detailed map can be found at (Olje- og Energidepartementet 2011: 101).
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The battle over Lofoten began in 1994 when the Labor (AP) government opened 
the Nordland VI field (see Figure 1) for oil exploration, an area that included the 
southern outskirts  of the Lofoten archipelago. Two years later, in the 15th 
concession round, exploration permits from the Commerce and Energy 
department were given to Statoil and Hydro. Statoil drilled the first exploration 
well in the area in 2000, without result. The second, planned by Hydro, was 
stopped by the incoming Center-Right coalition government in 2001.20  In 
addition to stopping oil activity in the Barents Sea they also initiated the first of 
several temporary halts to the oil activity in Lofoten (Ibid.). When a new 
environmental assessment plan (konsekvensutredning) for Lofoten and the 
Barents  Sea was presented by the same government in 2003, oil exploration in 
the LVS area was again temporarily halted, whereas the northernmost areas were 
opened (Olje- og Energidepartementet 2004: 84).
The new Center-Left government, which came to power in 2005, continued the 
deferred decision making regarding the status of the Lofoten oil fields. First, in 
the 2006 management plan (forvaltningsplan) for Lofoten and the Barents Sea, 
the issue was postponed until the next term period (Miljøverndepartement 2006: 
123). Then, after another election victory for the Center-Left coalition,21  the 
updated management plan of 2011 stated that the LVS area continued to be off 
bounds  for oil exploration until after the 2013 election (Miljøverndepartement 
2011: 130). The same conclusion was  reached in 2013 in the negotiation between 
the incoming Conservative (H and FrP) government and their backers  from the 
political center, the Liberal Party (V) and the Christian People’s Party (KrF), 
meaning that at present the LVS area is temporarily shielded from both 
environmental assessment and oil exploration up until the forthcoming 2017 
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20 This government was composed of the Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti 
or Krf), the Conservative Party (Høyre or H) and the Liberal Party (Venstre or V). 
21 Both the 2005 and the 2009 Center-Left governments were composed of the Labor 
Party (Arbeiderpartiet, or AP), The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, or 
SV) and The Center Party (Senterpartiet, or SP).
parliamentary election (Grande et al. 2013: 3). Kristoffersen and Dale describe 
this  process as  a ‘strategic advancement’ of oil exploration, where the least 
controversial fields are opened first, whereas  the more sensitive areas are 
shielded on a non-permanent basis (2014: 212).
Despite being opposed by the two biggest parties, the Labor party and the 
Conservative party, as well as the influential oil industry, the environmental 
movement and their political supporters have succeeded, for now, in stopping 
major oil exploration in the Lofoten area. A central narrative claims that is was 
the result of a halting tactic made possible by the specific political landscape at 
the time (Kristoffersen 2014: 62). The political parties were divided into two 
blocks with one major party each broadly in favor of exploration (Labor and the 
Conservative party) and several smaller parties  against. Since none of the two 
major parties could win an outright majority, the smaller parties, both the 
Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Center Party (SP) in 2005 and 2009, and the 
Liberal Party (V) and the Christian People’s Party (KrF) in 2003 and 2013, have 
successfully used their position at the balance of power as  leverage for stopping 
the Lofoten oil extraction. This narrative has been used repeatedly by the smaller 
parties  in several election cycles as a selling point proving their influence 
(Venstre 2013, SV 2015). But the small parties’ victories were only possible 
“[…] because they could build upon the fact that the opposition among the 
people was as a whole a lot bigger than their representation in 
Stortinget.” (Ryggvik 2014). And this opposition was led by a unified 
environmental movement who claim that their work at a national and local level 
played an important part in the success. As Informant 1 from FOLVS said: “We 
have already won this battle twice in the last years.”22
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22 As noted in chapter 3, all the quotes used from the informants have been translated 
from the Norwegian to English. 
The organized opposition to oil
When the idea of expanding oil exploration north of 62 degrees latitude was 
launched in the early 1970s there were few dissenting voices. Initially, the 
Norwegian public trusted the state’s  ability to manage the oil resources  in a way 
that would lead to long-term economic development and with an equitable 
distribution of the ensuing wealth (Kristoffersen 2014: 22-3). During the next 
decades, however, a growing skepticism towards the problems of oil extraction 
had taken hold. Concern for fisheries, operation safety, and the environment 
increased in the public, among the established environmental organizations, and 
in several political parties, such as the Socialist Left Party, the Center Party, The 
Liberal Party and even in some quarters of the Labor Party (Berge 2005: 7-8).
The opposition against oil extraction in the Lofoten area was from an early stage 
dominated by the established national environmental organizations, as  well as 
fishermen organizations Fiskarlaget and Kystfiskarlaget. This early cooperation 
was most visible in the summer of 2000 when Bellona and Natur og Ungdom 
together with local fishermen engaged in civil disobedience to block the 
transportation of the oil rig Transocean Arctic west of Lofoten (Bellona 2001). 
Research by WWF from this period also contributed to an understanding of the 
LVS-Barents area as a unique ecoregion whose protection required new forms of 
collaborations  and new institutions to sustain (Kristoffersen and Young 2010: 
583).
It took twelve years, however, from the opening of Nordland VI until an 
organized local opposition against oil extraction in Lofoten sprang up. In 
February 2006 PFL (Petroleumsfritt område utenfor Lofoten og Vesterålen) was 
formed in Vesterålen. The organization was politically unaffiliated and was 
founded to shift the terms  of the debate.23  Within a couple of months it was 
followed by Lofotaksjonen, a neighboring people’s movement formed on the 
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23  Because the organization was formed in Vesterålen it  is also referred to as 
Vesterålaksjonen.
same principles  and objectives.24  These local groups  soon established ties with 
the national environmental movement. In 2007 a platform for a joint opposition 
to oil exploration was established composed of the two local groups as well as 
the more established environmental organizations Natur og  Ungdom, Bellona, 
Norges Naturvernforbund og WWF (Bellona 2007). The local groups were 
nevertheless still small, and struggling; Lofotaksjonen only had 123 members 
(Johansen 2007), and PFL were in financial troubles (RU 2006). Kristoffersen 
and Young claim that the general weak level of grassroots  engagement at the time 
was due to Norway’s actively inclusive state structures (Kristoffersen and Young 
2010: 582). 
The engagement level would soon rise, however, when on an initiative from 
Natur og Ungdom (2009), Lofotaksjonen and Vesterålaksjonen  were merged in 
January 2009 to create Folkeaksjonen for oljefritt Lofoten og Vesterålen. At 
founding they had 800 members between them (Sneve 2009). In October the 
same year the organization had founded 16 local chapters and gathered 53.000 
signatures  for their petition to end the Lofoten oil drilling (Pedersen 2009). The 
island of Senja, and its surrounding maritime areas including the Troms II field, 
had up until then been beyond the scope of interest of the organization. Since the 
area has a strong connection to Lofoten and Vesterålen both through geography 
and fishery traditions, it was decided, at their first Landsmøte (National 
Convention), to incorporate Senja in both their focus and their now current name: 
Folkeaksjonen for oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja. 
Since 2011 FOLVS has  had a stable number of members ranging from 3.500 to 
4.500, the current count standing at 4.174. They still have 16 local groups spread 
across the country, though most of the groups are located in Northern Norway. 
Like both NNV and FIVH, FOLVS is  organized with a National Convention 
(Landsmøte), and a National Board (Landsstyret). The National Convention, the 
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24 Lofotaksjonen also went by the name Lofotaksjonen Vern Nordland VI og VII.
highest authority of FOLVS meets once a year. All members of the organization 
are granted voting rights. The Convention makes decisions  on matters of policy, 
economy and strategy. It also elects the National Board who is  responsible for 
the daily operations. The Board is  composed of between five and seven regular 
members  and at least five alternates. At least half of the regular members must 
have residence in the LVS-region (Folkeaksjonen 2009). After their founding 
FOLVS has figured prominently in traditional media in relations to the 2009, 
2011, and 2013 elections  (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014: 205). Their center of 
operations is in Lofoten where most of the board lives  and where their real life 
board meetings  are held (most meetings are held on Skype). FOLVS currently 
employs three people, two of which (the board leader and an information officer) 
work from Svolvær in Lofoten. In addition an organizational secretary working 
from Oslo, sharing office space with NNV, is  employed in a 40% capacity 
(Folkeaksjonen 2015b). 
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Chapter 5: Popular Participation
In their work Miljøvern uten grenser? the Bergen Group makes  a distinction 
between the content of environmentalism (miljøvern) and its form. Whereas  the 
content is related to the issues and topics the environmental organizations fight 
for, the form concerns “[...] the citizens’ possibilities as members  and activists 
within the organizations [...] what trends we see when it comes to the members’ 
role and influence [...]” (Bortne et al. 2002: 12). The form of environmentalism is 
thus  related to how citizens, members, activists, in short ‘the people’, participate 
in these organizations. In this chapter I will examine the form of 
environmentalism, i.e. popular participation, as it appears from the perspective of 
informants working at the central level of NNV, FIVH and FOLVS. I will be 
looking at how the participation of ‘the people’ is conceptualized in the way the 
informants understand their own organizations. With regards to NNV this will 
lead into an examination, presented in chapter 5.1, of the informants’ views on 
their local group network, democratic structure and mobilization efforts. In 5.2 
the discussion will revolve around the question of whether FIVH is  seen as 
movement or an organization by the informants. In 5.3 I will look at two focal 
points for the FOLVS-informants’ understanding of participation: ‘local 
adherence’ and ‘popular support’. As we saw in chapter 2.1, a central discussion 
about Norwegian environmentalism revolved around whether it can be described 
as a movement. In light of the preceding analysis I will, in 5.4, argue that the 
informants draw on the image of folkebevegelse when they describe their own 
organizations. Counter to the trend toward a dual-organizational society, from 
their perspective grassroots involvement forms an integral part of the DMOs. 
Even if they acknowledge that their organization might fall short on participants, 
the informants  still describe an aspiration for becoming a folkebevegelse. In 
addition, the informants  exhibit a clear identification with the environmental 
movement. 
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5.1 Local Network and Mobilization in NNV
Based on the recurring topics in my conversations with the NNV-informants I 
will describe two broad ways they understand popular participation in their own 
organization: It is  understood through the notions of local group involvement and 
larger mobilization efforts. This is not meant in an exclusive sense, as if they 
were the only two ways participation is understood; it merely states  that these 
two notions were the most central for the informants. In the following, I will first 
look at how local group involvement is tied to the democratic character of the 
organization. When it comes to mobilization efforts, I will focus  on the NNV-
informants’ ambivalent relation the notion of folkebevegelse, as well as the 
organization’s association with outside folkeaksjoner.
Before we begin, however, it is  instructive to briefly consider how NNV’s history 
has played a role in shaping the informants’ understanding of it today. The 
informants see NNV as having played a crucial role in establishing much of the 
playing field of Norwegian environmentalism:
What NNV has done the last century is to fight for causes, enshrine them into 
law, and then use those laws to the degree it is possible. When it comes to 
conservation and biodiversity we have managed, through struggle, to obtain 
both laws and an accompanying administration. (Informant 8)
In this way NNV’s history is  connected with certain achievements in the past that 
continue to shape how the organization works in the present. But when 
considering the way this fighting was done the same informant reminds us: 
It is important to remember that the environmental movement hasn’t ... you 
can’t just look at resource aggregation or whatever it is called, abilities to 
gather resources and power, you have to look at argumentative power and a 
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few more intangible things, but that has been really important. I think that  the 
environmental movement, it has achieved a lot without actually having the 
support of the big masses. (Informant 8)
During the first 50 years of its operation, as we saw in the last chapter, NNV was 
not a particularly democratic or popular organization. The organization continues 
to rely on lobbying and a close relationship with the state to further their agenda 
(Bortne et al. 2002: 50-1). Important in this context is that the informants’ 
relation to NNV’s ‘elitist’ past largely limits  itself to acknowledging it; it is not 
how they present the organization as it is today. Any elitist sentiment carried over 
from their early history is overshadowed by their emphasis on the organization’s 
present democratic structure and local network: “[Our strength] is that we are a 
locally based democratic organization, so I think that just as important as our 
achievements  on a national level, is  what we achieve locally with our local 
groups.” (Informant 10). This does not mean that the informants underplay their 
close cooperation with the authorities. They recognize that NNV enjoys “[…] 
intimate contact with the all parts  of the administration [forvaltningen] 
[…]” (Informant 8). My focus here, however, is on participation, and a large part 
of the way the informants view their own organization is  in terms of its 
democratic and local based nature, which I will describe in the following. 
Local group participation
Today, NNV has 84 active local groups and 17 regional groups spread out across 
Norway, which is by far the most extensive local group network among the 
Norwegian environmental DMOs. For the informants  this local group 
participation distinguishes NNV from both environmental foundations  without 
active members and the other DMOs who all have less extensive local networks: 
“We do a lot of communication work centrally and [also] lobbyism, so where we 
distinguish ourselves is  that we have a hundred local and regional groups that to 
70
a varying degree, but to a large extent, work with local nature 
conservation.” (Informant 8). The extensive local group network even leads one 
informant to come close to claiming that NNV is the only proper environmental 
DMO in Norway: 
[…] we are the ones who represent the grassroots and those interested in the 
environment in Norway. In that  way we are the ones who are the popular 
conservation or environmental organization. We have about as many  members 
as FIVH, but we have a much larger network out there. (Informant 10)
This statement also claims that NNV distinguishes itself from the other 
organizations by representing the grassroots. First of all, though not exclusively, 
this  means representing NNV’s extensive network of local groups 
(lokallagsnettverk). According to the informants, local groups usually spring up 
when an environmental issue, often related to nature conservation, arises close to 
where the activists live. Activist concerns are thus directed toward local issues 
like, e.g., the local salamander population, the close by waterway or the nearby 
woodland area, and normally not toward more overarching issues such as global 
warming.25  Representing these groups, and providing them with organizational 
and professional assistance, is seen as providing a key democratic service: 
But I think that in some cases we have a local presence in order for people to 
channel one’s engagement in environmental problems, [...] to join NNV, to be a 
part, and to raise one’s voice is then a possibility. Both to influence local 
decisions and to participate in influencing national decisions. (Informant 10)
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25  Though certain groups, like the Bergen local group, does work directly  on climate 
related issues.
Participating in the local groups is thus connected with the potential of having a 
democratic influence over key decisions outside of the organization. The 
informants identify joining NNV as enabling local activists to have a say. 
The informants  also make a point of how these groups have a high degree of 
independence from the main office. As  long as they don’t work directly counter 
to NNV’s program they are free to work on the environmental cases as  they see 
fit. This  independence, however, is seen as a double edged sword. On the one 
hand it leads to practical problems by making larger coordinated efforts harder: 
Sometimes we do have campaigns, we can never demand of the local groups to 
join a campaign, for they choose themselves what they want to work with, and 
often it is their own local issues where they  live which are the most important 
[…] (Informant 12).
On the other hand the local groups’ independence is  perceived as showcasing the 
democratic aspects internal to the organization. One example, in particular, which 
illustrates how NNV works as a democratic organization with a high level of 
grassroots  initiative, was mentioned by several informants. It revolves around a 
central conflict within NNV, namely the status of wind power: 
[...] since it  is a member organization there are these internal differences [...] 
those who would like, who are fully against all kinds of wind and water power, 
who wants to preserve [natural areas], against those who think that ‘no, the 
climate is so important we have to sacrifice [natural areas]’. So when you are a 
democratic organization you have to find a balance. (Informant 11)
At the same time as wind power is seen by some in the organization as a key 
alternative energy source necessary to combat global warming others  claim wind 
power development poses risks to wilderness areas. In 2013, in preparation for 
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NNV’s National Convention, a draft of the energy statement summarizing their 
wind power policy had been worked out with heavy involvement from the 
National Board (Sentralstyret). Their members, in addition to NNV’s leadership, 
include representatives from each regional group, but not the local groups. What 
happened at the convention was described by one informant in this way: 
[...] the National Convention is comprised of a lot of members, the most 
prominent members of various local groups, and then one experienced that 
many of those who had approved the document at the National Board level 
suddenly turned and got their members to vote against  it or make additions that 
changed the wording of the document, and made it a much more hardcore 
protection [vern] document than it was. (Informant 8)
What had been prepared by the National Board and supported by the leadership 
had been derailed by influential members from the local and regional groups at 
the last minute. After an attempt to compromise floundered, the changes 
prioritizing environmental protection were backed by a slim majority. “In 
practice it was a very clear conflict. [...] Lars Haltbrekken [the NNV Chair] went 
on the podium and said ‘I’m not too pleased about this, but it will work out, this 
is  the way it has  to be.’ This  was  really how democracy worked and it did get 
confrontational.” (Informant 8). In one way this development was seen as  a mild 
irritation: “Sometimes conflicts reach the surface that perhaps becomes 
unfortunate, and that was  obviously a problem at the recent National Convention 
[...]” (Informant 8). But, it also shows how differences of opinion within NNV 
are allowed to play out. This room for disagreement has several informants 
likening the organization to a political party: 
[…] I also think that it makes it a broader organization because you don’t have 
to agree with everything as long as you agree with some of it. Without drawing 
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a parallel to a political party, it is a bit  like a political party, and you don’t have 
to agree with absolutely  everything as long as you agree with the core 
principles. (Informant 12)
Piecing these elements together we can observe that the informants see the 
organization’s internal democratic character come to life in various ways. First, a 
democratic element is identified through the existence of internal disagreements 
and the need to strike a balance between them. It is further observed through the 
ability of prominent local group activists to upstage the agenda, showcasing 
grassroots  power. Before it is seen through the ability of the leadership to change 
course and adhere to the majority decision. Participating in the local groups is 
thus  viewed as  doubly empowering for the activists. In the external sense of 
influencing key decisions in the environmental field locally and nationally; and 
in the internal sense through the grassroots having real power within the 
organization. The informants  see the democratic nature of NNV as stemming 
from representing and providing an outlet for grassroots initiatives, and this 
democratic function is accentuated by the local group’s resilient independence, 
and their influence on the organization as a whole. While the Bergen Group 
describes a trend toward a dual-organizational society, within NNV there still is  a 
self-understanding close in line with the older unified organizational society, 
where the grassroots have influence at the center level.26
Popular mobilization
The local groups are not, however, the only part of the environmental grassroots 
supported by NNV. Participation in NNV is also discussed in terms of movement 
mobilization. My concern here is not to assess whether NNV in fact is or 
represents  a movement. Instead, I will first answer whether it is perceived as 
such within the organization, before then looking at how mobilization efforts are 
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26 See chapter 2.2.
framed. Several informants  described a desire within the organization for it to be 
a folkebevegelse: “[...] we want to be a folkebevegelse, and we want to have as 
many people as possible supporting us because it gives us clout in the political 
issues we work with.” (Informant 10). Other informants went as  far as claiming 
that, based on its  vast local group network and their number of supporters, NNV, 
in fact, was a folkebevegelse: “Yes, we have so many, almost 20.500 members. 
We have local groups  all over the country and regional groups all over, so yes I 
will definitively say that [we are a folkebevegelse].” (Informant 9). This opinion, 
though, was not uncontested: 
So, no, we don’t put enough effort in, or in my eyes we have allowed the effort 
to mobilize the great popular masses and recruit  members to crumble, and that 
probably  was of strategic reasons because we simply have had other 
[priorities]. But it hasn’t just been a question of will. It has been a question of 
ability as well. (Informant 8) 
What is meant with ‘other priorities’ is a preference for lobbyism and a more 
state centric approach to environmentalism. The lacking ability referred to has to 
do with NNV’s dire financial condition in the 1990s and early 2000s, which is 
perceived by the informants  to have hindered the organization in expanding their 
outreach. Evaluating NNV based on whether the organization has a large and 
broad support base, it is clear that opinions differed on whether NNV is a 
movement. That notwithstanding, there is a clear aspiration for NNV to be a 
folkebevegelse, as being one is viewed positively – also by those who refrained 
from identifying NNV as such.
For the NNV-informants mobilization is  connected to efforts both inside and 
outside of the organization. Local group participation (in addition to, as  described 
above, being empowering) is described as a mobilization process:
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[...] we build up  competence and credibility with regards to issues, while at the 
same time applying popular pressure. And it is about a popular pressure that  is 
built  up  by NNV from the bottom through local work all across the nation [...] 
(Informant 10). 
In addition to this  internal mobilization the informants also tie NNV’s 
mobilization efforts to external ‘popular actions’ (folkeaksjoner), and especially 
to FOLVS. As we saw in Chapter 4.1 Trædal (2013), in his study of NNV, 
describes FOLVS as “[…] an important source of climate-related activism within 
NNV […]” (Trædal 2013: 53), and claims that NNV is obscuring their own 
involvement in FOLVS. My informants avoided identifying FOLVS as a part of 
NNV outright: “No, they are their own organization and they have their own 
statutes. Like NU, they are also their own organization and they decide 
themselves what they want to work with.” (Informant 12). It was freely admitted, 
however, both that the two organizations are in agreement on the issues  and that 
NNV played a central part in the foundation of FOLVS: “But, [working with the 
authorities] doesn’t mean that we don’t work with people. Because it is  about 
mobilizing. NNV played a part in building FOLVS, and it is  to a large extent a 
popular action [folkeaksjon].” (Informant 9). Popular mobilization, then, is not 
only seen as mobilizing their own local groups, but can also involve channeling 
people into organizing outside NNV on concrete issues. Trædal notes that such a 
model had the perceived benefit of not deterring activists who were put off by 
NNV’s other more contentious  stances. Underscoring his point he cites NNV’s 
organizational secretary Steinar Alsos: 
People can be prejudiced against organizations. They think we are only 
interested in wolves, and do not see us as a platform to work with oil-related 
issues. Supporting an organization requires more conviction than supporting 
one of our core issues. (Trædal 2013: 54) 
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Funneling popular participation through outside groups is  here seen, as Trædal 
notes, as a way of lowering barriers to entry into activism. In addition I see it as 
indicating two things. First, it shows a concern over their image being too radical 
to be broadly appealing. Second, it can be interpreted as a way to avoid 
compromise, as  it enables the organization to hold on to controversial positions 
while at the same time engaging in broader initiatives. Both issues  will be further 
described in chapter 7. 
5.2 FIVH: Movement or Organization?
How do the FIVH-informants understand popular participation within their own 
organization? In FIVH’s case this  question is best approached through describing 
how the informants understand the organization itself. As we have already seen, 
FIVH started out as a movement of participants before it transitioned into a 
democratic organization composed of members. From the perspective of the 
informants, however, this transition is complicated in three ways. First, by the 
limited participation from the grassroots in the internal democratic process; 
second, by the lingering movement aspirations of the organization; and third, by 
the shift in the identity associated with FIVH-participants. These three factors 
will be examined below, after a short outline of the official organizational 
changes in FIVH. 
When the movement model was replaced by a traditional DMO-model in 1992 
the old core structure of FIVH – composed of Rådet (the advisory council), Styret 
(the board), the info-center, and the loosely connected groups – was  modified 
into a new, though fairly similar arrangement. From then on Landsmøtet, a yearly 
held national congress, replaced Rådet as the governing body of FIVH. Between 
Landsmøtet’s sessions, and on its  behalf, the operation was now controlled by 
Landsstyret (National board) instead of Styret. The same info-center remained as 
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the base of operation, and it was  still surrounded by thematic and local groups 
(Løken 1999: 76-7). When compared, the function and distribution of tasks 
remained roughly the same. The main difference is rather to be found in the local 
groups’ democratic participation in and oversight over the management of the 
organization. Whereas  the old council and board was staffed directly by 
Dammann and the other founders, Landsmøtet, the highest organ of FIVH today, 
is  composed of representatives from local groups and staff as well as independent 
individuals. By increasing the influence of the local groups and their members 
the aim was to make FIVH’s structure more democratic (Ibid.: 77).
Democratic
The transition from people’s movement to democratic organization is not, 
however, as  clear cut as it appears. Firstly, because it is uncertain how democratic 
the new structure was in practice. Løken, for instance, claims that FIVH’s 
democratization was largely formal, reaching her conclusion on the count that the 
network of local groups was sparsely built out, and that most FIVH members 
weren’t even connected to a local group (Ibid.). From an inside perspective, 
Steinar Lem, lamenting the low level of member involvement, claimed that the 
organization was democratic in name only (1996: 166). Their assessments were 
from the late nineties, but the opinion about the low level of local organizing is 
echoed among my informants as well: “To a certain extent the organization has 
had as a weakness that there hasn’t been a very robustly organized grassroots, we 
have had a fairly high member count, but the organized grassroots work has been 
limited.” (Informant 7). FIVH today has 20 local groups  though their activity and 
permanence vary widely. When asked if the local groups tend to pop up for then 
only to disappear, one informant answered: 
Some are like that, but very many have been there for several years, so they  are 
pretty stable, but it  happens that some local groups who just have been started 
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have been closed again. And it happens that we have to help a bit and recruit a 
few new [members], and get the momentum up. But it has to be some 
enthusiasm there to start with, so it doesn't help … we can’t put out the fires if 
they  [the groups] aren’t viable. We have about five, six, seven that are pretty 
stable that have been manned for many years and who are very dedicated. 
(Informant 5) 
Apart from the variable level of activity and the difficulty in recruiting new 
members, the informants also pointed out the local groups’ independence from 
the info-center, each group doing their own thing on their own volition. But, 
given the info-center’s many campaigns  and interactions with important 
governmental and business actors, overall the impression given by the informants 
(all of whom were connected to the info-center) was that the local groups’ 
participation in the organization was, if not dominated by the info-center, then at 
least overshadowed by it. Unlike the case of NNV, the democratic aspect of 
participation was not brought up by the FIVH-informants. The development 
FIVH has undergone seems to be best described as a transition from a roughly 
defined loosely connected network with a dominant center, to a formally 
incorporated group structure with a still dominant center.
Folkebevegelse
The second factor complicating the transition from movement to organization 
concerns the fact that among the informants  the terms ‘movement’ and 
‘folkebevegelse’ are still being used, even if they are not fully endorsed. Their 
conflicted attitude is perhaps best summed up by this  quote: “[…] it isn't 
uncomplicated to say that we are not a folkebevegelse because we are … the 
arguments are there as well, it is  a bit more complicated, but formally we are an 
organization with a history as a folkebevegelse.” (Informant 7). In what way then 
could FIVH still be a movement, even if it officially styles itself as a traditional 
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organization? From the conversations several implicit suggestions arises. One 
informant speaks of FIVH as a folkebevegelse in the context of their mobilization 
efforts  and attempts  to sway the political leadership: “It is  at least important with 
regard to the decision makers, that we have something to show off [å vise til], 
that we are a folkebevegelse in contact with people from the whole 
country.” (Informant 4). This  reference to a folkebevegelse encompasses both 
FIVH’s members and the organization’s ability to draw in unaffiliated supporters 
to participate in their campaigns. Another informant comes close to calling FIVH 
a movement based on its involvement in broader coalitions: “But I feel that the 
cooperation FIVH has with several other organizations through Klimavalg-
alliansen, if you add up all the members, then it potentially amounts to very 
many.” (Informant 5). Umbrella organizations and coalition work is an 
increasingly common way of working in the environmental sector, especially 
regarding larger projects involving government interaction (Bortne et al. 2002: 
107). FIVH participates in several, not only Klimvalgalliansen referred to here, 
but also Forum for Utvikling og Miljø, Nettverk for Mat og Miljø, and the now 
defunct Grønn Hverdag. 
Both these factors could, however, be true of any number of other organizations. 
FIVH is certainly not alone in participating in coalitions and amassing support 
from beyond its member base. A third informant draws attention to a factor more 
unique to FIVH: how it has  functioned as an incubator for other organizations. 
Utviklingsfondet, a solidarity based organization championing food security and 
biodiversity while fighting hunger and climate change in the global south, was 
founded by FIVH members in 1978 (Brænd 2009). The research project 
Alternativ Framtid (now ProSus) started up in 1986 on FIVH’s initiative. Forum 
for systemdebatt was launched by Erik Dammann in 1998; Besteforeldrenes 
Klimaaksjon formed part of FIVH before it branched off in 2012. And FIVH is 
also involved in Regnskogsfondet, Publish What You Pay, Slett U-Landsgjelda, 
Clean Clothes Campaign, to only name a few (FIVH 2007). In this way, claims 
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the informant “[…] it is kind of a FIVH family, with several groups having roots 
here and people in a network who know each other.” (Informant 7).
Common for all the examples above, even if they don’t in every case explicitly 
use the term movement, is the sense that FIVH is  more than just the core 
organization. Its mobilizing efforts, its coalition work, and the extensive FIVH-
family all point toward FIVH having an existence, a wide network from which to 
draw participation and support, beyond not only its  core structure and staff, but 
also beyond its members. As one informant referring to former FIVH 
spokesperson Steinar Lem said it: “[…] he called FIVH an organization bigger 
than itself. It sounds a bit pompous, but it is a bit about us still having a lot of the 
features from, call it a folkebevegelse […]” (Informant 7). 
As mentioned, however, the informants are conflicted about calling FIVH a 
movement. A central doubt concerns the number of supporters  required. Being a 
folkebevegelse calls for the participation of a certain number of supporters, and in 
this  regard the current number of around 25.000 isn't seen as sufficient: “But a 
folkebevegelse requires that you are many, we are fairly many, but a 
folkebevegelse, then i think maybe around 100.000, maybe more … So we want 
to be one, but I think it still is a way to go.” (Informant 5). Notwithstanding that 
the level of participation in FIVH does not add up to a folkebevegelse, there is 
among the informants a lingering hope of having the impact of one, even if FIVH 
now operates as an organization. 
Identity
The third complicating factor is the question of the attachment or identity 
connection to FIVH among those involved. Along with the official change from 
movement to traditional organization there has  been a concurrent development 
away from styling those involved in FIVH as participants. Now, the informants 
mainly refer to ‘members’, and in different contexts occasionally to ‘activists’, 
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‘local activists’, or in phrases such as  ‘those who support us’ (de som støtter oss). 
For the informants this transition is thematized through a distinction between old 
and new activism: 
I think that for some of the older generation FIVH is kind of this gang of 
hippies, and that is the identity  to many and I think that some of the elders also 
feel that if they are a FIVH member they are kind of concerned about the 
environment, you do all the big little things every day to do something for the 
climate, fellow human beings. Yes, I think there is pride and identity  connected 
to ‘I was in Nadderudhallen in 74’. It is a great identity carrier, but for a lot  of 
the newer, younger members I don’t think it is. And when for example … we 
have enlisted very many after the [recent] sweatshop campaign that I don't 
think feel the same. (Informant 6)
Whereas older activists were described as ‘manning the barricades’, ‘uniformed 
almost’, ‘hippies’, as  drawing a sense of pride from their involvement, all 
indicating a strong attachment to FIVH, the younger generation of activist were 
mainly described in relation to singular activities, especially their activism on 
social media. In short, the informants identify a transition away from a situation 
where the ideological components of the organization to a much larger degree 
shaped the totality of the participants’ lives. As mentioned in chapter 4.2 one of 
the core aim for the FIVH’s founders was  the creation of a new lifestyle. The 
new form of participation is  more limited in scope, more pragmatic, and more 
short-term. That is  not to say that the informants claim that the shift has been 
absolute, there still are aspects that linger, but the emphasis is on change: 
I think that those who are active [now] feel kind of a kinship with something. 
A strongly pronounced rebellion against  consumer society, that is a bit more 
unwritten, but it is very important this concerning consumer society. We were 
very … in old magazines it was very much different, uniformed almost, with 
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busseruller [old fashioned working shirt], and attitudes and a certain type of 
identity, and it  still lingers a bit, but there have been major changes. We 
encounter that sometimes, people that have an outdated image of us. 
(Informant 7)
The last sentiment isn't just an observation, but indicative perhaps of an irritation 
at being seen as something FIVH now wants to distance itself from: 
But I don’t think that  there are as many from the young generation that have 
those thoughts about what FIVH is and what identity  the organization has, I 
don't think so. And we try, it is a part of the communication strategy to move a 
bit away from that. (Informant 6)
We will get back to how this  distancing looks in practice in Chapter 7.2. Of 
import now is  that the understanding I have sketched so far centers on two shifts: 
The first from movement to organization, where some movement characteristics 
linger, and where hopes of having the impact of a movement remains. The 
second from participant to member, with an erosion, though not total, of the 
traditional overarching identity connected to being active in FIVH, an identity it 
explicitly tries  to distance itself from. From the SMT-perspective this seems 
unusual, given its emphasis on the connection between a movement and a strong 
identity (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20). This isn't just a theoretical matter, but 
something thematized by one informant. After affirming that FIVH is a 
movement the informant questioned the assumption that a folkebevegelse had to 
be connected to traditional markers of activism identity in the first place:
[…] but at the same time we see that there is perhaps need for a discussion 
about what a people’s movement is. What it  means. Before, I think it was more 
common for people to stand in the streets manning the barricades, but now that 
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fight has perhaps moved a bit  over to Facebook and social media, not totally, 
but to a certain degree. (Informant 6)
This reasoning is coherent with what I described earlier as a wish to mobilize the 
masses, and with the distancing from FIVH’s traditional identity. The informant’s 
suggestion is  that FIVH can function and have the impact of a movement without 
a strong identity connection, or at least, the same identity connection as before. 
In this way participation in the organization does not depend on adhering to a set 
of requirements, but is instead predicated on a more short term or piecemeal 
engagement. If FIVH is a movement at all now, because of the weaker identity 
connection, it is so in a very different way than it used to be.
5.3 Local Adherence and Popular Support in FOLVS
Looking at the title of FOLVS, two notions in particular stand out as central, 
those of local adherence (lokal tilhørighet) to the LVS-region, and popular 
support (folkelig støtte). These terms are not empty stand-alone markers, but are 
located at the root of how the FOLVS-informants present participation in their 
organization – as  demonstrated by statements like this: “It is  also important for us 
to communicate that we are a folkeaksjon [people’s action] with an origin in 
Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja.” (Informant 1). Before we begin the presentation 
of these two notions a clarifying remark is due. In the interviews the importance 
of the local comes into play in two similar but different manners. On the one 
hand ‘local’ means adherence to one specific locale, the LVS-area, which is 
awarded special significance in several respects, as we shall see. On the other 
hand ‘local’ means local representation in 20 different local groups (lokallag) all 
over Norway. In this second sense, local comes  closer in meaning to the term 
popular support. In this  way the two terms, local and popular, blend into one 
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another, but in spite of this they are still very distinct notions  and because of this 
I will treat them separately in the following.
Local adherence
What does local adherence mean for the FOLVS-informants? The first thing we 
can note is that the importance of the local is most clearly seen in the very aim of 
the organization: the protection of the LVS-area. While some of the 
argumentation used by FOLVS is  non-area specific, e.g. holding that exploration 
must be stopped to mitigate global warming, the main argumentative line is 
based on the perception that the LVS-area is of special importance: 
[…] in any case as I see it, there is something about these areas specifically, it 
isn't just political arguments, there are some special things about this area that 
differentiates it  from other areas where you also have important nature. 
(Informant 2)
This specialness is  what spawned the movement in the first place; there is 
something there that is worth protecting that isn't present other places. On the one 
hand this specialness refers to the unique natural qualities of LVS: The natural 
beauty; the World’s largest cold water coral reef, Røstrevet; the spawning area for 
both the last big cod stock as well as “[…] four percent of all the fish caught each 
year in the world oceans […]” (Folkeaksjonen 2013). But, on the other hand, it 
also refers to the local fishing and tourism communities that FOLVS claims will 
be affected by the oil because they rely on the natural qualities mentioned above. 
The local communities  and the oil industry are framed as pitted against one 
another in an area conflict. As a FOLVS argumentative document rhetorically 
asks: “Area conflicts  mean there isn't room for everyone. Who do we prefer? The 
Fishermen who can be there for thousands of years, or the oil industry who can 
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stay for 40?” (Ibid.). In this  way the communities living off these resources in a 
sustainable way are just as threatened and in need of protection as  the resources 
on which they depend. Therefore, what is seen as special isn't just the natural 
qualities, but also the communities  that are capable of cohabiting with them in a 
sustainable fashion. 
This leads  us to our second point: The local communities aren't just perceived as 
worth protecting, their support and participation is seen by the informants as the 
sine qua non of the organization. You can’t achieve the goals of preserving the 
Lofoten archipelago from oil extraction if you don't have the backing of the 
locals: “It wouldn't be possible to preserve these areas if the locals had been very 
positive to opening them [for oil exploration], then one wouldn't manage 
[…]” (Informant 2). And the reason for that not being possible goes beyond the 
fact that the organization is run mainly by locals. The same informant continues: 
[…] because it is the ones who are closest, who actually feel the practical 
consequences, in these political debates they automatically  get clout [tyngde], 
naturally  because it is their situation and life that are directly  affected by what 
is happening. So it is really important for FOLVS to be visible in these regions. 
(Informant 2)
The support of the locals is seen as vitally important because of the clout they 
have in political debates. And clout isn't awarded to the locals on the count of 
previous ills or because of any kind of special local expertise or knowledge. 
Clout is here understood as being dependent on two factors. The first is self-
determination. According to the informants  the locals  have clout in this  matter 
because, as the above quote states, “it is  their situation and life [my italics])”, 
which they have a right to have a say in. In fact, local voices  aren't just 
understood to be important they also claim that they should be more important 
than other voices: “And we think that the voices from Nordland and Troms and 
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the voices from LVS should hold more weight.” (Informant 1). This line of 
argumentation can be seen as a clear reaction to what Kristoffersen and Dale 
identifies as “[…] a perceived lack of inclusion of local concerns into the 
decision making process from proponents and opponents to petroleum 
developments in Lofoten.” (2014: 215). This right to decide is accentuated 
through the second clout-giving factor, the locals’ affectedness. The locals  are 
understood to get clout because they are the ones  who, foremost, will be affected 
by the oil exploration. Worth pointing out here is that even if the notion of 
affectedness is used together with the claim that the locals have a right to be 
heard the informants refrain from framing themselves as victimized: 
Things aren’t going downhill, it is not true that Lofoten is a victim in this 
whole debate. You see that you have lots of possibilities for people moving into 
the region and for new jobs being created that aren’t consequence of oil and 
gas. (Informant 2)
This, in part, reflects the fact that the oil exploration has  not started, and thus 
couldn’t have incurred many victims. But it could also be an attempt on part of 
FOLVS to paint their alternative of an oil free future centered on fishing and 
tourism as just as strong and viable as  one dominated by oil exploration. What is 
clear is that through the locals’ right to self-determination and their affectedness 
their participation in and support of FOLVS is seen as essential.
Popular support
Despite the importance put on the local FOLVS is more than just a local 
organization, and there is no attempt at limiting participation to only people from 
the region. As  mentioned earlier it has 16 local branches spread across Norway. 
A cynical perspective would point out that popular support garnered in this way 
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through membership in local branches  is  important first of all for getting 
government grants. And indeed the organization estimates that they in 2016 will 
receive 1.7 million NOK or 71% of their income in government support based on 
its status as  a DMO with a presence across  the country (Folkeaksjonen 2015a). 
So much is  true, but pecuniary import is only a part of what popular support and 
participation entails  for FOLVS, and was not emphasized by the informants in 
the interviews. Instead, garnering popular support, whether through members or 
non-affiliated supporters, is primarily seen as important because it cuts to the 
heart of the organization’s identity and how it wants to present itself: 
For FOLVS it  is about showing people in resistance. If you are a board of six 
people, that will never be popular resistance because you are six people. For 
FOLVS it simply  is important to be many and to be visible in many places, that 
is how we are a folkeaksjon. (Informant 3)
This statement can be read almost as a tautology, having the support of the 
people is  self-evidently a necessary condition for being a folkeaksjon. But the 
statement can also be interpreted as emphasizing FOLVS’ identity, stating that to 
be many is of intrinsic importance for who they are. As the quote above implies 
there is  also a theatrical element – the support has to be showcased. In this way 
demonstrating one’s popular support functions as an argumentative strategy for 
convincing both the public and the politicians about the merits of the cause: 
The strongest argument we have when facing the politicians is that we are 
many. That there are really  many who care about  this case, when we can point 
to that half of the population don't want any oil exploration in Lofoten, then 
that is an argument that  counts a lot for politicians who want to be reelected. 
(Informant 1)
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The more instrumental side of popular support lies, then, in its importance as 
leverage towards politicians. A way of saying ‘if you don't agree with us we will 
not support or vote for you’. This numbers game used when swaying politicians 
is  also seen as a selling point when recruiting new members: “People want to be 
on the winning team, the popular team. In this way being many is  communicated 
both to politicians and to the people.” (Informant 1). In this  case the logic of 
leverage is lost, but both towards politicians and the public an emphasis on being 
popular is seen as a recipe for increasing support. 
Popular support, however, is not just a case of poll numbers or generic 
supporters, it is also connected with member participation. Their role is also 
understood differently: 
[…] for FOLVS, even if members are important, it  is even more important 
what we do, visibly outside. It is very good for us to have many members in 
order to say that we are a big movement. But the way we show it is more often 
through being present  in places, having stands in the street, writing op-eds, 
more than all the time saying that we have 4.500 members, I don’t think that is 
very effective if the members aren’t visible in some way. Active members are 
very important. (Informant 3)
The mere fact of having a high member count is  downplayed in favor of how 
those members participate. Active and visible members are clearly preferred 
because through their presence in the communities they increase the visibility of 
the whole organization, which is a way of garnering even more support. In 
addition, activists are also seen to participate actively in the governing of the 
organization: “So power is close at hand, and power is distributed evenly. So 
there is  a low threshold to talk to who you want to talk to.” (Informant 2). Both 
the organizational culture and structure are described as showing great 
89
similarities  with NU and NNV, which is  not surprising if one takes  account of the 
close relationship between these organizations and FOLVS. 
Further, for it to be popular the support must also be broad. For one, this  means 
that their members and supporters have a wide variety of backgrounds. More 
important than background, however, is an indiscriminate approach to people’s 
reasons for their engagement. Some people’s  engagement stem from their 
closeness to the potentially affected area, others from a concern for the climate or 
for classical environmental protection. Those concerns may be different, but they 
are all equally accepted in FOLVS. For even if the focus of the organization is 
narrow, namely stopping oil exploration in LVS, they do not want to paint a 
picture of themselves as  a narrow community, rather the opposite: “This must be 
a platform where one with different starting points can show that one does not 
want oil and gas activity.” (Informant 2). Even if they view local participation as 
especially important, they do not operate with any exclusionary mechanisms. 
Participation, from the perspective of the FOLVS-informants, is  open to 
everyone. Through examining the two identity markers  ‘local adherence’ and 
‘popular support’ we can clearly see that even though the informants imbue local 
participation with a special importance, FOLVS does not exclude others from 
participation, they want to appeal as  broadly and to as  many as possible. As such 
the informants’ image of a folkeaksjon shows great similarity to the concept of 
folkebevegelse. The two central differing elements are the limited scope and the 
brief ad hoc nature of a folkeaksjon, as it is only focused on one goal, and has no 
further purpose once that goal is reached. 
5.4 Movement Identification
In the above analysis we have seen that the informants sketch out three different 
ways of participatory involvement. In NNV participation is connected to 
empowerment and exercising both internal and external democratic functions. 
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Within FIVH the democratic aspect, while present, was downplayed. Instead, the 
informants described a change in participation patterns, from being long-term 
and involving, to being short-term and pragmatic. For the FOLVS-informants 
local participation was of particular importance, but not to the point of excluding 
participation based on other criteria. This diversity of focus  is partly a feature of 
the open interview style, which did not follow a rigid format. The question of 
participant identity, for example, was a central topic in my conversations with the 
FIVH-informants, but only marginal in the material from NNV. From this one 
cannot conclude that member identity is not an important topic within NNV, only 
that the NNV-informants emphasized other factors. With that caveat in mind, 
however, I will claim that these differences in emphasis do reflect real 
differences between the organizations. The NNV-informants’ focus on the 
empowering aspect of participation reflect the prominent role of their local 
groups. While local participation in FOLVS is  grounded in their connection to 
the LVS-region, the preoccupation with identity in FIVH reflects its history 
where lifestyle changes have been central. 
In chapter 2.2 we saw that the Bergen Group identifies a trend towards a sharper 
split between the local and the central levels of NEM organizations – what they 
refer to as the dual-organizational society. As we have seen, within NNV, the 
grassroots  are still held to have a strong influence on the operation of the 
organization. Regarding FIVH, because they shifted towards a democratic 
organizational structure comparatively late it is hard to claim that they are 
moving toward a split. Nonetheless, in FIVH, there is a clearer sense of division 
between the two levels, as  the info-center is  considered to overshadow the local 
group’s influence even if the latter enjoy democratic privileges. Being a recent 
addition to NEM, it is interesting that FOLVS has chosen to follow a traditional 
democratic organizational model closer to their partners, NNV and NU. 
Accordingly, the FOLVS-informants  emphasized both the importance of the local 
groups and their proximity to the central decision making process. From the 
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DMO-informants’ perspective, then, there is  little to indicate a further movement 
toward a dual-organizational society. For them the grassroots level still has a 
salient influence on the operation of the DMOs. This conclusion comes with 
three caveats, however. First, since almost all the informants came from the 
central level of their respective DMO, their views do not represent the grassroots, 
who might have a different perception of the situation. Second, as we saw 
strongest in the case of FOLVS, talking up activism and support is seen as 
making it more attractive – a fact that incentives the embellishment of the 
strength and influence of activists. Third, the conclusion underplays that among 
the informants there is an understanding of changing engagement patterns. A 
statement by a FIVH informant is  representative in this regard: “[…] there is a 
transition away from the week-to-week organizing, where one physically attend 
local meetings. That is on the way down, and it has been for a long 
time.” (Informant 4). Even if the informants view the grassroots as  still having 
influence on their DMO, on the whole they acknowledge that grassroots 
engagement is not the same as it was.
Common among all three organizations  was a positive view on mass 
mobilization. The FOLVS-informants  explicitly label their own organization a 
folkeaksjon, on the count of their broad and open support base. Even though 
FIVH officially has transitioned from a movement to an organization, the 
informants point out lingering movement aspects, like being part of a broader 
network, and the aspiration of having the effect of a movement through new 
types of campaigns. The aspiration of being a folkebevegelse is  also present in 
NNV, though it is  not fully endorsed as an accurate description of the 
organization. It is noticeable that the DMO-informants  for the most orient 
themselves toward what I in chapter 2.1 described as the Norwegian concept of 
folkebevegelse. This was by far their term of preference. The alternative term 
bevegelse (movement) was used sparingly, while sosiale bevegelser, a term less 
familiar in the Norwegian context, was not mentioned at all. According to their 
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name, in FOLVS’ case the term of use was folkeaksjon, which largely carries the 
same connotations, save for a narrower focus and a clearer emphasis on swift and 
immediate action. The informants’ use of folkebevegelse might, on a couple 
occasions, have been caused by me introducing the term. But, interestingly, when 
spoken by the informants, it was always imbued with the core meaning of a 
broad and large support. Thus  their use of the term should not necessarily be 
considered an effect of the interviews.
This does not mean that these organizations are folkebevegelser, only that term 
plays a central part in the way the informants understand their own organizations. 
As the Bergen Group notes  referring to NNV and FIVH: “Those organizations 
that see themselves as a part of a democratic folkebevegelse, are not always what 
they claim to be […]” (Strømsnes and Selle 1996b: 282). Nevertheless, it is 
important to remark, first, that the informants’ claims are not baseless. It is  not 
just from the perspective of the informants that the input of the people in terms of 
activism is seen as important for the success of their campaigns. FOLVS-activists 
gathered 53.000 signatures against oil-drilling in LVS, putting the issue and the 
organization on the map (Pedersen 2009). The work NNV’s local groups do 
around the country is vital for the protection of landscapes and vulnerable species 
and habitats (see e.g. Falch 2013, Heimberg 2014). And short-term activism has 
been an effective weapon in FIVH-campaigns, e.g. when pressing companies to 
change their practice. (Fossmark 2013). Even if their support isn’t massive, the 
DMOs do rely on public participation to some extent to further their ends. 
Second, through stressing their folkebevegelse-credentials the DMOs are drawing 
on a culturally specific image of how activism is done. In this image participation 
is  painted as both large and broad, stressing cooperation more than antagonism. It 
is  measured against this image the informants find their organizations lacking, 
when noting they have too few members. But it is also this image they follow 
when they describe what they want for their organizations: To be massive, to be 
open for everyone, and to have an impact. 
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As we saw in chapter 2.1 the term folkebevegelse is in the literature associated 
with single organizations. Using the term in a similar way, the informants 
described their organization as a folkebevegelse, rather than as part of a 
folkebevegelse. This does not mean that they don’t see their own organizations as 
participating in a broader movement composed of a network of actors. As we saw 
in the case of FIVH, it was described both as an incubator for several sister-
organizations, and as collaborator with other organizations. Through NNV’s 
active involvement in the founding of FOLVS, the two organizations share an 
intimate connection. The three DMOs also work together on larger campaigns: 
“We cooperate with the other organizations on very many climate campaigns, 
and that is a very conscious move. Because through [cooperation] we are bigger 
and stronger.” (Informant 9). Indirectly described here is a network of 
cooperating organizations, a phenomenon closer in line with the SMT-definition 
of a movement. Miljøbevegelsen (the environmental movement) is a fitting term 
to describe this network. Among the informants  from all three DMOs this term 
was used as a point of identification, connecting their organization to the 
network. Regarding this cooperation one informant said that “[…] the relations 
within miljøbevegelsen has become more congenial, we have gotten better at 
patting each other’s backs and cooperating, there were some hard fronts that are 
in the process of softening […]” (Informant 7). In chapter 2.3 we saw that the 
Bergen Group did not find a common identity that united the ‘environmental 
field’. What we do find, however, if we focus on the DMOs here under study, is, 
if not a strong common identity, at least a common claims of identification. First, 
informants from all three DMOs draw on the image of folkebevegelse when 
describing their own organization. Second, the informants  in all three 
organizations identify their DMO as belonging to the same network, as part of 
miljøbevegelsen. On the face of it this seems to agree with Hjelmar (1996) that 
even if the DMOs operate as pressure groups, when interacting with the 
government, they still harbor a lingering movement identification. 
94
Chapter 6: Organizational Roles
All organizations fill different roles in different contexts. A DMO might play one 
role when dealing with the government, and another when cooperating with other 
organizations, corporate partners, or their members. In this chapter I will expand 
my analysis of the three environmental DMOs by focusing on the roles they play 
when interacting with ‘the people’. The analysis  will be moving back and forth 
between describing the explicit and implicit levels of the informants’ 
understanding. On the explicit level I will seek to describe the role or roles the 
informants most prominently identify with their organization. This means I will 
not attempt to write a full taxonomy of all the roles these organizations fill, 
neither in general nor in relation to ‘the people’; my focus will be limited to the 
roles most emphasized by the informants. Keeping close to the informants’ 
statements, I also want to examine if the informants implicitly or explicitly 
identify one overarching role in relation to all members and supporters or if they 
understand the roles of their organizations differently with respect to different 
groups. Since the organizations’ roles, as we shall see, are connected to assisting 
activism, the way their roles are performed will also inform us about what is 
perceived as hindering people’s engagement in these organizations. 
In the following sub-chapters the discussion will revolve around the roles of the 
three organizations: Chapter 6.1 will describe NNV as a provider of voice and 
service, chapter 6.2 will focus on FIVH as educator and mobilizer, and FOLVS’ 
role as facilitator will be the topic of chapter 6.3. In chapter 6.4 I will argue that 
the different roles  explored are all concerned with making participation and 
activism easier by removing both practical and ideological barriers to 
engagement in the DMOs. Based on these roles  – and the importance put upon 
broad popular participation in chapter 5 – the DMOs should be categorized as 
having inclusive identities. 
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6.1 NNV: Provider of Voice and Service
How does the NNV-informants understand the roles  their organization play in 
relation to the people? Through the analysis of the interview material I could 
discern that the NNV-informants implicitly identity an overarching role 
pertaining to the organizations relation to ‘the people’: that of voice provider. It 
also became clear, however, that this role is framed in two different manners 
depending on the target group. I could discern a distinction between NNV’s voice 
provision and advocacy work on behalf of all ‘environmentally 
interested’ (miljøinteresserte), and its service and voice provision to local group 
members  within the organization. This might seem like an obvious distinction to 
make, but, as we shall see in the following sections, there is a clearer divide 
between inside members and outside supporters in the way the NNV-informants 
present their organization, than in both FIVH and FOLVS. 
The role the NNV-informants put most emphasis on with regard to internal 
members  and activists was that of a provider of organizational service. As I will 
try to show, however, the role of service provider is intimately linked with the 
provision of voice. We can start by looking at a quote describing different kinds 
of service provided: 
I think that we to a large extent are a service agency [serviceorgan], at least the 
section I work in, which is the organization and communication department, 
we are of course supposed to support [gi oppfølging] and service [gi service]. 
Then there is the specialist department [fagavdelingen] who are very 
competent, but it is a lot about teaching and supporting the local groups, giving 
tips and advice as to how they can work with their cases where [the activists] 
live. So I think of the central office as a service agency. (Informant 12)
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That the main office was a provider of support and service to the local groups 
and their members was an oft-repeated refrain throughout the interviews with the 
NNV-informants. In fact, it was seen as so central to the operation of their main 
office that the lack of it was described by one informant as resulting in member 
complaints: 
When you are a democratic organization, and you have a central section 
[sentralledd] that work at the office, it can always be someone who thinks that 
the central office gets too much power, or use too many resources or provides 
too little service, not enough help when it is needed, so that  is a lingering 
debate. (Informant 8) 
Three different activities  were talked about by the informants as part of this 
group or member service. The first was practical support, which is  mainly the 
domain of the organization and communication department. Practical support 
involves sending material, organizing member lists, communicating 
organizational information and news, assisting with member recruitment, etc. 
The second activity framed as a type of service was  internal capacity building 
(skolering). Whereas NNV for some time has  held courses for activists in 
general, it is only in the last years they have held leadership courses. These 
courses focus on: “How to strategize, how to work with the media, how issues 
should be framed in the media for them to be picked up, but also how to appear 
as an organization.” (Informant 8). The third form of service provision was 
connected more directly to the members’ activism: 
 
Being a member of NNV, then you have a whole organization backing you. 
You can say that we are 21.000 members who thinks that Bymarka in Arendal 
must be protected, rather than ‘we are five people here who think this would be 
a bit cool’. It is getting the support of the whole organization, and that you 
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have an apparatus, you have a secretariat that can help you with things, can 
help you to write hearings or press releases [...] (Informant 12)
When doing activism the local group members of NNV can count, not only on 
the practical support of the central office, but also on the power of the whole 
organization’s backing. 
As we have seen, the provision of service is explicitly identified by the 
informants as  a prominent role of the organization. When considering the goal of 
this  service, however, it is clear that the role of service provider ties directly in 
with the provision of voice or representation. Through providing organizational 
support and service NNV enables local activists to raise their own voices: 
But I think that in some cases we have a local presence in order for people to 
channel one’s engagement in environmental problems, [...] to join NNV, to be a 
part, and to raise one’s voice is then a possibility. Both to influence local 
decisions and to participate in influencing national decisions. (Informant 10)
It is important to note that in the literature on civil society the provision of voice 
and service are treated as distinct. Whereas the provision of voice has to do with 
interest representation, the provision of service is connected to welfare 
(Wijkström and Zimmer 2011: 11-2). Welfare service, however, is not the type of 
service the informants see NNV as providing. In their way of speaking, provision 
of service is not identified with welfare benefits to individual members, but with 
benefits that help activists do their volunteer work. For them, the service they 
provide is thus intrinsically linked to providing voice. 
Despite all the support provided by the organization, the informants acknowledge 
that it is still difficult to get activists to commit time to volunteer for NNV: 
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This is a volunteer organization and it is supposed to be on a volunteer basis, 
and people do have a lot to do in their spare time. You have a job and a family 
and you are perhaps involved in the kids’ after-school activities, and then there 
are people that think that [volunteering] involves a lot more responsibility and 
work than it necessarily does. (Informant 12)
Two obstacles to activism are identified here, too little time and too much 
responsibility. Except for sporadic insistences that NNV-activism wasn’t really 
that time-consuming or wouldn’t necessarily involve much responsibility, 
however, actual strategies for removing said obstacles  were not mentioned. 
Instead the informants lauded the considerable work and volunteer effort put 
down by those who were active: “There are very many incredibly talented people 
in NNV and in our local groups that I am very impressed by. Both with regard to 
the competence they have and the effort they put in […]” (Informant 10). 
In relation to their members it is clear that the NNV-informants see their role as 
service and voice providers in the sense I described above. The provision of 
service, however, is  reserved for those affiliated with the organization, and is thus 
not extended to those outside NNV, unless, of course, they want to become 
members. With regard to NNV’s role in relation to the rest of ‘the people’, viz. 
the public, the informants’ views were more difficult to ascertain. One possible 
reason for this  difficulty is that NNV’s outreach efforts have often been indirect. 
Mobilization efforts, as  we saw in Chapter 5.1, have in several cases been run 
through people’s actions, instead of through NNV directly. More consumer 
oriented outreach used to be funneled through the now defunct Grønn Hverdag, a 
joint project with several other organizations that was discontinued for financial 
reasons. That is not to say that their public outreach is non-existent, it just hasn’t 
been prioritized: “We contribute, we are in a dialogue with the communes, we 
work with the county governor [fylkesmann], we work with the government, 
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more than we have talked to each individual person and said ‘you must do 
this’.” (Informant 9). 
What role, then, do the informants see their organization as taking in relation to 
the public? One informant suggests that NNV fills an educator role: “Yes, I 
would say that through a part of our work, we do a lot of information work. Both 
through, when we are present locally it is about information stands and talking to 
people and do educational work […]” (Informant 10). Two such campaigns were 
mentioned especially, the Energismart-campaign and the Oljefri-campaign. Even 
if these campaigns form a part of NNV’s operation the informants, however, are 
reluctant to ascribe this role as central to the organization. The same informant 
continued: “But it isn’t our most important job to be a … still, we must watch 
ourselves for doing the job of the authorities as well.” (Informant 10). Continuing 
in the same vein another informant decried: “What campaigns? We don’t have 
the means to really make something that we really know is going to reach people, 
so we have to make it in-house, and try to get it out in the media, that is how it 
is.” (Informant 11). This jibe did not complain that there were no campaigns. It 
rather suggested that they were underfunded and of a smaller scale. These and 
similar statements sow doubt over the claim that the educator role, though 
certainly present, is the most prominent role of NNV in relation to the public. 
A more prominent suggestion was  connected to the provision of voice. One 
informant mentioned that NNV, through its  environmental work, represented, not 
just the concerns of activists, but what the majority of the people want: “[…] 
most frequently we very often have the majority with us, then, in surveys, they 
v e r y o f t e n s h o w t h a t p e o p l e a r e v e r y p r o n a t u r e a n d t h e 
environment.” (Informant 9). Does this mean that the informants agree that 
NNV represents  the general public? One respondent drew attention to the fact 
that some of the organization’s  opinions  are far from the mainstream, especially 
regarding conservation issues: “There are 1% who are negatively inclined to 
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hydropower and that is our members, haha. That is, kind of, not the 
masses.” (Informant 8). While NNV does support some popular causes the 
informants were aware that it does not uniformly do so. A more nuanced 
assessment that better seemed to capture the informants’ understanding held that 
NNV represents those who are environmentally interested: “[…] we are the ones 
who represent the grassroots and those interested in the environment 
[miljøinteresserte] in Norway.” (Informant 10). In this way, when NNV is doing 
advocacy work in the media, and when they work with the various levels of the 
government, they are framed as speaking for and representing those who care 
about the environment. 
We can observe then, that even if there are considerable differences between the 
two roles discussed, both have to do with the provision of voice. With regard to 
the members the informants  view their organization’s roles  as providing service 
for the purpose of letting their members have a say, in this way enabling their 
members. With regard to the public, the same notion of service does not apply, 
but the notion of voice does, only here it takes on a different form. Providing 
voice for the environmentally interested means speaking for them, while 
providing voice for the members means helping them speak for themselves. 
6.2 FIVH: Educator and Mobilizer
So far in our analysis of FIVH we have seen how its transition from a movement 
to an organization has been understood by the informants. The roles  which FIVH 
has taken toward the people, in contrast, have been more stable. The two 
interconnected roles of educator and mobilizer have been central to FIVH since 
its inception, and accordingly the informants explicitly identify them as such. 
These roles  are overarching, i.e., it is the roles the FIVH-informants see their 
organization take both toward members and outside supporters. That is not to say 
that FIVH doesn't have other roles  in relation to ‘the people’. The provision of 
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service was briefly mentioned by the FIVH-informants, but was overshadowed 
by the two other roles and will not be discussed in the following.
We have already seen how the info-center played an important part in the 
founders’ strategy of enlightening people about the unjust resource distribution of 
the world and how individuals  could act to improve it. Employing a broad focus 
FIVH’s education activity today ranges from broadly appealing consumer tips to 
more narrowly oriented reports  and investigatory expositions. Thus, both the 
info-center and the closely aligned educator role have continued to characterize 
FIVH’s work and are key to how the informants understand FIVH today. Just as 
central as the role of educator is the role of mobilizer: “I think the most important 
function we have is mobilization, and perhaps initiate and spearhead some 
processes, it is in a way about moving [bevege] and mobilizing [mobilisere]. 
Mobilizing people to join, get involved and you start something.” (Informant 7). 
We have already looked at the informants’ lingering aspiration for FIVH to be a 
movement, in the sense of having the capacity to mobilize. Important to note 
here, however, is that the two roles of educator and mobilizer are not seen as 
contradictory or unrelated, they are understood as deeply intertwined: 
For FIVH’s part the history  here in any case is that the main office was an info-
center. It has been a point the whole time both to run a popular education 
program (folkeopplysning), and that when you have enlightened people about a 
topic, give people an alternative course of action (handlingsalternativ), giving 
people the opportunity for concrete action on the basis of an established 
problem. (Informant 4)
In this way the educator role is not about spreading neutral information. Instead, 
through its  focus on establishing problems with accompanying courses of action 
it is deeply connected to motivating and mobilizing people to effectuate change. 
Among the FIVH informants the educator-mobilizer role is perceived as the role 
102
people want them to play, giving them information and solutions which they see 
as useful: “I think primarily that it is a model that actually is  in line with 
something people want.” (Informant 4).
A central factor when providing such action oriented information is the 
informants’ clear picture of who their members  and supporters are. They know, 
e.g., that about 2/3 of their members are female, they mostly live in urban areas, 
they are highly educated and have a median income. This information stems not 
only from interaction with members and the public, it is  backed by member 
surveys, opinion polls and interaction data from social media statistics. And it is 
knowledge actively used when targeting potential members or activists: 
We have reason to believe that these groups have a special interest in the topics 
that the organization work with. We think that is an acknowledgment we have, 
and I also think that the way  forward, where we have the greatest chance of 
succeeding, at least when it  comes to fetching new members, then it will be in 
these segments here. (Informant 4)
Their knowledge doesn't stop at who to target but they also have clear picture of 
how best to reach them through the media: 
We know a bit about who watches NRK, who reads Aftenposten and regional 
newspapers which we reckon are central for us. It  is based on user surveys and 
the like. Especially NRK is a big institution and they have different platforms, 
but they have many  platforms that hit our target group  pretty good. So I would 
say that we have fairly many discussions on choice of press, media for our 
messages. (Informant 4)
Access to the media is something they work to obtain, but is not perceived as 
difficult: “[…] as late as yesterday there was a debate on Dagsnytt 18, where 
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Arild [Hermstad, leader of FIVH] was present. Which he is  often, he has almost 
got a punch card [klippekort] in these settings, so we are on the inside of that 
arena.” (Informant 7). This detailed knowledge both of their potential supporters 
and how to reach them leaves the impression of an organization which takes 
education and mobilization of their supporters very seriously. 
The fact that targeted communication is of importance to FIVH is a heritage from 
founder Erik Dammann whose background was from the advertising industry. 
The advertising roots are still noticeable through their current cooperation with 
advertising firms like Uniform. Through one such collaboration a categorization 
of FIVH’s supporters was drawn up for internal use. They divided their member 
base into four different segments. There was Sølve og Sølvi Selvberger (Self-
sufficient), representing a small group of eco-minded idealists and self-
sufficiency advocates, who grew their own food. Wenche Verdi (Value) was an 
elderly widow, connected to missionary circles, and represented those with a 
burning desire for solidarity. Arne og Anne Almén (Common), representing the 
largest group, were urban, public sector workers, who supported FIVH’s ideals, 
but didn't live up to them in practice because of a busy work and kids schedule 
(tidsklemma). The last group was represented by a student who ate organic food 
and was well versed in the theoretical groundwork of environmentalism. The 
impact of this  categorization should, however, not be overstated: “It has been 
used a bit, it was referred to, a kind of reference point sometimes […] but it is of 
course very rough and generalizing […] And I don't think people are as  different 
as we want to believe.” (Informant 7). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
this  categorization is  reflected in how FIVH presents itself. They have, for 
instance, tried to avoid using images  of too alternative self-sufficient types on the 
cover of their magazine because it would be seen as an endorsement, in a way it 
wouldn't in other more mainstream publications: 
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Yes, we wanted to frame ourselves in a different  way, because it was, it would 
be too one-sided, and it would be perceived as if we said ‘this is how everyone 
should live, this is a great  idea, move to the countryside and get  a millstone and 
live that way’. And we didn't mean that […] (Informant 7) 
FIVH, then, is an organization that not only has a clear picture of its supporters 
and how to reach them. It also uses that information in their education and 
mobilization efforts to frame themselves in specific ways. On the one hand they 
target specific groups seen to be especially receptive to their message. On the 
other they try to avoid appearing too extreme in order to attract a broader 
segment of the public. This dynamic will be explored further in Chapter 7.2 with 
regard to FIVH’s connection to moralism. 
Since the aim of FIVH’s information work is  to motivate action the informants 
often put emphasis on communication features  that could help or hinder activism 
and mobilization. Positive, inspiring messages in a feel-good wrapping is  seen as 
important: “[…] we want to inspire, and we often feel we succeed doing that 
[…]” (Informant 5). A key communication feature of the educator-mobilizer role 
in FIVH, is  the distinction frequently made by the informants between abstract 
and concrete information. Whereas abstract, complicated, technical information 
removed from everyday life is seen as a hindrance, information that is presented 
in a concrete, simple manner, and connected to the people’s everyday lives is 
preferred: 
[…] we have to meet people where they are, and with the cases they are 
concerned about, in a way that impacts them, and then it is just a fact that you 
can’t talk about system critique at an abstract level, it isn't easy to get people 
involved. You can explain to people that the jeans you have are actually a very 
bad solution, there are other ways to make it, or if we give the workers at least 
ten kroner more an hour, then they would have a salary, that  is a decent life. So, 
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simpler things are easier to get people involved, and then perhaps, to the degree 
it is a point, get people involved in the encompassing politics. (Informant 7) 
Another important distinction the informants make is that between high and low 
bar activities  (høy- og lavterskeltilbud). Low bar activities could involve, e.g., 
signing a petition, receiving newsletters  or becoming a passive member. The idea 
being that “[…] to start off with some low bar activities would be a gateway to 
participating in something bigger the next time.” (Informant 5). This would 
include joining a local group or participating in a campaign or protest. The 
people are to be met with concrete easy to grasp information about a problem and 
practical simple solutions to that problem, with the hope that they will be become 
more involved. 
Inherent in such a strategy is  the notion, as  we saw Informant 7 put it above, that 
“[…] it isn't easy to get the people involved […]”. If we interpret the abstract/
concrete distinction as  more than a just strategical tool, it can also be seen as  a 
diagnosis of why it is difficult to motivate people: the problem is too abstract or 
removed from them to be grasped. In a similar vein the low-bar activities suggest 
that the people aren't willing to do demanding work on behalf of the 
organization. That isn't to say that the informants see the people as  cognitively 
unable to understand complex issues and morally unwilling to act on them. 
Instead they see it as a function of available time and a busy schedule: “[…] 
people are very busy today and they have many irons in the fire, so not everyone 
feel that they have the time to involve themselves in volunteer work in that way. 
Or to prioritize it.” (Informant 5). At this juncture the personality categorization 
we described above comes into play as well. The picture we have drawn up of 
FIVH’s education and mobilization role appears to be directed at the most 
common FIVH supporter, the Alméns. This is  a family that aren't able to follow 
all of FIVH’ ideology because they don't have the time. They need someone who 
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makes it easier for them, by providing information and action alternatives; and 
that is the role FIVH attempts to fill. 
6.3 FOLVS: Facilitator
What role do the FOLVS-informants  see their organization take in relation to the 
people? As is the case with any organization FOLVS’ realm of operation is 
constrained both by resources and by competing organizations. I will begin this 
section by considering a statement by an informant that is as much about what 
roles FOLVS doesn’t occupy as the ones it does: 
The strategic assessment from our side is that we don’t have the resources to be 
present at every  meeting about this case and in all hearings [høringer], to learn 
every  new fact. We have partners for that who do well. Our role is more to 
relay this to the people, and try  to involve more, and gather the great grassroots 
passion. (Informant 3)
At the same time as lacking resources limits FOLVS’ ability to take on the roles 
of fact-finders  or bureaucratic negotiators, the presence of other capable 
organizations in their field is also perceived to limit the need for FOLVS to 
engage in such roles. Instead the informant here alludes to two central roles of 
the organization: the role of an intermediary between the experts/authorities and 
the people; and that of an involver who gathers grassroots engagement. Those 
were not the only roles that came up in my conversations with the informants. 
Also mentioned was the role of a unifier (“FOLVS unites people who have very 
different reasons for being against oil drilling there [LVS].” (Informant 3)), and 
that of a facilitator (tilrettelegger). Among these, I want to put emphasis on the 
facilitator role. Through the turn of phrase ‘to facilitate’ (å legge til rette for) it 
stood out as the role most frequently alluded to. It is also the one I deem the most 
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central, and that through which all the other roles should be understood in light 
of, as I will attempt to show.
What does being a facilitator mean in practical terms? First, it means setting the 
entry bar low. The informants claim that FOLVS puts an effort into making it as 
easy as  possible for people to give their support: “[…] each time someone wants 
to get involved we have to pick it up and facilitate so that everyone who wants to 
get engaged in FOLVS are enabled.” (Informant 2). This means both making it 
easier to become a regular member as well as supporting grassroots  initiatives. 
Such an approach might sound a bit indiscriminate and indeed the types  of 
projects that have come out of this bottom-up strategy show great range: 
The thing about FOLVS is that there is room for every possible way of 
organizing. Some do yoga against oil drilling, and just do yoga, but makes the 
cause visible. While others are more directed towards the politicians, going to 
local council meetings and persuading the council to say no to oil exploration. 
But FOLVS has not chosen between those strategies, we shall house all 
possible ways of getting involved against oil exploration. (Informant 3)
This entails that supporting FOLVS might be termed minimally committal: “I 
think a lot of the motivation comes from people seeing that it works, that it is 
possible, that FOLVS, there aren’t many things  that you have to agree with 
[…]” (Informant 2). When you sign up, you sign up for one thing, you do not 
commit to a long list of causes. In keeping with the narrow focus of the 
organization and the perceived importance of a broad public appeal FOLVS’ 
chosen path stays away from heavy ideological baggage and grand visions. That 
doesn't mean that they don't have any visions concerning the future they want, 
sustainability is  frequently mentioned for instance, but the specifics are mostly 
left out: “It is complicated, because we agree on one unifying thing, that we don't 
want oil and gas activity. And then we have phrases concerning everything else 
108
one can do, that are very general phrases.” (Informant 2). Concretely this 
position means, as  we have seen, that they don’t advocate against oil exploration 
in other areas than LVS. Neither do they take a stand against the main driver of 
oil drilling, i.e., oil consumption: “But that is  also a natural cause of us only 
caring about oil exploration in Lofoten, and there are many links (ledd) from that 
to people’s consumption.” (Informant 1). 
When asked whether it is unfortunate that the organization can’t give a more 
specific new vision for the region one informant answered: “No I don't think so. I 
think it is  really positive because the whole point is  to get a debate.” (Informant 
2). Instead of imposing specific visions for the region, other than that it should be 
oil-free, they want to spur enthusiasm and debate around the future of LVS where 
the locals themselves can be heard: “There are lots of people that care about this 
case, and we are facilitating for that to be shown.” (Informant 1). 
If we look back at the other roles mentioned above, through the lens of the 
facilitator role we see that we can describe them with more specificity: Being a 
facilitator not only means  to relay information, but doing so in a matter that 
makes it easier for people to be engaged, and without trying to impose ones 
views; it means  not only to gather and involve people, but to make it as  easy as 
possible to join; not only to unify people around a single cause, but to avoid 
trying to make them commit to more ideological standpoints. Does this minimal 
approach mean that they think people are lazy or not as engaged in their cause? 
The short answer is no. As the above quote shows, one assessment is that the 
people are already engaged, the problem is rather to make that engagement 
visible. But a lull in activity at the time of the interviews caused by their 
temporary victory makes the question of engagement more pressing: “People still 
care just as much about the case, but they might not participate as much at the 
moment because it doesn't feel like the most important case, there are a lot of 
other cases more acute at the moment.” (Informant 1). If not a judgement on 
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people as lazy, it is  at least an acknowledgment of the difficulty of motivating 
people. Another obstructing factor is the competition from other causes: “[…] of 
course we know that it doesn't weigh the most when people choose which party 
they vote for. But it can at least have an impact.” (Informant 1). The facilitator 
role can be seen as  an answer to both these challenges  by making it as easy as 
possible for people to be involved. 
Being a facilitator thus means  taking a very pragmatic approach to activism. An 
approach where the number and especially the visibility of supporters  count, 
hence a broad, inclusive approach with low barriers to entry. Even if local 
support, as we saw in chapter 5.3, are deemed important, FOLVS’ outreach is 
open for everyone. To further ensure engagement they have chosen to keep a 
narrow focus, honing in on one central aim, at the same time as avoiding 
potentially alienable positions  such as anti-consumerism or anti-oil exploration. 
Going beyond the narrow focus would also be going beyond the role of 
facilitator. 
6.4 Inclusive Identity
In the above analysis I found in each organization a different, though similar, 
overarching role. This does not mean that the DMOs treat all people the same 
way, or that the DMOs have the same strategy to reach all groups of people. They 
do, of course, behave differently when it comes to passive and active members, 
avid supporters and more reluctant ones. To state that there is an overarching role 
means rather that there is an overarching coherence in the way the DMOs behave 
with respect to these various segments. In FOLVS activism was facilitated for 
members  and supporters  alike. Similarly, in FIVH, members and supporters were 
to be educated and mobilized. This  could happen in various manners and through 
various channels, but the overarching role guiding this interaction would be the 
same. This is  best illustrated with the case of NNV. While their role in relation to 
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members  was as a service provider, in the public context the role concerned the 
representation of those environmentally interested. Both roles, as we have seen, 
are connected to the provision of voice. 
As for the different roles  of the three DMOs they all share the similarity of 
assisting activism. Does this  similarity mean that the roles here described are but 
different names put on the same phenomenon? No, the roles  are not 
interchangeable; instead their differences highlight real differences between the 
organizations. It is  not coincidental that NNV, the organization with the most 
extensive local network, is also the organization where service provision to local 
group members is  identified as a key role. Their orientation toward the 
government, both at the local and national level, is also a natural fit with the 
provision of voice. The educator-mobilizer role in FIVH, in contrast, reflects the 
organization’s stronger orientation towards individuals. FOLVS’ facilitator role is 
predicated on the narrow focus of a single issue organization and would not fit 
organizations with a more diverse portfolio of activities. 
When that is said, the similarity of the roles adopted by the DMOs is revealing in 
several respects. First of all, their concern for assisting activism confirms what 
we saw in chapter 5: the DMOs value popular engagement within their 
organizations. In addition, the similarity of the roles points both to common 
challenges facing the DMOs and to common solutions. The informants feel that 
the people are hard to engage, they are perceived as busy and preoccupied with 
other activities. I will refrain from positing a cause and effect relation here, but it 
is  natural to connect the roles which focus on activating people, on the one hand, 
with the perception of a disengaged public, on the other. For all three DMOs, 
activism is to be made easier by removing potential barriers to engagement – a 
strategy which includes both making participation practically uncomplicated as 
well as easier to accept ideologically. NNV’s provision of service to local group 
members; FIVH’s focus  on low-bar activities; FOLVS’ openness to supporting 
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grassroots  initiatives: all are examples  of practical facilitation for the purpose of 
making activism easier. Among the informants there also seems to be a 
recognition that it is not conducive to participation to be identified as too radical. 
In chapter 5.1 we saw how NNV, instead of organizing the popular opposition to 
the Lofoten oil exploration in-house, channeled participation into FOLVS. By 
avoiding the associations to NNV’s more contentious  policies, thus making 
opposition to oil look less radical, the barriers  to participation were lowered. 
Accordingly, FOLVS, as  a single issue organization, has avoided taking 
controversial stances outside their position against the Lofoten oil exploration. In 
the case of FIVH the organization is  trying to distance itself from being 
associated with images of self-sufficient types, for fear of alienating their more 
moderate target groups. 
In this way the DMOs’ roles indicate an orientation toward environmental 
organizing which emphasizes pragmatism before ideology and attempts at 
transforming people’s  lifestyles. The organizations see it as  more important to 
mobilize around specific issues than to foster broader environmental sensibilities. 
In chapter 5 we saw, in all three DMOs, that participation was conceived of as 
broad and open to all. Based on the above discussion we can now observe that 
the three DMOs all show signs of an inclusive identity, as described in chapter 
2.3. This is  first indicated by the fact that the ‘we’ of the DMOs is a broad ‘we’, 
encompassing all those inclined to join. Second, after describing the DMOs’ roles 
it is clear that the informants do not see it as a prime objective of their 
organizations to foster a collective identity around the markers of a specific 
group, ideology or lifestyle. This is in agreement with the Bergen Group’s 
observation of a shift in the organizations’ focus away from controlling their 
members  ‘faith’: “Now, attitudes, to a larger degree are developed other places  – 
before people approach the organizations.” (Strømsnes and Selle 1996a: 29). To 
clarify, that there is no attempt to foster a collective identity around a specific 
(exclusive) group, ideology or lifestyle, does  not mean that there is  no collective 
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identity. It means rather that the collective identity of these organizations is 
inclusive, i.e., based on a broad inclusive ‘we’. 
Having an inclusive identity has been linked to weaker solidarity between 
members  (Saunders 2008: 237). In contrast, according to Della Porta and Diani, 
having a stronger connection, like in the case of organizations with exclusive 
identities, brings the advantage of reducing risks and costs of participation: “[…] 
feeling part of a shared endeavor and identifying one’s own interests  not only at 
the individual level but also at the collective level makes costs and risks more 
acceptable than they would otherwise have been.” (2006: 102). The DMOs’ 
inclusive identity and their roles related to assisting activism could be seen as a 
different way of reducing costs and risks for the participants. Signing a petition is 
less costly/risky than a full out participation and identification. Instead of being 
motivated by a common purpose, participation is enabled by making efforts as 
easy as possible. But it makes  little sense to participate only because it is  easy, 
there has to be other motivating factors. Given that the benefits  of environmental 
activism in many cases are not linked directly to the individual in the same 
manner as in other social movements (e.g. the LGBT-movement, where the 
activists  themselves stand to benefit directly from activism) it is reasonable to 
assume that there is an element of a ‘shared endeavor’ also in this form of 
participation. One can easily imagine that those who sign petitions and partake in 
online activism feel part of a shared endeavor, just as someone engaged in a 
lifestyle change. As one FIVH-informant put it: “I think that they who are active 
[now] feel kind of a kinship with something.” (Informant 7). The difference, 
however, is the strength and intensity of the link. 
To summarize, the roles of the Norwegian DMOs reveal them as inclusive 
organizations, which instead of creating exclusive identities for their operations 
rely on weak identity connections drawn from outside the organizations. 
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Chapter 7: Public Stereotypes
A common trope throughout the interview sessions was the informants’ concern 
that the public had negative pre-conceived notions of their own organization. 
Specifically, this was expressed as a worry about being pigeonholed as elitist, 
negativist or moralist. Expressing such concerns the informants engaged in a 
characterization not of themselves or their own organization, but of the public’s 
potential understanding of these organizations. As such they were identifying a 
problematic aspect of their relationship with the people. Even though these three 
concepts can be brought under the rubric of stereotypes, it is interesting to note 
that each organization has its peculiar version. For the FOLVS-informants it was 
the issue of elitism, in FIVH it was the charge of moralism, and for NNV it was 
both moralism and negativism. 
Following the same structure as the last three chapters, I will in the upcoming 
sub-chapters  mainly focus  on two things. First, I will look at how these 
stereotypes are described within each organization. Second, I want to investigate 
how these stereotypes are dealt with, specifically to see whether the informants 
connect concrete actions or strategy changes  to remove themselves  from these 
stereotypes. In conclusion, I will argue that when reacting to the stereotypes 
associated with their organization the DMOs engage in a frame negotiation 
process, where the DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda to fit a more 
moderate image.
7.1 Negativism in NNV
In my conversations with the NNV-informants  two stereotypical views of the 
organization were mentioned, moralism and negativism. Of these two the charge 
of negativism struck a deeper chord and was seen as  a bigger problem. When the 
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label ‘moralist’ was discussed it was accepted, to a degree, as a part of who they 
were: “Afraid, no, we are moralists [moralister], of course we should be 
perceived as moralist. That is, our job is to talk about what’s important to do for 
Norway and the world.” (Informant 9). It should be pointed out that the 
acceptance of the moralist label only meant an acceptance of a specific type of 
moralism: 
Well, approaching individuals and telling them that they should feel guilty  for 
driving a car to the store, we don’t do that. We don’t want  to be that type of 
moralist. To tell [former prime minister] Stoltenberg that ‘you have a moral 
responsibility for future generations’, that is the type of moralist we are. 
(Informant 9)
The NNV-informants, then, do not see themselves as  traditional moralists 
haranguing individuals. Instead, moralism is connected to making powerful 
actors aware of their responsibility. As such it is  accepted as a fundamental part 
of the organization, and as an impetus for their activism: “We are in the business 
of [driver med] morals, so that isn’t a problem. That is as it should be […] You 
have to have a foundation.” (Informant 8). 
Moralism was neither seen as a problematic nor the most common stereotype the 
informants thought the public associated with NNV. That position was given to 
what might be called negativism: “And [people] might have an impression of 
NNV as an organization that takes care of the earth, but perhaps  also is  a bit 
against everything, to put it bluntly.” (Informant 10). Negativism can be 
categorized as a near relative of moralism. Instead of saying to people what they 
should do, you say that they can’t do what they want or are about to do. For the 
NNV-informants, negativism is seen as an unfortunate effect of their activism: 
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Because, as an environmental organization one can easily be seen as the ‘no to 
everything’ guys, you always say no […] and it  can be a bit demotivating that 
you always are the negative one, who always goes against development […] 
(Informant 12)
Saying no to development projects such as mining depots  or dams was by the 
informants seen as creating an image of the organization as negative, whiny 
(sutrete), and reactionary (bakstreversk). When speaking about NNV’s project 
Naturglede (Nature joy), which tries to connect the beauty of nature with the 
threat of climate change, one informant said: 
 
People go around the forest in Nordmarka, [and say] ‘it was nice here’. What 
we do then is to say ‘no, it actually isn’t, because this is a not a natural forest, it 
isn’t nice at all, it  is really ugly. We have a very specific [view of nature], we 
are like a poisoned chalice [malurt i begeret], nobody wants to admit to this. 
We are involved in nature wrath [naturvrede], we make people pissed off […].
(Informant 8)
Even if said half in jest, this  description nevertheless illustrates how NNV’s 
environmental stances can be perceived as standing in the way not only of 
development, but also of ordinary people’s enjoyment of nature.
NNV’s negative image was among the informants seen as something that should 
be countered, and there was already a new strategy in place. Part of the 
diagnostic was that the problem was largely driven by the media: “[…] it is  much 
easier to get media exposure by saying no to things.” (Informant 12). 
Accordingly, the solution was a new media approach. As part of the service 
provided to their members  NNV has started to include media training with advice 
on “[…] how it is smart to present our cases to the media for them to be picked 
up by the media, but also about our appearance as an organization.” (Informant 
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12). This  information was part of a new overarching communication strategy also 
used at the central level: 
In the new communication strategy we try to think in a bit new and a bit 
different way as well. Because it  easily comes to us just saying no to 
everything, at least it appears that way in the media. And now we have 
attempted to think that if we say no to something, we should also try to 
emphasize what we really say yes to. (Informant 11)
To combat the negativist stereotype, a focus on solutions, not just on problems, 
was to be implemented. Several examples were given as to how this would look 
in practice. In addition to saying no to building a new highway, they would 
promote bike lanes and footpaths. In addition to saying no to oil, they would say 
yes to renewable energy sources. In addition to just saying no to a development 
of an IKEA store in an area worth preserving, they would promote the building 
of one where it didn’t do the same damage. The phrasing ‘in addition to’ is 
important since for the informants  this change is understood as  a supplement to, 
not as a relinquishment of, their positions: “When I talk about that we shouldn’t 
just say no, but say yes, then that isn’t, we shall of course protest, that is not it. It 
is  more about trying to get a more positive spin, to get more impact.” (Informant 
11). The new strategy is  in this  way not understood as compromising their 
policies. Further, the change is seen more as  one of emphasis, than one of actual 
policy change: 
I think that we always have been focused on both [the positive and the 
negative], but that we perhaps focused more on the negative before, more on 
the consequences than the solutions. But, now we focus more on the solutions 
and that we communicate those outwards. (Informant 8)
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NNV, of course, had policies on renewables and bike paths before the change in 
communication strategy made them emphasize it to a larger extent. In this  way 
combatting negativism is perceived more as a change in communication and 
framing than as an actual change in policy. 
Recollecting our findings from chapter 5.1, a pattern starts to emerge. Just as 
NNV’s funneling of engagement into FOLVS could be seen as a way to hold on 
to controversial positions while at the same time engaging in broader initiatives, 
so is combatting negative stereotypes a way to keep their policies and attract a 
broader public. Both cases are examples of retaining a more unpopular, radical 
profile while opening up for a broader public support based on a more moderate 
image. That is, both cases are ways to avoid compromising. 
7.2 Moralism in FOLVS
As we saw in Chapter 5.2 the charge of moralism has been directed against FIVH 
since its  early years. But, whereas moralism could be seen as the glue that bound 
the early movement together around a shared identity, the informants now 
identify moralism as  a problematic stereotype that is  tied to the central educator 
role, which I explored in chapter 6.2. While, as we saw, some informants  claim 
that this  role represents the role the people want FIVH to fill, the strategy of 
focusing on individual consumption does have some risks: 
To challenge individuals has the advantage that it can make something which is 
very abstract very concrete, and bring it into people’s day-to-day life. And it 
also has the drawback that it can be perceived as moralizing, and that you push 
people away by bringing these questions up, the way you bring it up pushes 
people away […] (Informant 4). 
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First of all it is important to note that not all the informants saw moralism as 
negative, remarking that it was of importance to have a focus  on morality and to 
stand behind their moral arguments. Nevertheless, they were not keen on being 
perceived as moralists  either. “But yes, I see it as a form of danger, but it is also 
something which we have tried to avoid.” (Informant 6). In my conversations 
with them the informants used several arguments to distance FIVH from the 
moralism charge. One argument was that since there are more radical 
environmental actors with more dystopian visions, then FIVH was at least not the 
worst offender. Another argument held that since FIVH provided people with 
concrete solutions to the problems they pointed out, at least they should be 
distinguished from the guilt only variant of moralism. This amounted to in effect 
claiming that theirs was  a more constructive form of moralism. In addition, two 
informants referenced a recent in-house survey that showed that moralism isn't a 
term people outside of FIVH frequently associate with them. Through these 
examples a pattern of distancing FIVH from moralism emerges. 
The avoidance of the label of moralism has had a noticeable effect on their 
campaigns  and outreach, where they have taken concrete steps in order to 
attempt to seem less  moralistic. In chapter 6.2 we saw how FIVH’s member 
magazine avoided using images of too alternative self-sufficient types on their 
cover because it would look like an endorsement, and thus set standards too high 
for many to follow. Another example was their recent campaign to reduce meat 
consumption: 
In the food campaign we had last fall there was a very clear or pronounced 
strategy that we shouldn't at all say: ‘People, you have to stop  eating meat’ or: 
‘You have to become vegetarians’. We should say: ‘We have to eat a bit less 
meat’. And we really tried to push ‘Yes, eat a bit less meat, then you can eat 
more fruits and vegetables’. By, for example, pushing fruit and vegetables up 
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instead of just pushing meat down, yes, that was a part of the strategy. 
(Informant 6)
In both these cases, the FIVH-informants in effect describe attempts at distancing 
themselves from the moralism label. This is done by reducing the requirements 
and lowering the bar for people to follow a sustainable lifestyle. In a similar 
fashion to NNV, there is a balancing act going on between keeping their ideals 
and broadening their appeal. That is to say, the FIVH informants  don’t mind 
moralizing as long as they aren't perceived as being moralizing: 
We think that […] the consequences become greater by having a bit simpler or 
nicer communication, but our target, and the way  we work politically, for 
example, shall still be as ... the level of ambition shall still be as high. 
(Informant 6) 
Their goals are the same, they are just to be achieved through a communication 
strategy that puts emphasis on not demanding too much of people. As we have 
seen for FIVH this is a familiar problematic. Hansen, describing the organization 
in the 70s frames the problem as a wedge between “[…] the need for one 
common core that unites the participants versus an ideological openness  to gather 
as many as possible.” (Hansen 2007: 71). There are two dimensions to this 
conflict, the radical-moderate dimension, and the exclusive-inclusive dimension. 
In its  early years FIVH attempted to build a more exclusive identity based on the 
fostering of specific lifestyle choices. Now participation is less demanding, it is 
more inclusive and open to anyone at their preferred level of engagement. We 
can also see that through framing themselves  as less  moralistic, they are 
attempting to move away from being perceived as too radical by creating a more 
moderate image of themselves. Such a move is in agreement with FIVH’s 
educator-mobilizer role, where they want to appeal to the broad segment of 
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normal people. It is important to note, however, that from the informants’ point 
of view this  change has more to do with how they frame themselves than a 
change in policy. 
7.3 Elitism in FOLVS
In chapter 5.3 we saw how important local support was  for the FOLVS-
informants. Conversely, we find an equally strong enmity towards being 
perceived as lecturing elites coming from outside of the region: “And that is 
important to say, so that people don't think that it is the ‘caffe latte youths’ in 
Oslo who run this organization, because they in no way do.” (Informant 1). 
Norwegian environmentalism is  also mainly an urban phenomenon (Bortne et al. 
2002: 23), and the term ‘caffe latte youths’ used here implies ignorance of the 
local conditions, through indicating urbanity, fashion and trends, notions that are 
antithetical to an authentic long-term engagement.
Despite the organization’s firm roots in the region, the connection between 
FOLVS and urban environmentalists  isn't far-fetched considering, as  we saw in 
chapter 5, both their substantial cooperation with the other environmental 
organizations, and their close connection to Natur og Ungdom especially: “It 
might be a point that half the board comes from Natur og Ungdom and probably 
is  pretty affected by the organizational culture there […]” (Informant 3). The 
close ties between FOLVS and the rest of the environmental movement has also 
been pointed out by local proponents of the oil industry, in order to de-legitimize 
their campaign (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014: 224). Being identified in this way 
could put FOLVS in the same category as  they perceive the oil industry to fill, 
the preachy outsider:
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That we to a larger degree are people’s neighbors, who you meet on stands 
each Saturday, whereas the oil industry  is more of a business. A lot of people 
are skeptical towards those from the outside. And that is why it  is important to 
have local groups, that you are present where people are. Because the same 
could affect the environmental movement, that one flies in from Oslo and says: 
‘You must say  no to this, it is bad for you’. People are often, and rightly, 
skeptical towards others coming to lecture. (Informant 3)
These quotes do not imply that the informants think this  is  how FOLVS is 
perceived by the whole public. That notwithstanding, they clearly display an 
awareness not only of the pitfalls of being perceived as  outsider elites imposing 
their views, but also of the importance of countering such charges. This is done 
in two ways. The first involves, as we briefly mentioned in chapter 5.3, a focus 
on starting a debate about the future of the region. When “[…] the whole point is 
to get a debate.” (Informant 2), it is  harder to claim that they are imposing their 
views. To further dispel the notion of elitism the FOLVS-informants also put 
emphasis on their local credentials. The informants think that if you are 
perceived as local, that lends an aura of authenticity, which counters accusations 
of imposing one’s  views in an elitist fashion. A similar pattern of reasoning is 
also employed with regard to where the board leader should operate from: “I 
think it is really important for FOLVS that the ones  who make public statements 
are in the area [LVS], I don’t think [the board leader] could have been, or it 
would be unfortunate for FOLVS if she had been, in Oslo.” (Informant 3). 
Distancing themselves from the outsider/elitist role, in this case quite literally, 
can therefore be seen as a strategic move. Even if it doesn't mean that they are 
cut off, to operate from Lofoten does pose some logistical challenges, especially 
in a case which will be decided in Oslo and involves substantial lobbying. But on 
the plus side, not only does it diminish potential charges of being an outside elite, 
it also emphasizes the connection to the region and facilitates local participation 
in the governing of the organization. 
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Elitism, as it is portrayed here can be seen as another variant of moralism. Just 
like moralism it involves telling people what to do, the difference lies  in the 
person who lectures. The FOLVS-informants want to differentiate FOLVS both 
from the oil companies and the stereotypical urban environmental preacher. Not 
only do these actors  lack local roots, they are not affected in the same way as the 
locals are. Avoiding this  label should also be seen as  a continuation of FOLVS’ 
facilitator role, explored in chapter 6.3. When weary of being identified as 
imposing elitists, it would be difficult to take on roles where imposing one’s 
views stood central.27
7.4 Negotiating Moderation
As we can see, informants from all the three DMOs identify negative stereotypes 
in connection with their own organization. Even though the specific stereotype 
for each organization is distinct, they can all be seen as variants of moralism. 
Negativism only differs  from moralism proper in that it merely involves telling 
people what they should not do, while elitism’s distinguishing mark is  found in 
the status of the person who is  lecturing. In all three organizations  emphasis was 
put on the avoidance of being perceived in connection with ‘their’ stereotype; 
this  took the form of concrete strategies to distance themselves. First of all, what 
is  revealed here is a concern for the public’s perception of the organizations’ 
image – an observation that should not be surprising considering the DMOs’ 
positive understanding of folkebevegelser and popular participation as seen in 
chapters 5 and 6. In addition, the stereotypes and their avoidance can both tell us 
something concrete about each organization and reveal something about the 
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27 On an additional note one could speculate that a reason behind NNV’s decision not to 
enter as directly  into the Lofoten battle as they could have, say  through the founding of 
a proper local group, was to avoid the label of elitist outsider. By helping organize a 
people’s action outside of NNV, the opposition to oil exploration could enjoy  both local 
support and central backing at the same time.
Norwegian environmental sector as  a whole. In FIVH, the informants  identified 
moralism as a problem stemming from the organization’s educator role. In an 
attempt to broaden their appeal, FIVH is described as combating this stereotype 
by framing themselves as more moderate both in their demands and in their 
image. Similarly, in NNV, the stereotype of negativism is by the informants 
connected to NNV’s opposition to various development projects. By focusing 
specifically on solutions the organization attempts to challenge this stereotype by 
appearing more constructive. In FOLVS’ case the charge of elitism is connected 
to their close affiliation with other environmental organizations, and it is 
challenged by brandishing local credentials and the avoidance of holding 
lectures. The negative images the organizations are battling are from the 
informants’ perspective not unreasonably hurled upon them by outside agents, 
but are seen as  resulting from the organizations’ own activity; they are perceived 
to have some root in reality. 
In contrast to the examples from the literature (see chapter 2.4) – where the 
emphasis was  on attempts to turn negative stereotypes into something positive – 
the strategy of the DMOs is  to distance and dissociate themselves from these 
labels. Though some in FIVH and NNV accepted moralism as part of their 
identity, on the whole the impression given was that the DMOs do not dig their 
heels  in fighting to turn moralism, negativism and elitism into something 
positive. Instead, the way they attempt to gain control over their own image is by 
framing themselves as more in line with ‘normal’ people: more moderate in 
outlook; more constructive in approach; more in-tune with local sentiments. As 
such it is tempting to claim that the DMOs are engaging in the process described 
by Snow et al. (1986) as  frame transformation, the variant of the four frame 
alignment processes that closest matches  up to our case (see chapter 2.4). But 
frame transformation is described as planting new values, jettisoning old 
meanings, and reframing erroneous beliefs (Ibid.: 473). Neither of these fit the 
DMOs under study. Because the stereotypes have a root in reality the DMOs are 
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not reframing erroneous  beliefs. Instead of jettisoning old meanings, in the case 
of FIVH and NNV especially, there is an attempt at holding on to their (radical) 
positions. Nor do the DMOs plant new values, rather they rely on moderating 
their values so they fit with the values that already are well established within 
Norwegian society. Also mentioned in chapter 2.4 were the four processes of 
identity construction, but as these only concerned individuals adapting their 
identity to fit the movement (Snow and McAdam 2000: 49), they are not 
applicable in our case. This state of affairs poses the question of how we should 
describe the identity framing process, which the three DMOs clearly are engaged 
in. 
As I see it the problem can be approached in two opposing ways. The first would 
claim that through distancing themselves the DMOs attempt to become more 
acceptable to ‘normal’ or ‘average’ people. From this perspective it seems as if 
there are forces – practical and cultural – pulling the DMOs from their radical 
positions toward normality or conformism. From a different perspective, 
however, the DMOs are not pushed into moderation, they have always been 
moderate. As we saw in chapter 2, when comparing the attitudes of ordinary 
people and environmentalists, the Bergen Group could find little difference 
between the two groups (Grendstad et al. 2006: 85). Instead, then, the distancing 
could be seen as  challenging stereotypes that ‘wrongly’ paint the DMOs as 
outside of the moderate sphere, their rightful place. Before I discuss these two 
perspectives further it is necessary to clarify the different senses  of the term 
‘moderate’ here employed. In chapter 2.3 we saw that the Bergen Group 
connected the moderate form of environmentalism to the two anomalies called 
the ‘state-friendly society’ and ‘local community perspective’. The two feed into 
each other, but for our purposes it makes sense to distinguish between political 
moderation (the state friendly society), and ideological moderation (the local 
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community perspective). Since the stereotypes do not involve the relation to the 
state, what we are concerned with is ideological moderation.28
Here I want to make three points. First, even if Norwegian environmentalists 
have moderate attitudes in comparison with the rest of the public, this does not 
mean that the policies of the DMOs by necessity are moderate. Regarding, e.g., 
hydropower in the case of NNV, and meat consumption in the case of FIVH, the 
environmental DMOs decidedly have policies that differ from the Norwegian 
mainstream. Second, the informants clearly understand the situation in terms of 
the first perspective. For them the stereotypes, as  we have seen, have a root in 
reality. In both NNV and FIVH there are explicit strategies in place that have the 
intended effect of moderating their image. This  is  not to say that the DMOs all 
have radical agendas. The point is that the informants  see their organizations as 
having more radical agendas than the public. Third, the moderation which the 
informants are describing is not total. They claim that even if they moderate their 
image, they can still pursue a more radical agenda. In the words of a FIVH-
informant: “[…] the level of ambition shall still be as high.” (Informant 6). 
The informants want their DMOs to be seen as broad and inclusive, while they at 
the same time want to be perceived as ideologically uncompromising. In the case 
of FOLVS the dynamic is different, as the organization has little to gain by 
keeping an elitist identity. But both FIVH and NNV seem to want to have their 
cake and eat it too. Such a description is a bit imprecise, however. What the 
distancing from the stereotypes  reveals is that the process which the DMOs seem 
to be undergoing is  better described as a form of frame negotiation, where the 
DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda (which they perceive to be more 
radical) to fit a more moderate image. On the one hand, the DMOs are motivated 
by an urgent need to find adequate solutions to environmental problems of 
sometimes  overwhelming proportions, such as global warming. On the other 
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28 As a side note, it  is interesting in itself that none of the informants mentioned any 
stereotypes applicable to the close relation the DMOs have with the state. 
hand, there are practical and cultural forces pulling these DMOs toward moderate 
positions. First, as we have seen, the DMOs orient themselves after the culturally 
specific image of folkebevegelse. This  orientation, however, is not just a cultural 
relic, but is mirrored in their practical reliance on the participation of ‘the 
people’ for funding, clout, and legitimacy. In order to convince ‘the people’ to 
participate in their campaigns they have to negotiate their position in relation to 
them. As described by the Bergen Group it is not only the environmentalists, but 
the Norwegian people as a whole who are steeped in “[…] the national ideal of 
the local self-reliant community.” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 21). This ideal provides 
the cultural context of both the DMOs’ interpretation of their own environmental 
agenda, and ‘the people’s’ moderate environmental leaning. Drawing on the 
image of a folkebevegelse, the DMOs must balance their environmental agenda 
with the more pragmatic orientation of the Norwegian people, inspired by the 
local community perspective. In contrast to the Bergen Group, who claims that 
the Norwegian environmental field is moderate, I want to emphasis the 
continuing process of negotiated moderation the DMOs are engaged in. As the 
stereotypes reveal, this  is an ongoing process, with strategic elements. The NEM 
DMOs, then, want to be broad, inclusive folkebevegelser, but they also want to 
champion environmental causes that are outside of the Norwegian mainstream. 
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks
In this thesis I have tried to answer the question of how the Norwegian 
environmental DMOs understand the relation between their own organizations 
and ‘the people’. Given both a set of recent developments  in the Norwegian 
environmental sector, including institutionalization, professionalization, and new 
forms of participation; as  well as the fact that the DMOs need public support in 
order to achieve their objectives, the question seemed a pertinent one. In order to 
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answer it I have analyzed interview material from 12 informants from NNV, 
FIVH, and FOLVS. Through keeping close to the source material the analysis 
focused on describing the shared understanding between the informants, but not 
to the point of omitting dissenting opinions. A review of the relevant literature on 
NEM revealed that the study of the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’ 
has mainly revolved around assessing whether NEM conforms to the definition 
of a social movement or a folkebevegelse. The fact that neither of these 
definitions  were found to be fitting posed several questions, which I now will 
attempt to answer in turn. 
In the first question I will address it was asked how far Norwegian 
environmentalism has progressed into a dual-organizational society. In terms of 
the sector as  a whole, our data material is insufficient for providing a complete 
answer. But, as we saw in chapter 5, from the DMO-informants’ perspective, 
because the grassroots level is perceived as still having a salient influence on the 
operation of the DMOs, there is little to indicate a further movement toward a 
dual-organizational society, at least within the DMOs. The second question 
asked: What kind of movement is the Norwegian environmental movement if it 
is  not a folkebevegelse? The reason the Bergen Group rejected the term was 
primarily on the count of the organizations’ limited size. Apart from that, 
however, the term would fit the DMOs reasonably well. The DMO-informants 
draw on the image of a folkebevegelse when describing their own organizations. 
This involved emphasizing the importance of grassroots engagement, and, as we 
saw in chapter 6, having an inclusive identity and seeking broad popular appeal. 
In addition, on a topic present in the interview material, but not explored in detail 
in this thesis, the informants expressed a cooperative attitude towards the state, 
even if they challenged many of the state’s decisions. The last point, on the lack 
of an adversarial character, means that the DMOs would not be considered as a 
proper social movement (see e.g.: Dryzek et al. 2003: 27). Nevertheless, the 
DMOs do show other characteristics associated with the SMT-tradition’s 
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conception of a social movement. Like we saw in chapter 5, the informants 
perceive their organizations as part of an integrated network of environmental 
actors, miljøbevegelsen. The DMOs, then, combine features from both the 
traditional Norwegian conception of folkebevegelse, and from the SMT-tradition. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the most prominent features of these 
movement conceptions – the size of a folkebevegelse, the adversarial character 
and distinct identity of a social movement – was not associated with the DMOs.
The third question – How should the relation between ‘the people’ and the 
Norwegian environmental DMOs be assessed? – is  obviously related to the one 
answered above. But I will also add that the relation should be viewed as a 
process of negotiated moderation. As we saw in chapter 2, the Bergen Group 
characterizes the sector as moderate, both politically and ideologically. But they 
focus on the environmental field as a whole, thus omitting the role identity can 
play in connection with single organizations. Further, Kapstad sees the identity 
problematic in terms of the individual participant, not in terms of the collective 
or in relation to the specific context of the organization. The way organizational 
identity operates in relation to the DMOs context was in our case explored 
through the phenomenon of stereotypes. Through the stereotype analysis we 
could see that the DMOs engage in a negotiation process where their radical 
aspirations and agenda had to fit a more moderate image in order to appeal to 
‘the people’.
The analysis  has shown that despite the differences  between the three 
organizations in terms of history, development, size, and focus, the Norwegian 
environmental DMOs under study exhibit similarities  in the three areas  of 
analysis. The DMOs value popular participation and relate to the same 
Norwegian understanding of what a movement is. Their roles in relation to the 
people show great similarities as they are all concerned with assisting activism. 
The negative stereotypes  associated with them are all variants  of the same 
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stereotype, and the way they react to their negative image is  also broadly similar. 
These similarities are best viewed as imprints of the shared context of their 
operation. 
The exploratory approach followed in this thesis has enabled us to give a 
description of the Norwegian DMOs in terms of their movement connection and 
identity. The approach we have followed is, however, not without its  problems, 
and I will end the thesis on some methodological considerations. First of all, the 
findings  are based on a non-representative selection of informants. This has 
yielded insights into the workings  of the organizations. It is nevertheless 
important to note that when I have used the phrasing ‘the informants say/claim/
understand’ in the plural, it might in some cases only have indicated that two 
informants held that opinion. This is not necessarily discrediting in itself, 
especially when the informants were not randomly selected, but purposefully 
sought out because of their familiarity with the topic. However, to see if the 
understandings here described are as  widespread as  the impression given from 
the small pool of informants  here relied on, the findings must be confirmed with 
more extensive surveys of other central actors within the organizations. The 
findings  could also have been strengthened through the process of triangulation, 
with a more extensive use of secondary material, such as official documents. The 
thesis  should in this  regard be viewed as a first step into exploring how the 
DMOs understand the relation between themselves and ‘the people’. 
Second, the interpretation of the informants’ understanding was reached through 
examining their statements, piecing the statements together thematically and 
organizing them in a coherent fashion with each organizational context in mind. 
First of all, this means that my interpretation does not necessarily reflect how the 
organizations present themselves officially. This does not have to be problematic, 
in fact, it could be seen as a virtue of the undertaking as it provides a view under 
the hood of the organization. A serious methodological problem does emerge 
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however, from this approach. By attempting to reveal the shared understanding 
among the informants, the limit between what the informants say and what the 
interpreter brings to the table gets blurred. The process of looking at 
commonalities and illustrating that through the selection of quotes risks imposing 
a direction to the material. This  is  perhaps  an unavoidable feature of such an 
interpretive approach, but also one I, to the best of my ability, have tried to 
minimize by keeping close to the source material. 
The last shortcoming I will describe here lies in the thesis’ relatively exclusive 
focus on the form of environmentalism, as opposed to its content. The two are 
obviously interlinked and inform each other. The analysis would have been 
greatly improved if it also could have provided a deeper description of 
ideological and cultural factors  impinging on the topic. But, even if there were 
place to include it, a focus on ideology was  never a part of the idea behind the 
thesis, and, consequently, was not represented in the interview material. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide
Introduksjon
- Kan du kort fortelle meg hva din rolle i organisasjonen er?
- Hva vil du si er de viktigste målene og oppgavene til organisasjonen du 
jobber i?
- Hvordan bidrar du til å oppnå disse målene?
Aktør og Strategi
- Hvordan vil du beskrive din organisasjons rolle? I samfunnet/ som politisk 
aktør? 
- På hvilken måte jobber din organisasjon (som helhet) for å oppnå målene 
sine?
- Hva er de viktigste strategiene dere bruker for å få gjennomslag for målene?
- Har er styrkene og svakhetene?
- Har disse strategiene endret seg? Er de i behov for å endres?
- Hva er grunnen til at dere har valgt disse og ikke andre strategier?
- Hvilken rolle spiller «folket» i disse strategiene?
Folket
- Hvilken rolle spiller din organisasjon overfor det brede lag av folket? 
- Hvor viktig er det med en bred folkelig støtte?
- Kan man klare seg uten?
- Hvordan går dere fram for å mobilisere folk?
- Er organisasjonen din (en del av) en folkebevegelse?
- I hvor stor grad har dere prøvd å bygge opp en massebevegelse?
- Vil dere endre på folket? Forbedre det?
- Er dere redde for å støte fra dere noen? 
- Hvem er det som hører på dere?
- Hvordan blir dere oppfattet av folket? Har de fordommer?
- Påvirker dette hvordan dere legger opp kampanjer/strategier?
 
Medlemsmassen
- Hvilken rolle har din organisasjon overfor medlemmene deres?
- Hvordan vil du beskrive medlemsaktiviteten i organisasjonen deres?
- På hvilken måte har dere forsøkt å involvere medlemmene i aktivitetene 
deres?
- Hvor viktig er det med en aktiv medlemsbase?
- I hvor stor grad har dere lykkes med å aktivisere medlemmer?
- I hvor stor grad har dere prøvd å skape en bred bevegelse?
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- Er det store forskjeller i aktivitetsnivå mellom ledelsen/de mest aktive og det 
vanlige medlemmet?
Informasjon
- Hvilken rolle har informasjonsspredning i arbeidet deres?
- Ser dere på dere selv som en folkeopplyser? 
- I hvor stor grad lykkes dere? 
- Har dere spesielle målgrupper dere forsøker å nå?
- Vinkler dere sakene på en spesiell måte? Flere måter? Hvilke?
- Er det noen fallgruver når dere kommuniserer i media? med folk?
Oppsummering
- Hvis du skal oppsummere:
- Hva er det som gjør at deres  mål får gjennomslag og hva er det som hindrer 
gjennomslag?
- Hvilke strategier opplever dere som virkningsfulle?
- Hvilke kampanjer opplever dere som virkningsfulle?
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